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Abstract
i
In the last decade London and Mexico City have suffered from perceived poor air quality 
due to increased concentrations of road transport emissions. Current data on mortality rates 
show that in 1991 a wintertime pollution episode in London contributed to 100-180 
premature deaths; similarly, it is said that high levels of pollution in Mexico City during 
1990 contributed to an estimated total number of 6,400 excess deaths. In addition, the 
number of health studies on morbidity in these two cities shows that air pollution has 
produced adverse effects on the health and well-being of their inhabitants. Linder London 
and Mexico City’s air quality situation local authorities play a crucial role for addressing 
and tackling this urban environmental problem.
This thesis examines air quality management and diverse models of local government 
organisation. By adopting a comparative approach, the analysis focuses on how diverse 
local government structures operate in relation to air pollution control from the perspective 
of local and central authorities and other key agencies. The purpose of this research is to 
combine analysis of the impact of political and institutional changes for air quality 
management looking at two local case-studies: London and Mexico City. The main 
objective is to contribute to the understanding of local government studies as well as of air 
quality policy research. Theoretically, the research outlines the debates on reorganising 
local government by focusing on three perspectives which offer diverse explanations to 
urban environmental problems: orthodox public administration model, public choice 
theory, and the local governance approach. The main argument considers the need for both 
an upper-tier area-wide coordinating authority and lower-tier politically fragmented 
government units at the local level for improving air quality and thus in both urban centres.
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Introduction
“One o f today's ‘buzz’ words is ‘megacity' (over 10 millions), and Mexico City 
with almost 15 millions in 1990 is certainly mega-big...if one is sensible and 
reasonably sensitive, then it is not a particularly dangerous city. Nor is it an 
easy city in which to live permanently. People often challenge me and ask, 
‘Would you want to live permanently in Mexico City?'. ‘Hell, no!', I  reply, but 
then nor do I  want to live in London, New York or any other large metropolitan 
area where many o f the same hassles and problems apply”.
Peter Ward (1990) in the first edition o f his 
book ‘Mexico City'.
1.1 Introduction: aims and objectives
This thesis examines urban environmental management and diverse models of local 
government organisation. The analysis focuses on air quality management! from the 
perspective of local and central authorities, and other key agencies in the context of how 
different local government structures influence the capacity to address and ameliorate this 
urban environmental problem.
The purpose of this research is to combine analysis of the impact of political and 
institutional changes for air quality management with the analysis of two local case-studies 
(London and Mexico City) in the light of the emerging urban environmental concerns of the 
1990s. The main objective is to contribute to the understanding of local government studies 
as well as of air quality policy research. This is explored by adopting a comparative 
approach looking at two different systems of local government and their response to air 
pollution.
1 The terms ‘air quality management’ and ‘air pollution control’ are used interchangeably in the vast 
academic literature on air quality. Likewise, this thesis uses these two terms interchangeably. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that ‘air quality management’ is the currently preferred policy term.
2Conceptually, this research outlines the debates on reforming local government by focusing 
on three perspectives which offer different solutions or explanations to urban 
environmental problems: orthodox public administration model, public choice theory, and 
the local governance approach. This is because this thesis attempts to distinguish the 
advantages and disadvantages of each model for reorganising local government to improve 
air quality. The main argument considers the need for both an upper-tier area-wide 
coordinating authority and lower-tier politically fragmented authorities at the local level for 
managing air quality.
1.2 Rationale of the study
This thesis is an exploration of urban environmental issues, a major reason being that until 
now, research within environmental studies has concentrated on the preservation of natural 
resources or the ‘Green Agenda’ and has recently turned to recognise urban environmental 
issues or the ‘Brown Agenda’ (Gilbert et al 1996: 13-14; Serageldin & Cohen 1995: 1; 
WB 1994: 32). The importance of urban areas at the fore of the environmental debate has 
been increasingly recognised due to the positive and negative effects they have on the 
natural environment (see, for example, Breheny 1992b: 277; Haughton & Hunter 1994: 1; 
Stren 1992a: 1). While the need to adopt a comprehensive or integrated approach to urban 
environmental problems means including key aspects such as public policies, political will, 
private sector involvement, social participation, government intervention at all levels, and 
so forth, this research addresses just one of these variables: local government intervention 
(see, for example, Breheny & Rookwood 1993: 150; Keating 1993: ix). The reason for 
this is because local governments, increasingly embedded now as one of the key 
components of local governance, have been recognised as crucial for promoting, designing 
and implementing urban environmental policies as well as acting as mechanisms for 
enhancing individual participation (Blowers 1993b: 16-17; Gilbert et al 1996: 24-28; 
Gordon 1993: 13; Johnston & Pattie 1996: 672; UNCHS 1996a: 161). Having said this, 
the identification of the way in which local governments intervene in urban centres becomes 
a crucial point. That is to say, the manner in which local governments are organised needs 
to be addressed and revised (see Haughton & Hunter 1994: 300-303; OECD 1990: 38-43; 
WCED 1987: 243-247).
Reviewing the organisation of local government has traditionally implied analysing such 
aspects as the organisational structures or units of government, functional allocation, 
democracy and accountability, finance of local authorities, and the question of central-local
3government relations (see, for example, Barlow 1991: 10; Rhodes 1980: 574). The 
organisational structure issue (particularly in terms of size and boundaries) has been given 
special consideration among local government organisation studies. So, for example, 
according to Humes and Martin (1969: 34) the structure of local government is relevant in 
as much as it represents “the framework within which local [and central] public policy is 
determined and implemented”. Furthermore, it has been argued that,
“the structure is perhaps the most important determinant of 
the nature of local government and administration and of the 
way in which it functions”
(Leemans 1970: 51).
Over the last few years, it has been similarly stated that devoting more attention to diverse 
aspects of local government, especially regarding organisational structures, would 
significantly contribute to the understanding of and designing solutions to the problems of 
local governance (see, for example, Humes IV 1991: xi; Rowat 1980: xv). Discussing the 
organisation of local government thus needs to consider both the units or structures 
themselves and the other subjects of traditional study of local government, such as finance, 
functions, governmental interrelations, accountability, and so on (Humes & Martin 1969: 
34-35; Leemans 1970: 29; Rhodes 1980: 572-574).
This research focuses on two main areas of current local government organisation studies. 
First, it concentrates on the description and analysis of what the academic literature has 
identified as organisational structures (also known as institutional arrangements or units of 
local government) and of other traditional aspects (particularly functional allocation, and 
intra- and inter-governmental relations) (see, for example, Barlow 1991; Bish & Ostrom 
1973; Gunlicks 1981; Hesse & Sharpe 1990/91: 603-604; Humes & Martin 1969; Leemans 
1970; Wolman 1995). Second, it also concentrates on the analysis and description of key 
actors that in the past were not thought of or simply were not actually involved in the 
process of governing metropolitan areas. These other actors include special-purpose or ad 
hoc authorities, non-governmental organisations, the private sector, and diverse forms of 
public participation. The reasons for including these actors in today’s local government 
studies, are due to the changing conditions and values in society and because of the 
importance that the emerging issues on local urban environmental governance2 currently 
have (Gilbert et al 1996: 16; Humes IV 1991: xi; Jones & O’Donnell 1980: 541; 
Serageldin & Cohen 1995: 12-15).
2 For an explanation of the term ‘governance’ at the city level, see Chapter III.
4While discussion on the organisation of local government has been the subject of much 
debate in developed countries, it has only recently become evident in developing countries 
(Leemans 1970: 13; McCamey 1996d: 5; Rowat 1980: 375). In the North, the debate on 
how to organise local government has developed particularly in the USA and Britain in this 
last century. The traditional discourse on reforming local government - mainly concentrated 
on organisational structures - has focused on the issues of size and area of local 
government (see Barlow 1991: 8-10). In the United States, for example, the debate on 
improving urban government in the last century was dominated by the centralised views 
and recommendations espoused by the consolidationist school - also known as the reform 
movement - which advocated large scale units of government (Gunlicks 1981: 11). It was 
not until the late 1960s, and particularly during the 1970s, that a decentralised and 
alternative logical-deductive model - public choice theory - started to use concepts and 
methods from economics in order to explain urban governments’ behaviour. This theory 
has focused on individual preferences and on diverse nature of goods and services rather 
than on the organisation structure (Bish & Ostrom 1973: 17; Dunleavy 1991: 147). In 
Britain, the academic debate on favouring large scale units of government - initiated by 
William Robson (1939) - blossomed during the post-war period. The emerging ‘New 
Right’ ideology of the 1970s, though, started challenging the idea of large-scale or 
metropolitan government. This ideology favoured political fragmentation whereby local 
communities and private sector would widen their participation (see John 1990: 18-19; 
King 1995: 236-238)..
During the 1980s and 1990s, the debate on reforming the structures of local government 
has continued. There are two trends, though, that seem to characterise these last years of 
debate among Western democracies. First, although there seems to have been a retreat of 
the idea of metropolitan government, it has been argued that the metro model is far from 
dead and that it has actually come back onto the political agenda, especially in countries like 
Britain (see Barlow 1991: 36; Keating 1995: 118; Sharpe 1995b: 22). Second, the debate 
on confronting diverse models of government during the last decades - i.e. consolidation vs 
fragmentation - has increasingly started to shift towards new avenues of discussion which 
are closely related to the issues of local governance and urban sustainability. The latter has 
been manifested through a change in the focus of debate over the role local authorities 
currently have. So, while within local government and governance studies there is an 
increased call for local authorities generally to think of themselves as ‘enablers’ rather than 
as ‘direct’ providers of services, within urban sustainability studies the recommendations 
are similarly for local authorities to increasingly act as enablers, coordinators and
5facilitators of environmental strategies and policies (Haughton & Hunter 1994: 300; 
Wolman 1995: 153-158).
In countries of the South, the debate on reforming local government also developed during 
the post-war period, but at a very slow pace. It is, actually, much more difficult to 
generalise in less developed countries on the type of debate surrounding local government 
organisation. As explained by Rowat (1980: 376) because developing countries are spread 
around the world and have different histories with diverse conditions, a generalisation of 
the nature of their reorganisations becomes difficult to make. In spite of this, it is possible 
to depict some common characteristics from a historical point of view. For instance, due to 
Western imperialism and colonialism diverse systems of local government of the North 
have been imposed to developing countries over the last centuries. As countries in the 
South became independent, they have either inherited the same colonial system of local 
government or tried to introduce new structures as a result of changed political conditions 
(see also, Leemans 1970: 13). In many cases, the reform of local government has taken 
place because a new state system of government at the central level has been adopted. The 
latter, in turn, has oftenly been a copy - frequently distorted - of other existing models of 
central, and consequently, of local government in the North. Overall, local government has 
been a neglected tier of government in the development effort (McCamey 1996d: 5).
The organisation of local government in the South has often been reviewed either through 
regions - Africa, North America, South America, Asia (see, for example, Alderfer 1964; 
Humes & Martin 1969; Mawhood 1993; McCamey 1996a and 1996c) - or through systems 
of local government - French, Germanic, Soviet, British models (see, for example, Humes 
IV 1991). Very few have actually reviewed local government organisation by 
distinguishing them within the unitary and federal systems of state government dichotomy 
(see Rowat 1973).
The origins for the discourse on local government organisation in countries of the South 
has not been the issue of scale-enlargement as it has happened in the North. Rather, the 
debate on local government reform has focused on the political reliability of the system 
itself in terms of social and economic development, democracy and public participation, 
and political rights (see Akin Aina et al 1991: 4-6; Leemans 1970: 13). Although some 
debate on organisational structures has actually taken place at the metropolitan level, there 
exists an enormous gap in the academic literature in this area. In Latin America, for 
example, the debate on the general issue of local government organisation is scarce - let 
alone on the detail of structural arrangements. This is partly because the issues of
6democracy and political rights in urban centres have overshadowed those of city 
management, and partly because large or mega cities started to appear only during the 
1960s and 1970s (see Richardson 1993: 48-54).
Within the debate on local government organisation in countries of the North and of the 
South, seldom has there been an attempt to revise diverse proposals or models for reform 
in the context of the emerging urban environmental demands of the 1990s. This gap in the 
academic literature exists despite the fact that much of the understanding and scientific 
progress on local governments can develop from doing comparative studies; yet, such 
studies have not been recurrently done (see Fried & Rabinovitz 1980: 19; Hesse & Sharpe 
1990/91: 603; Humes IV 1991: x-xi; Rhodes 1980: 563; Rowat 1980: xiii). Hence, this 
research seeks to foster the understanding of urban government in developed and less 
developed countries by comparing two different local government organisations: Greater 
London and Mexico City. In doing so, it also aims at reducing the existing gap on 
comparative local government organisation studies. In order to achieve the latter, the thesis 
carries out a pragmatic, empirically-based-analyses of the two localities in the context of 
their own governmental systems. Given the differences between each city, key 
governmental characteristics (e.g. constitutional status, democracy, accountability, ad hoc 
agencies, and so on) pose some difficulties of comparative analysis as they have diverse 
connotations and play different roles in each of them. Nevertheless, while comparing local 
government has always represented analytical puzzles, especially within a North-South 
context, the scale of these two world cities brings some generic problems of local 
administration and urban environmental issues. As Fried and Rabinovitz (1980: 19) argue 
“readers can learn much about urban problems by studying them comparatively”. The 
theoretical justification for comparing London and Mexico City is because the former is 
currently a system of government with a simple, single tier of 33 unitary authorities with no 
city-wide authority, and the latter consists of a highly centralised, city-wide and mayor­
headed local authority. Analysing these two different systems of urban government is, in 
itself, a major justification for doing comparative studies and thus advancing the 
understanding of local government systems.
Among the existing urban environmental problems in cities, the research focuses on urban 
air pollution. This is because air pollution has been a significant environmental problem in 
urban centres over the last decades. According to Elsom (1996: 1) urban air pollution 
currently is one of the major problems in developed and developing countries as it threatens 
the health and well-being of about one-half of the world’s urban population. In fact, the 
UN Centre for Human Settlements HABITAT (UNCHS 1996a: 143) has categorised air
7pollution, together with water pollution, the collection and management of solid wastes, 
and noise pollution, as one of the four most serious city-wide environmental problems.
Much of the existing literature on air quality management issues in urban centres has 
actually concentrated on describing the cases of diverse cities in different countries but have 
not always included a serious empirically-based comparative approach. Among the few 
comparative exercises at a worldwide or regional level some of the most important are 
Bennet (1991); Medina & Quenel (1993) Murley (1991); OECD (1995); WHO/UNEP 
(1992). Other relevant studies have included two, three or four specific case-studies, such 
as Bridges (1995); Elsom (1996); Eskeland etal (1994); Levinson & Shetty (1992); UN 
(1984). The subjects of study within such comparative frameworks have mainly addressed 
policy measures and air pollutants effects on human health as well as air quality standards, 
monitoring systems, legal regimes, and statistical information. None the less, little has been 
done in relation to how a particular type of local government organisation within the 
process of urban governance can contribute to ameliorate such a problem.
1.3 Thesis structure
Chapter I provides a general view of the research introducing the reader to the aims and 
objectives, the rationale of the study, the thesis structure, and the methodological approach.
Chapter II provides a descriptive and analytical insight into the main environmental issues 
that are addressed in the thesis. The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it gives an 
introductory summary of the most relevant events that have taken place within the 
environmental debate in countries of the North and the South of the last decades. Second, it 
centres on the topic of the thesis: urban air pollution. In so doing, it briefly examines the 
origins and consequences of air pollution at the local, national and global levels, as well as 
portraying the scale of the problem in the two case-studies: London and Mexico City.
Chapter IP examines the role of local governments within an urban environmental context 
as well as considering the theoretical debates on reforming their organisational structures. 
The argument centres on the need for an area-wide coordinating authority at the local 
government level (without excluding lower tier authorities’ participation) for dealing with 
air quality management issues. The main purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it 
stresses the importance of local governments as essential components for governing urban 
centres. Second, it outlines the debates on reforming local government by focusing on three 
different perspectives: orthodox public administration model, public choice theory, and the
8local governance approach. The main objective in this section is to confront the advantages 
and disadvantages of each model for reorganising local government to bring about 
improved air quality.
Chapter IV has two main purposes. First, it aims to bring into a comparative framework the 
main local structural arrangements in London and Mexico City. In doing so, it describes 
and analyses the current organisation of local government in each case-study by examining 
such number of variables as geographical areas, population, functional allocation, finance, 
democracy and accountability, and so on. Second, it discusses variants of local government 
systems by distinguishing the two case-studies: London and Mexico City. This part seeks 
to identify from a historical perspective both, the debates and experiences on governmental 
reform that London and Mexico City have undergone over the last decades, and the 
relationship of their governmental structures with air pollution control. While highlighting 
the metropolitan government response to air pollution, the main purpose of this chapter is 
to pull the two cities into a single scheme of interpretation.
Chapter V brings into comparative perspective the viewpoints of London and Mexico 
City’s local authorities regarding local government organisational structures and air quality 
management issues. This chapter analyses in a comparative fashion various air pollution 
and local government issues based on a survey (structured interviews) carried out with 
local authorities in both urban centres (see Appendices I & Et). It also seeks to review the 
lessons that can be learned from each case-study according to their systems of local 
government and air quality management strategies in the light of the three approaches 
outlined in Chapter III.
Chapter VI examines the viewpoints of central and local government authorities, London- 
wide agencies, and other key actors (e.g. non-governmental organisations) on London’s 
government structural organisation in relation to air pollution control. The analysis of how 
air quality management works in London includes such issues as air quality monitoring 
systems, transportation and traffic management, and the application of an eventual 
emergency plan (see Appendix I). This chapter seeks to make reference to the relevance of 
the empirical information provided to the three approaches of local government.
Likewise, Chapter VII examines the viewpoints of central and local government 
authorities, and other key policy actors on the organisational structures of local government 
in Mexico City regarding air pollution control. The analysis of how air quality management 
works in Mexico City similarly includes such’issues as air quality monitoring systems,
9transportation and traffic management, and the application of the existing emergency plan 
(see Appendix II). It also makes reference to diverse points of the empirical material in 
relation to the three perspectives outlined in Chapter IE.
Finally, Chapter VIII gives an overall view of the main findings (differences and 
similarities) of the research. A brief section on further avenues for research is included in 
this last chapter.
1.4 Methodology: intensive and extensive methods
This research makes joint use of two techniques known within the social sciences as 
intensive and extensive research designs. Their roles in this research are complementary 
rather than competing (see Harre 1979: 134; Sayer 1992: 246).
1.4.1 Semi-structured questionnaires: the face-to-face interviews
The discussion and analysis of the data presented in Chapters VI and VII, are grounded in 
qualitative methods following a technique known within the social sciences as intensive 
research design (Harre 1979: 132-134; Sayer 1992: 241-251; Sayer & Morgan 1985: 150- 
157). As it has been argued that there is no standard approach for conducting qualitative 
research (see Bryman & Burgess 1994: 12-13), this research uses an intensive method 
because this technique provides for explanatory penetration and substantial causal analysis 
essential for the purposes of the research (Sayer & Morgan 1985: 152-153).
In order to identify the key issues surrounding air pollution control and its governmental 
response, the research develops a method which allows in-depth understanding and a 
powerful explanatory mechanism. As with any other intensive research approach, the aim 
in Chapters VI and VII is not full ‘representativeness’ or ‘replicability’, but rather 
corroboration and enrichment of information about a particular event cited by identifiable 
individuals (Maseey & Meegan 1985: 146; Sayer 1992: 244; Sayer & Morgan 1985: 156). 
In order to facilitate the comparative analysis, the method followed in London and Mexico 
City was as similar as possible for both cases. This method consisted on elaborating and 
carrying out semi-structured interviews with central and local government authorities, non­
governmental organisations and other key policy makers involved in air quality 
management.
In the case of London, the arguments in Chapter VI are developed from the analysis of
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thirteen semi-structured in terview s3  with key policy makers carried out in London during 
the period November 1994 - May 1995. The latter is complemented by four updating or 
second interviews carried out during the years of 1995 and 1996 and by a number of 
informal discussions with other air quality management participants. Additionally, several 
visits to air quality manual and real time monitoring sites were also included as part of the 
fieldwork (see Appendix I).
The semi-structured interviews were carried out in two stages. The first stage of data 
collection included tape-recorded interviews with central government authorities, non­
governmental organisations, and London-wide agencies. During this stage interviewees 
were selected one-by-one as the research proceeded and as a causal group of individuals 
was identified. During the second stage, while the semi-structured interviews were not 
tape-recorded and targeted only local authorities in London, the latter were identified 
through an initial structured questionnaire survey (see 1.4.2). The selection of local officers 
in different boroughs for intensive investigation was based upon the job characteristics of 
the informants and on the answers given from the survey questionnaires. These, in turn, 
related first to the geographical setting of the borough since the research seeks to identify 
the causal relations and responses of local officers from diverse physical locations across 
London. The main idea was to collect and corroborate information about common practices 
from local authorities. Second, it related to the type of job held by the interviewee, that is to 
say, whether a Divisional Environmental Health Officer, a Pollution Inspector, a Built 
Environment Director, or so on. This is because the research aims at exploring and 
explaining how local authorities with different ranks connect or interact with one another 
and with the rest of the interviewees. Finally, the interest showed by some local authorities 
through the survey questionnaires also influenced the criteria for selecting the interviewees. 
This interest was reflected by the written explanations to open-ended questions and by the 
official publications enclosed in the answered surveys. The findings concerning their 
interrelationships are presented in Chapters V and VI.
Likewise, in the case of Mexico City, the arguments in Chapter VII are developed from the 
analysis of sixteen semi-structured interviews with key policy makers carried out in Mexico 
City during the period May - September 1995. The latter is complemented by two updating 
or second interviews carried out during the years of 1996 and 1997 and by a number of
3 During the fieldwork period, I had access to few interviews that were carried out for an ESRC funded 
project called “Metropolitan Governance & Community Study”. The development of the arguments include 
these few interviews as they are relevant for the research.
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informal discussions with other air quality management participants. Several visits to air 
quality manual and real time monitoring sites were also included as part of the fieldwork 
(see Appendix II). The data collection included tape-recorded interviews with central and 
local government authorities, non-govemmental organisations, and other key policy makers 
regarding air pollution control. As with the case-study in London, interviewees in Mexico 
City were selected one-by-one as the research proceeded and as a causal group of 
individuals was identified. Mexico City’s local authorities at the lower-tier were not 
interviewed because air pollution functions at the local level belong to Mexico City’s local 
authorities at the upper-tier.
1.4.2 The survey: structured questionnaires
In order to complement the analysis of the semi-structured questionnaires, the research also 
uses a technique known within the social sciences as extensive research design (Harre 
1979: 132-133; Massey & Meegan 1985: 145; Sayer 1992: 241-251). The main aim of this 
was to increase and collect further data on air quality management issues through structured 
questionnaires. The reason for using this design is because this research seeks to discover 
some of the common properties and general patterns of a particular population (see Sayer 
1992: 242), namely, local authorities. Thus, these type of questionnaires targeted local 
authorities at the lower tier level in both cities.
The motivation for choosing such a particular population or members of the same class, i.e. 
lower-tier local authorities, is due to the need for more empirically-based research within 
local government studies, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The sample seeks, like any 
other extensive research design, to be representative of a whole population where answers 
or results can be averaged or abstracted as a type due to some common properties of the 
population (see Harre 1979: 133; Sayer 1992: 244-245). This extensive study comprises 
principally formal relations of similarity and dissimilarity rather than substantial relations of 
connection. It is useful as a descriptive background making comparison possible not only 
among the same members of the class but between the chosen populations of London and 
Mexico City (see Massey & Meegan 1985: 146; Sayer 1992: 245; Sayer & Morgan 1985: 
152-153).
The analysis of the structured questionnaires with local authorities in London - boroughs - 
and in Mexico City - delegaciones - is presented in Chapter V. In both cities, the 
questionnaires targeted local authorities involved in environmental or pollution control 
issues related to a greater or lesser degree to air quality management regardless of the name
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of the office or unit they are allocated. In the case of London, responses were obtained 
from twenty nine borough officers such as Environmental Health Officers, Pollution 
Inspectors, Senior Technicians (Pollution Sections), Built Environment Director, and so 
on. In Mexico City, the completed questionnaires were obtained from all sixteen 
delegaciones that include Heads of Environmental Offices or Administrative Units, Urban 
Development Units, Social and Cultural Services Offices, and so forth (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 Local authorities interviewed through structured questionnaires
LONDON M EX ICO  CITY
No. of local authorities 32 boroughs + City of London 16 delegaciones
Interviews 29 16
No response 4 -
Source: Author’s survey
Overall, it was possible to interrogate the results of this extensive method with those of the 
intensive one, and viceversa (see below). This kind of ‘triangulation’ between interviewees 
and respondents is analysed in Chapters V, VI and VII.
1.4.3 Methodological limitations
The methodological limitations in this research are basically those that are commonly found 
in other investigations that use intensive and extensive techniques (see, for example, 
Harre 1979: 133-134 and 1993: 103-104; Massey & Meegan 1985: 145-146; Sayer 1992: 
241-251; Sayer & Morgan 1985: 152-157). These limitations relate, in the case of the 
intensive design, to the fact that the members that are interviewed, i.e. key policy makers 
regarding air quality management, are not representative of the whole population of the 
same class. This limitation is, however, counterweighed by the great advantage of using an 
intensive approach, namely that many properties of the interviewees are investigated 
together and their structural relations and interactions are ascertained (see Harre 1979: 133- 
134). In the case of the extensive design, the limitations are that the members or 
respondents simply share formal relations of similarity rather than relations of connection. 
The advantage is that it is representative of a population, i.e. lower-tier authorities in both 
cities, and provides at least some results which can be averaged and compared (Harre 1979:
13
133; Sayer 1992: 244-246). While this research ascertains that the explanations in the use 
of the extensive method are incomplete and do not represent its main analytical skeleton, 
they provide useful comparable data that is included to foster the exploration of the 
arguments presented in the thesis.
/
Using both the intensive and extensive designs assists in solving some of the 
methodological limitations each has. As Harre (1979: 134) puts it, “a resolution of the 
difficulty occasioned by the advantages and disadvantages of each method comes by the 
joint use of the extensive and intensive designs”. In the case of London, the use of the 
extensive method helped identify individuals - namely specific London borough authorities 
- which were subsequently subjected to intensive investigation.4 In the case of Mexico 
City, as lower-tier authorities, i.e. delegaciones, have limited air pollution control 
responsibilities and because six of the structured questionnaires were carried out 
interactively, there was no need to follow the process of implementing first the extensive 
method, and then the intensive one as with the case of London.5
Additionally, this research acknowledges the many complex analytical problems of 
assessing the meaning of questions and responses. It is not the aim of this research to 
discuss how to conduct and analyse an interviewing process - i.e. through a stimulus- 
response model, discourse method, and so on (see Mishler 1986: 9-34). The original 
purpose of the interviewing is as Mishler pointed out,
“to understand what respondents mean by what they say in 
response to our queries and thereby to arrive at a description 
of respondent’s worlds of meaning that is adequate to the 
tasks of systematic analysis and theoretical interpretation”
(Mishler 1986:7).
4 In London, of the 33 local authorities subjected to a structured questionnaire survey, seven were identified 
and subjected to a subsequent intensive semi-structured questionnaire. The methodological limitation in 
terms of not interviewing other members of the same borough for corroboration purposes is not necessarily 
a problem because in most cases the interviewees were either the heads of the office or the only responsible 
for intervening on pollution issues.
5 The six lower-tier authorities where some interaction took place during the process of answering or 
commenting on the answers of the surveys were: La Magdalena Contreras, Iztacalco, Benito Judrez, 
Azcapotzalco, Tlalpan, Miguel Hidalgo.
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Thus, the viewpoints of the interviewees expressed and analysed in the thesis are treated as 
causally related individual stories. The understanding, analysis, and explanation of these 
stories is ascertained in each case according to the particular individual’s context in terms of 
their institutional and political interests regarding air pollution control in London and 
Mexico City. Furthermore, the interviewees are seen as policy actors whose responses are 
closely linked to their own personal benefits if and when policy or institutional changes 
take place. The creation of the structures or categories for these explanations is based on 
my own understanding of the issues according to the theoretical framework presented in the 
research.
Finally, it must be noted that the stories presented in the last three chapters are not 
necessarily identified with the official or authoritative views of the agencies or 
governmental units that the interviewees represent.
C H A P T E R  II
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The Environmental Debate and the Problem 
of Urban Air Pollution
“they [my ancestors] told me that there used to be trees, butterflies, that the air 
was pure, the rivers crystalline; they told me that in the past people were humble 
and knew the language o f flowers, and also sang at the sunrise and danced at the 
sunset...[but]...when I  opened my eyes everything had gone: and the only thing I  
could feel, I  could be certain o f  was that our ancestors spoke a common 
language, which the trees speak during the day, and the stars during the night”.
Chamalu (Quechua Indian and 
Andean Shaman).
2.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, environmental issues around the world have gained increasing 
importance within political agendas at the international, national, and local levels (Mannion 
& Bowlby 1992: 17; Thomas 1992: 61). The perception of a current environmental crisis 
stems from the concerns during the 1960s and 1970s - particularly in countries of the North 
- over the depletion of natural resources, the pollution of the environment and the 
associated health impact (Lovell & Johnson 1994: 199; Rees 1991: 1; White 1993: xi-xii; 
Wilson 1984: 3). The predominant worldview during those two decades concerned local or 
regional environmental problems and resource depletion. This shifted during the 1980s to a 
debate on global and common sustainability concerns. During the first half of the 1990s, 
the environmental debate started to focus on urban environmental concerns, particularly on 
the issue of ‘sustainable cities’ or ‘sustainable urban development’. Many older concerns 
with public health in cities has now been subsumed within this urban sustainability agenda. 
Within this discussion much attention has been paid since to the need for diverse forms of 
local action in order to improve environmental conditions in urban centres. This focus on 
local practice has in turn recognised the fundamental role that local governments can play in 
tackling city-wide pollution. Strengthening the participation of local authorities as well as 
creating more efficient, effective, coordinated, and representative structures of local 
government have been highlighted as key issues that need to be addressed when dealing 
with urban environmental issues (see, for example, Gilbert et al 1996: 23-42; Hardoy etal
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1992: 162-164; Haughton & Hunter 1994: 300-303).
As well as giving a summary of some of the principal events and views that have emerged 
within the environmental debate in countries of the North and the South, the aim of this 
chapter is twofold. First, it highlights the need for local action, particularly by local 
authorities, in dealing with urban environmental issues. Second, it focuses on the main 
environmental issue that is addressed in this thesis: urban air pollution. In so doing, it 
briefly examines the origins and consequences of this particular issue at the local, national 
and global levels as well as portraying the scale of the problem in the two case-studies: 
London and Mexico City. The choice of two cities across the North-South divide 
necessitates some consideration of the different forms the environmental debate has taken in 
the North and the South. This is the focus of the next section.
2.2 Environmental debates: the North-South distinction
The terms ‘North’ and ‘South’ usually represent developed and developing countries. 
Within this terminology, it is generally accepted that the ‘North’ consists of North America 
(USA and Canada), Europe (Western), the former Soviet Union, Japan, Australia, and 
New Zealand; the ‘South’ includes the rest of the world’s countries (Pearson & Pryor 
1978: 3-6; White 1993: 3). This distinction between developed and developing countries, 
generally based on economic income grounds (see Keating 1993: ix), can help us to 
understand the diverse origins and views that have evolved within a rapidly expanding 
environmental discourse.
The environmental debates of the late 1960s and early 1970s in countries of the North, 
originated from concerns about preserving the natural landscapes, the impact of toxic 
chemicals, and in particular, from resource depletion (White 1993: 12). The issue of 
scarcity of resources - which became a major issue of concern with the first OPEC oil 
shock (Sandbrook 1984: 12) - led to the discussion on ‘The Limits to Growth’ thesis of the 
Club of Rome which linked projections of population, resources and economic growth (see 
Meadows etal 1972; White 1993: 14). This thesis centred on the Malthusian argument that 
uncontrolled population growth and resource exploitation would be the cause of an 
imminent exhaustion of the human’s stock of natural resources. The environmental debate 
focused on the incompatibility between continued economic growth and environmental 
protection (see Ehrlich 1969; Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1970; Gandy 1993: 10; McCormick 1995: 
80-81; Meadows e ta l  1972). However, it was not until the North realised that 
environmental issues were “indeed global and that concern for environmental quality was 
not exclusively the domain of the rich” (Pearson & Pryor 1978: 1), that it began to 
recognise the need for including the South within the emerging environmental movement. It
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then rapidly became apparent that there was a distinction in the concerns of the North and 
the South. After the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment UNCHE and the 
Cocoyoc Declaration of 1974,1 it was acknowledged that environmental concerns in the 
South were not primarily about the conservation of the countryside, the use of chemical 
toxics, or resource depletion. Rather, the immediate environmental interests of the South 
were related to development problems; that is to say, there was an emphasis on the relations 
between the environment and development. The position of the South toward 
environmental issues has therefore included the ‘basic needs’ and ‘strategies to survive’ 
arguments, as well as socio-cultural and environmental issues such as equity, cultural 
diversity, self-reliance of communities, democracy, and participatory and self-management 
of resources (see, for example, Atkinson 1991: 406-410; Leff 1991: 134-135 and 1995: 
120; Pearson & Pryor 1978: 2-3; Redclift 1984: 46-47; Redclift & Goodman 1991: 4). 
This led various countries in the South to consider the need for a strategy in which an 
environmental dimension would be inserted into the development process. This strategy, 
which emerged during the 1970s from UNCHE and the newly created UNEP, became 
widely known as ‘ecodevelopment’ (see, for example, Branes 1994; Garcia Guadilla 1991; 
Leff 1995; Szekely 1978). In countries of the South, while the idea of ecodevelopment 
continued to influence the environmental debate of the 1980s and 1990s, it was subsumed 
within the new incoming slogan ‘sustainable development’ in the early 1980s (Leff 1995: 
59; MacManus 1996: 50). Meanwhile, the pessimistic neo-malthusian thesis of the North 
rapidly became the subject of much criticism and the environmental debate during the 1980s 
and this shifted attention from the concerns of scarcity of resources to the environmental 
consequences of using those resources. By the 1990s, the discussion in countries of the 
North had also moved on to the issues of sustainability and development (Gandy 1993: 13; 
O’Riordan 1981: 60-65; Soussan 1992: 22-23).
Following the 1987 Brundtland Commission’s Report ‘Our Common Future’ (see WCED
1987), the UN called in 1989 for a world-wide conference - the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development UNCED - to be held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. 
Considered as a ‘milestone event’, UNCED (also known as the ‘Earth Summit’) raised 
consciousness on global issues such as the loss of tropical forests and of the world's 
biological diversity, the changing climatic conditions, and particularly on the issue of 
sustainable development (see Bimie & Boyle 1992: 4-5; Grubb et al 1993: 6-7; Keating 
1993: 6). Albeit the interests and attitudes of the North and the South became more
1 The Cocoyoc Declaration - also known as ‘Founex II’ - was held in Cocoyoc, Mexico, in October 1974, 
in order to discuss the relationship between environment and development and to analyse the impact that 
environmental issues were having on development strategies and international economic relations (see 
McCormick 1995: 183-184).
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conciliatory in the 1980s (McCormick 1995: 179), their environmental concerns and 
priorities even under the umbrella of sustainable development remained dissimilar. By the 
end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the environmental concerns of the North were about 
carbon dioxide emissions, ozone depletion, loss of rare species and toxic waste disposal. 
For the South it was about basic needs: poor water supply, bad sanitation, soil erosion, 
depletion of wood supplies and environmental health. At the same time, the South 
highlighted the importance of reducing the burden of debt to Northern banks and 
governments in order to better address environmental problems. In addition, it became 
clearer that the North had a great deal of shared responsibility - perhaps the dominant 
responsibility - for issues such as global warming (see Redclift & Sage 1994: 4-8).
During the 1990s, the environmental debate in countries of the North and the South started 
to focus on urban environmental issues and shifted toward the notion of ‘sustainable urban 
development’. The increasing debate over sustainable urban development issues within the 
North-South framework provided for a distinction between the ‘Green’ and the ‘Brown’ 
Agendas. The ‘Green Agenda’ - identified as a Northern challenge - usually refers to the 
preservation and management of natural resources focusing on issues such as resource 
depletion, deforestation, biodiversity and global warming. Conversely, the ‘Brown 
Agenda’ - identified as a Southern challenge - commonly refers to urban environmental 
issues in developing countries concentrating on the health impact that derives from 
inadequate water, sanitation, drainage and solid waste services as well as poor waste and 
air quality management (see Bartone et al 1994: 1; Serageldin & Cohen 1995: 1; WB 1994: 
32). Despite this distinction, it is clear that ‘brown’ issues are not purely within the domain 
of developing countries. Although cities in the North often have the means to reduce the 
pollution they produce locally, they can also suffer from severe urban environmental 
problems such as air pollution or waste disposal (Gilbert et al 1996: 13). Likewise, not all 
urban centres in the South, like the rapidly growing city of Curitiba in Brazil, suffer from 
serious environmental problems (Hardoy et al 1992: 17). In the case of air pollution 
(which is the main focus of the thesis) achieving healthy urban air quality is not only a local 
indicator of sustainability in urban centres but a matter of much local concern for countries 
in the North and the South. Indeed, among the existing environmental problems in urban 
centres, air pollution has now been categorised as one of the most serious urban-wide 
problems in developing and developed countries (Elsom 1996: 1 and 214-220; Hatcher 
1996: 192-197; UNCHS 1996a: 143).
2 Some efforts that have been made within the environmentalist thought of the 1980s and 1990s to identify 
the variety of approaches and competing positions in relation to sustainable development include Daly 
(1993), MacManus (1996), and Turner (1993).
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The idea of achieving urban sustainability began to address not only the environmental but 
also the socio-economic, cultural, political and institutional aspects of the city (see Breheny 
1992a: 2 and 1992b: 277; Greig 1993: 1; Hardoy et al 1992: 171; Haughton & Hunter 
1994: 10; Stren 1992a: 1). In other words, securing sustainability at the urban level was 
seen as involving the adoption of a comprehensive or integrated approach to urban 
environmental problems. An integrated strategy requires the inclusion of key aspects such 
as public policies, political will, private sector involvement, social participation, 
government intervention at all levels, and so forth (see Breheny & Rookwood 1993: 150; 
Elkin etal 1991: 9; Hardoy etal 1992: 188-197; Keating 1993: ix; OECD 1990: 39-43 and 
1996: 168; WCED 1987: 243-247). The reasons for bringing about sustainable urban 
development by adopting an integrated approach, though, are not necessarily the same for 
developed and developing countries. By way of illustration, for those cities with high 
levels of non-renewable resource use - usually wealthy cities - the priority is to reduce 
levels of fossil fuel use and waste generation, while maintaining a productive economy and 
preserving the natural and built environment. For cities with low levels of non-renewable 
resource use - usually poor cities - the priority is to achieve socio-economic and political 
goals preserving the natural and built environment without increasing that resource use. 
Furthermore, although cities in the North and the South face the challenge of reducing local 
pollution, the North sees urban sustainability also as a major contribution to the solution of 
global problems, and the South mainly sees it as an urgent need for solving local problems 
(see Gilbert et al 1996: 14; Hardoy ef al 1992: 188-189).
It is within the context of UNCED (through Chapter 7 of Agenda 21) and the debate over 
sustainable urban development that the need for local action and the fundamental role of 
local authorities started to be addressed. The latter also gained greater official recognition 
with the second UN Conference on Human Settlements UNCHS - Habitat II, also known 
as the ‘City Summit’ - held in Istanbul, Turkey, in 1996 (see Satterthwaite 1997: 1686; 
Serageldin & Cohen 1995: 1). This conference resulted in a broad consensus on the fact 
that the future of the Earth will depend to a great extent on the quality of life in urban 
centres. It was ascertained that both the scale and scope of the issues, and the participants 
concerned with human settlements have changed and actually expanded since Habitat I - the 
first UN Conference on Human Settlements UNCHS held in Vancouver, Canada, in 1976. 
Habitat II addressed the issues and problems of human settlements (urban and rural) into 
the next century including such new topics as democracy, human rights, participation, 
sustainability, government decentralisation, women’s empowerment, and public-private 
partnership. Additionally, it included the participation of mayors and representatives of 
local governments who had the opportunity to speak at conference sessions, and NGOs 
which actively intervened through organised events, demonstrations and diverse activities 
(see Carlson 1996: 4-5; Cohen 1996: 8; Hundsalz 1996: 6; UNCHS 1996b: 1).
20
The emerging focus on the participation of local authorities in urban centres has led to a 
concern that most governments at the local level (particularly in the South) lack both the 
trained personnel and the financial base to control pollution, as well as the institutional 
means to ensure an effective, coordinated and representative governmental response to 
environmental problems. Although the South’s urban environmental problems may be 
wider in scope and more traumatic and human health-damaging than in the North, 
allocation or devolution of responsibilities for environmental management to the local level 
has occurred in both developed and developing countries (see Gilbert et al 1996: 24; 
Hardoy et al 1992: 220). By way of illustration, in both the two local case-studies 
presented in this thesis - London and Mexico City - there is evidence of shifting 
responsibilities on air quality management matters from central to local government, for 
example, regarding air quality monitoring systems (see Chapters V-VII).
While there exist some differences within a North-South context for addressing urban 
environmental issues, recommendations for reorganising the structures of local government 
have been similar in many ways. First, local authorities need to act as leaders in order to 
mobilise and reconcile varied interests within a community and thus adopt a more effective 
approach to tackle city pollution. Second, while becoming the coordinators or enablers of 
service delivery and the facilitators for public participation within an urban centre, they also 
need to be seen as legitimate (i.e. elected) actors within the whole system of governance. 
Third, in seeking an effective and coordinated response to urban environmental problems 
they need to enhance the capacity to work in partnership with other public and private 
sectors of a community. Finally, while working in public/private partnerships they need to 
build a network to allow financial and technical support from other local authorities and 
from the central government, local associations and non-governmental and private agencies 
(see, for example, Gilbert etal 1996; Hardoy eta l 1992; Haughton & Hunter 1994). As 
will be seen in following chapters, some of these issues are central to the discussion on 
reorganising the structures of local government in London and Mexico City in order to deal 
with urban environmental issues more effectively. In the case of London, concerns have 
been raised about the need for a more efficient, legitimate, and coordinated governmental 
response to air pollution at the local level. In the case of Mexico City, while there are 
concerns over improving the structures of local government, a more effective response to 
air pollution seems to be constantly linked to enhancing the democratic local units of 
government. Before turning in more detail to the research on the case studies, this chapter 
now considers the issue of urban air pollution.
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2.3 Urban centres and air pollution: the scale of the problem
The significance of urban centres at the front of the environmental debate has been 
increasingly recognised because of the effects (positive and negative) they have on the 
natural environment (see Breheny 1992b: 277; Haughton & Hunter 1994: 1; Stren 1992a: 
1). On the one hand, cities are key elements in the development of local, national and 
international economies. They are regarded as centres of production, exchange and 
consumption where cultural, artistic and social activities are manifested. On the other hand, 
cities are also seen as obsolete centres in the approaching age of advance information 
technology where a high degree of environmental contamination is produced (CEE 1990: 
20-21; Elkin etal 1991: 4; OECD 1990: 9; Sherlock 1991: 13).
From an environmental perspective, urban centres play a complicated but essential 
ambivalent role (Stren 1992a: 1). While they are the major consumers of resources and the 
major producers of pollution and waste, they can also make a fundamental contribution to 
the solution of local, regional and global environmental problems (Breheny 1992a: 2; 
Gilbert eta l 1996: 15; Gossop & Webb 1993: 129). As already seen, the environmental 
challenges for urban centres lie on the issues of resource-use and pollution reduction while 
achieving sustainable patterns of living. While urban centres continue to expand - by the 
year 2000 half of the world’s population will be living in cities3 - it is their environmental 
impact and not their size or wealth which has become the central issue in the move towards 
global and urban sustainability (see Gilbert etal 1996: 14-15; Haughton & Hunter 1994: 
10). Certainly, although the degree of environmental deterioration varies within different 
cities around the world, city dwellers are exposed to a combined number of environmental 
problems whose damaging effects are not restricted to any particular size, age, or type of 
city (OECD 1990: 21-22). As seen in Table 2.1, common urban threats that can damage 
human health, flora and fauna and the built environment, include air, noise and water 
pollution, waste disposal, and derelict land. In particular, the adverse effects on the health 
and welfare of human beings and the environment caused by urban air pollution vary 
according to diverse existing air pollutants in urban centres - such negative effects are not 
only local, but regional (such as acid rain) and global (such as ozone depletion and global 
warming) (Haughton & Hunter 1994: 157). As seen in Table 2.2, the most common 
sources of these urban air pollutants are industry, production and consumption of energy 
and, above all, motor vehicles.
3 Since 1950, population rates in developed countries nearly doubled from 447 to 838 millions, and in 
developing countries nearly quadrupled from 286 to 1.14 billions. In 1940, while 1 in 100 lived in a city of 
1 million or more inhabitants, in 1980, 1 in 10 lived in a city of the same number of inhabitants (WCED 
1987: 16, 236-237).
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Table 2.1 Common environm ental problem s in u rb an  centres: cause-effect re la tionsh ip
Source E ffec t
A ir P o llu tion Mainly from traffic, industry and 
waste incineration
Affects human health 
(respiratory illnesses; may 
contribute to death). Reduces 
human production potentiality 
and industry productivity.
Affects atmospheric environment
W ate r Pollu tion
Mainly from domestic and 
industrial sources (heavy 
industry and waste disposal 
activities)
Considerable risks for human 
health (deterioration in quality 
for human consumption i.e. 
drinking water). Harmful 
consequences to aquatic 
environment and industrial needs
Noise P o llu tio n Mainly from road traffic, 
neighbourhood and aircraft noise
Human health is affected: 
disturbs sleep and causes stress
W aste
Mainly from household use and 
from radioactive, clinical and 
other 'hazardous waste' 
(hospitals, factories, industrial 
premises)
Dangerous to human health. It 
can contaminate air, water or 
soil
C ontam inated Land
From a variety of human 
activities, e.g. urban sprawl 
(conversion from land to urban 
uses); industry (metal extraction 
and mineral processing) 
industrial and domestic waste
Affects human health (particles 
of soil with irritant or poisonous 
chemicals) and agricultural uses
Source: Adapted from Murley (1994); OECD (1990); UNEP (1993); WRI (1992)
Achieving and maintaining healthy air quality in urban centres requires the adoption of an 
appropriate and effective urban air quality management regime. Ideally, as an integrated 
functional system, the latter should include such components or subfunctions as air quality 
monitoring networks, emission inventories, numerical prediction models, air quality 
standards and public information bands, and a range of cost-effective pollution control 
policies (e.g. public transport and traffic management measures) together with the 
resources and powers to impose them (see Elsom 1996: 67-68; Richardson 1992: 148- 
149). In establishing and operating an effective pollution control system for managing air
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quality, the question of what constitutes pollution to the atmosphere, thus, becomes 
essential. The lenses through which the concept of pollution has been seen and defined, 
and thus applied to air emissions, has considerably changed over the years. It has been 
usually said that pollution exists when enough of a substance or form of energy introduced 
by humans are present in the environment to produce harmful effects on it (see, for 
example, Blowers 1993c: 72; NSCA 1991: 133; RCEP 1971: 4). The contamination of the 
environment and its subsequent damage, occurs when pollutants and sinks are not in 
balance, that is to say, when due to the nature or quantity of the substances released they 
cannot be readily absorbed by the ecosystem (see Button 1988; Haughton & Hunter 1994: 
125; Levinson & Shetty 1992: 16; Strauss & Mainwaring 1984: 3). Nevertheless, there is 
no consensus on how much of these substances is ‘enough’ to pollute and cause harm to 
the environment. Hence, as argued by Ball & Bell (1994: 90) pollution is a relative concept 
because “there is no absolute rule about what amounts to pollution”. It follows that air 
pollution exists only when the discharge of substances into the environment have been 
associated with damage or threat to humans and their health, other living species and their 
interrelationships, and to the natural and built environments (see, for example, Branes 
1994: 435; Elsom 1992: 3; EPA 1990; Strauss & Mainwaring 1984: 6).
The debate on defining air pollution moves then on to decide what level of pollution is 
permissible, involving two major considerations. First, the level established is usually the 
result of social, and above all, political constructions. In other words, the ultimate decision 
on what amounts to ‘permissible levels of pollution’ in a particular location (city, town, 
village) or for an entire nation or region, is societal and particularly political. Thus, special 
attention needs to be paid to the diverse ways in which society and government perceive 
and look at pollution, particularly when doing research on a specific country or city from a 
comparative perspective. It may be mentioned, though, that standards and guidelines set up 
by international organisations (e.g. WHO) also play an important role in defining threshold 
limits of domestic and/or local pollution levels. Second, when determining those 
permissible levels of pollution, there must exist a trade-off between pollution itself and 
other factors such as society, political aims, model of economic development, finance 
costs, environmental quality standards, international legally-binding agreements, and so 
forth. The following sections examine the scale of the problem (origins and consequences) 
of air pollution in two different urban locations: London and Mexico City.
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Table 2.2 Common u rban  a ir  pollutants: cause and effect on hum an health
P o llu ta n t C ause E ffec t
Asbestos
Heating and insulation 
materials, car clutch and brake 
linings
Pulmonary fibrosis (asbestosis) 
Pleural plaque, lung cancer, 
mesothelioma (asbestos cancer)
Carbon Monoxide
Incomplete combustion of 
carbon-based fuels: exhaust of 
petrol engines, industrial 
furnaces, power stations, faulty 
domestic cooking and heating 
appliances
Suffocation, central nervous 
system affected, headache, with 
reduced mental activity- 
throbbing headache-vomiting and 
collapse-coma-death
1 pnd
Motor car exhaust accounting 
for about 75% (exists in the 
form of dust or fume)
Central nervous system affected 
(young people; foetuses), 
concentration and intelligence 
affected (specially on children 
even at low levels of exposure)
Nitrogen Oxides
Significant ones: nitric oxide 
and nitrogen dioxide. 
Combustion of fossil fuel 
(power generation, heating 
plants, road) industrial non­
combustion processes
Nitrogen oxide: causes throat and 
eye irritation; respiratory illness 
in children. Nitric oxide: 
contributes to inhibit capacity of 
blood to carry oxygen round the 
body
Photochemical Oxidants
In the presence of sunlight 
nitrogen oxides react with 
hydrocarbons form vehicle 
emissions and industrial sources 
to produce ozone (a secondary 
pollutant)
Eye, nose and throat irritation, 
chest discomfort, cough and 
headache. Dangerous to people 
exercising or suffering bronchitis 
or asthma: reduce resistance of 
the lungs to disease
Sulphur Dioxide
Burning coal and oil Irritant to eyes, mucous 
membranes,
bronchioconstriction, stimulate 
coughing (dangerous in patients 
with cardio-respiratory problems)
Suspended Particulate Matter
Combustion processes, 
industrial activities, natural 
sources (e.g. smoke)
Affects lungs obstructing the air 
sacs, disturbance to the tissue
Volatile Organic Compounds
Exhaust fumes, cigarette smoke, 
synthetic materials and 
household chemicals
Toxic and carcinogenic 
chemicals. Anemia, eye, skin, 
throat irritation, nausea, allergic 
reactions, lung disease
Source: Murley (1994)
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2.3.1 The case of London
Air pollution in London has a long history (see, for example, Ashby & Anderson 1981; 
Ball & Bell 1994; Brimblecombe 1987; Elsom 1992; RCEP 1971; 1974; 1976 and 1984). 
Although the earliest registered air pollution incident in England occurred in Nottingham, 
London is one of those few cities in which polluted air was detected and contested as early 
as 1273 (Murley 1994: 47). At that time, coal began to substitute wood as an industrial fuel 
and since, the usage of industrial coal (lime production) represented the main source of air 
pollution within medieval London.
Although pollution from coal burning was regarded as a problem in medieval times 
(Brimblecombe 1987: 10-11), however, air pollution in London grew more severe when 
the Industrial Revolution began. The rapid technological advance, demand on fuel 
consumption, the use of coal for industrial and domestic purposes, together with urban 
expansion in a growing industrial country during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
started to have an important effect on London’s atmosphere and consequently, on humans, 
flora and fauna, and the built environment (Brimblecombe 1987: 9-36, 65-68; Ball & Bell 
1994: 286-303).
By the time the first Alkali Act was passed in 1863, London had already been experiencing 
high levels of polluted air - known as ‘London smogs’ or ‘pea-soupers’4 - which became 
more frequent and severe during the late Victorian times producing tragic effects. As seen 
in Table 2.3, during this period, and well into the mid-twentieth century people died in 
London as a result of severe pollution episodes.5 The worst took place on 5-8 December 
1952 when a heavy concentration of smog (high pollution concentrations of sulphur
4 The called ‘London smogs’ were the result of ‘smog’ - a synthesis of fog and high levels of smoke, 
sulphur dioxide S02, and meteorological conditions, for example, temperatures falling below freezing (see 
Elsom 1992: 22-23 and 242-244).
5 In Britain, the Advisory Group - which was set up by the Department of Health to provide advice to the 
Chief Medical Officer about personal protective measures during air pollution episodes - has explained in its 
last report that an episode of elevated air pollution is to some extent arbitrary and that the criteria for it has 
changed over the years. This Group has identified three types of air pollution episodes in current Britain. 
First, the ‘summer smog’ a pollution mixture with the main, or indicator, pollutant being ozone. Second, 
‘vehicle smog’ where the indicator pollutant are oxides of nitrogen. Third, ‘winter smog’ where the indicator 
pollutant is sulphur dioxide with a contribution from oxides of nitrogen. For some further explanations on 
this including case studies of pollution episodes, see DoH (1995 and 1997).
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dioxide and smoke) hanged over the city with calm conditions (i.e. still air) and 
temperatures below freezing. This led to an increased number of deaths - nearly 4,000 - 
especially among the elderly, due to bronchitis, influenza, pneumonia, tuberculosis and 
other respiratory illnesses (Ball & Bell 1994: 288; Elsom 1992: 242-243). The number of 
health studies - mainly epidemiological investigations - on mortality and morbidity due to 
the infamous ‘pea-soupers’ in London, is now very well documented (see, for example, 
Brimblecombe 1987; DoH 1991; 1992; 1993; 1995 and 1997; Medina & Quenel 1993; 
Schwartz & Marcus 1990).
Table 2.3 M ajo r London a ir  pollution episodes and  excess deaths (1873-1993)
Date Duration (days) Excess deaths
1873 - December 3 270-700
1880 - January 4 700-1100
1882 - February n.a. n.a.
1891 - December n.a. n.a.
1892 - December 3 -1000
1948 - November 6 -300
1952 - December 5 4000
1956 - January n.a. 480-1000
1957 - December n.a. 700-800
1959- n.a. 200-250
1962 - December 4 340-700
1975 - December 3 n.a.
1976 - June n.a. n.a.
1982 - November n.a. n.a.
1989 - June 2 n.a.
1991 - December 4 100-180
1993 - November 2 n.a.
1994 - December 1 n.a.
Source: Brimblecombe (19871: DoH (1995 and 1997).
n.a. = not available
The levels of smoke, grit, dust and SO 2 in London during the 1950s and following years 
started to decline due to a number of independent factors acting at the same time. These 
included the initiatives of local authorities bringing in their own measures to control smoke 
and the efforts of the alkali inspectors. In addition, technological measures, such as the 
change-over to gas and electricity and the spread of central heating, were also implemented. 
From a social point of view, migration from the city to the suburbs during those years also 
influenced air quality in London (see Ashby & Anderson 1981: 116-119).
The nature of air pollution in London over the last three decades, thus, is substantially 
different from that in the past. Current concerns about polluted air in London are not related 
to the once feared ‘London smogs’ of the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Rather,
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they are related to the rising levels of contemporary or modem pollutants6 associated 
primarily with road transport emissions (Bell 1993: 12-13; Elsom 1996: 185; FoE 1994; 
QUARG 1993: 1; SEIPH 1994: I/2-I/3; Weir 1993: 1-3). In Britain, the ‘traditional’ 
pollutants have been identified with sulphur dioxide S02, smoke, and other particulates that 
arise mainly from the combustion of coal or heavy oil for heating or power generation 
purposes. The ‘newer’ pollutants have been normally associated with motor vehicle 
emissions, although some of them also derive from heating or power generation sources, 
for example, nitrogen dioxide NO2 (see DoH 1993: 3). These contemporary and also 
common pollutants in other urban centres, include carbon monoxide CO, hydrocarbons HC 
(more generally volatile organic compounds VOCs such as benzene and 1,3-butadiene), 
oxides of nitrogen NOx, and ozone 03. Suspended particulate matter SPM (especially 
black smoke and particles less than 10pm PM 10) and carbon dioxide CO 2 have also been 
included within such category (see, for example, WHO/UNEP 1992: 7-10).
Other sources of pollution in contemporary London include processes that also involve the 
combustion of fossil fuels; for instance, domestic and commercial building heating 
systems, plants producing heat and/or electric power for industry, and the two power 
stations which generate electricity for London Transport (LRC 1993: 119). Geographical 
and meteorological conditions have also played an important role in the formation of some 
pollutants such as oxides of nitrogen NOx or ozone 03. Depending on the temperature or 
the season these pollutants could be dominant when a pollution episode occurs (DoH 1992: 
3-6 and 1993: 3-4; QUARG 1993: 29-30, 111-112).
The research that has been recently carried out by govemmental-led and autonomous 
organisations, such as the Advisory Group, the Quality of Urban Air Review Group 
QUARG, the London Research Centre LRC, or the London Air Quality Network LAQN, 
on the newer pollutants and their environmental effects, confirms the impact of vehicle- 
emissions on contemporary London’s air quality (see Tables 2.4 & 2.5). As seen in Table 
2.6, car ownership in London has considerably increased over the last years, particularly 
due to many households acquiring a second or third car. According to the DoT, growth in 
the number of cars available to London households is estimated at an average of 32% 
between 1991 and 2011. Nevertheless, the DoT has emphasized that car ownership 
forecasts are less relevant than car use (see DoT 1996: 72-73).
6 There is not a standardised or universal classification of what stands for ‘traditional’ or ‘contemporary’ 
pollutants. For example, whereas for Britain modern pollutants usually include CO, NOx and 03 (see DoH 
1993: 3), for the OECD all of them are traditional pollutants (see OECD 1995: 13-14).
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T able 2.4 Total emissions (1991) by sector (% )
S E C T O R C 0 2  (as 
carbon)
S 0 2 BLACK
SM O K E
CO N O x V O C s
Road
transport
33% 22% 96% 99% 76% 97%
Other
transport
3% 1% 2% 1% 4% 1%
Electricity
supply
industry
2% 0 0 0 1% 0
Other
industry
13% 43% 1% 0 5% 1%
Domestic 30% 1% 0 0 6% 1%
Other 19% 32% 2% 0 8% 0
Source: LRC (1993)
Table 2,5 T ran sp o rt contribu tion  to a ir  pollution in London (% )
PO L L U T A N T ROAD TR A FFIC O TH E R
T R A N S P O R T
TOTAL
T R A N S P O R T
Sulphur dioxide 22% 1% 23%
Black smoke 96% 1% 97%
Carbon monoxide 99% 1% 100%
Nitrogen oxides 76% 4% 80%
Hydrocarbons 97% 1% 98%
Source: LRC (1993)
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Table 2.6 Vehicles* growth in London (available to households 1971-1991)
A R EA 1971 1981 1991 1971-91 
(% change)
Inner 472 000 502 000 580 000 23
Outer 1 392 000 1 682 000 1 969 000 41
All London 1 893 000 2 213 000 2 581 000 36
Source: DoT (1996)
In its Eighteenth Report (1994), the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution RCEP 
emphasized its concerns that pollution caused by vehicle emissions may be adversely 
affecting human health in London. Nevertheless, the epidemiology of the health effects of 
the more recent air pollutants and of their mixtures in London’s air, that is to say, basically 
those pollutants that are related to vehicle emissions, is still poorly developed (see DoH 
1995: 84; SEIPH 1994: 3/1-3/7). The existing health reports in relation to the latter?, have 
particularly focused on the respiratory effects of exposure to NO2, 03, and particulates. 
The recent concerns on the risk of cancer from exposure to benzene and other VOCs have 
also been included in such reports (see RCEP 1994: 28-31). The outcome of these studies 
shows not only that London can still experience air pollution episodes, but that there is
7 One of the most recent and significant bodies that have fostered the understanding of air pollutants and 
their human health effects is the Advisory Group. So far, this group has concentrated on 0 3  (First Report); 
S02, acid aerosols and particulates (Second Report); NOx (Third Report); and on health effects of exposures 
to mixtures of air pollutants (Fourth Report) (see DoH 1991; 1992; 1993 and 1995). Another example is 
constituted by QUARG (Quality of Urban Air Review Group), a working group of experts established by 
the Department of the Environment to review current knowledge on urban air quality. Its First Report 
presented a fairly comprehensive description of nitrogen, organic and sulphur compounds, CO, particulate 
matter, oxidants, and metals (see QUARG 1993). Two other significant studies are worth mentioning. 
First, a report prepared by the London Research Centre with support of the European Commission. This 
report focused on a study of energy use in Greater London and the opportunities for improving efficiency 
and reducing pollution (see LRC 1993). Second, the air quality reports of the London Air Quality Network 
LAQN produced by the South East Institute of Public Health SEIPH in conjunction with the Association 
of London Authorities ALA and the London Boroughs Association LB A. These reports present air quality 
information across London in terms of long term trends and peaks, and for the first time, by local authority 
area. The results include N02, CO, 03, S02, particles (PM 10), hydrocarbons (benzene), and smoke (see 
SEIPH: 1994).
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growing evidence of the dangers that high levels of pollution may pose to human health 
(see Bell 1993: 18-25; DoH 1991: 67-87; 1992: 101-127; 1993: 89-116 and 1995: 83-118; 
SEIPH 1994: 3/1-3/7).
From a worldwide comparative perspective, London does not have the alarming levels of 
air pollution found in other urban centres. In a recent report of urban air pollution in twenty 
megacities of the world, jointly produced by WHO and UNEP (see WHO/UNEP 1992), 
concentrations of diverse air pollutants in London does not seem to regularly exceed the 
WHO health guidelines. For example, while the WHO guidelines are normally met in 
London for levels of 03, these guidelines are normally exceeded in cities such as Los 
Angeles, Mexico City, Sao Paulo or Tokyo. Likewise, while London has low pollution 
levels of particulate matter SPM, this pollutant is a serious problem for cities such as 
Bangkok, Beijing, Bombay, Cairo, Calcutta, Delhi, Jakarta, Karachi, Manila, Mexico 
City, Seoul and Shanghai (see WHO/UNEP 1992).
Within the European context, London is neither among the most polluted European cities 
nor among the cleanest. For instance, the levels of exposure for 03 in 1991 (pg/m3/day 
over 1 year) in London were lower than in Athens, Barcelona, Berlin, Lisbon and Turin. 
Likewise, over the same period, levels of exposure for SO2 in London were lower than in 
Athens, Barcelona, Berlin and Turin, but were higher than in Lisbon, Paris and Warsaw. 
The levels of exposure for NO 2, were also higher in Athens, Madrid and Turin, but lower 
in Lisbon and Paris when compared to those in London (see Medina & Quenel 1993).
Nevertheless, among diverse UK cities, London seems to be one of the most polluted 
urban centres. For example, N02 concentrations over large parts of the Greater London 
area have been higher than in the rest of the UK and have exceeded the EC Guide Value 
(Bell 1993: 15). Although cities such as Glasgow and Manchester have also experienced 
high concentrations of NO2 in recent years, these have barely exceeded the EC Guide Value 
for NO2 and have breached the WHO health guideline only a few times (see QUARG 1993: 
48). Most significantly, the per centage of total emission of pollutants from road transport - 
such as CO, HC, black smoke, NOx and SO2 - is higher in London than across the entire 
UK (see SEIPH 1994: 4/2-4/3).
Improving air quality in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s does not seem to have been a 
government priority as the rising levels of new emerging pollutants in London - other than 
smoke and sulphur dioxide - were not promptly, or adequately, dealt with (Elsom 1992: 
276). The reasons for this are threefold. First, there was lack of interest from the central 
government. Indeed, the slow and piecemeal government response to controlling air
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pollution in these years is closely related to the fact that many contemporary environmental 
affairs became part of the British public policy agenda only in the late 1980s (McCormick 
1991). The belated recognition by the British government of the impact of acid rain8 is an 
example to this. Despite the fact that many research groups and environmental 
organisations had been highlighting likely acid deposition effects for many years, it was not 
until the mid 1980s that the British government recognised the effects of acid rain on 
aquatic ecosystems and forests in the UK (Elsom 1992: 257). Hence, there was no reason 
for the British government to tackle such pollutants as NOx and photochemical oxidants on 
the grounds of ‘acid rain’ damage.
Second, with the exception of lead9, pollution control acts and regulations continued to 
focus mainly on smoke and sulphur dioxide emissions from industrial and domestic 
sources (Elsom 1992: 244-250). Despite the increase in the levels of some pollutants in 
London from mobile sources, such as CO and NOx during the 1980s (QUARG 1993: 32; 
82-83), the government did not introduce new legislation until the EC started issuing 
Directives specifically requiring air quality standards. For instance, it was not until 1989 
that the government formally introduced British legislation in this area via the Air Quality 
Standards Regulations which set the limit and guide values for S02, suspended particles, 
lead in air, and NO2 previously set by EC Directives (DoH 1993: 10; QUARG 1993: 174). 
A considerable part of the current British environmental policy and body of legislation 
regarding air quality has actually been formed mainly due to EC directives, regulations and 
other measurements (see Ball & Bell 1994: 70; McCormick 1991: 20; O'Riordan & Weale 
1990: 2).
It must be noted that the UK, since joining the EC in 1973, has consistently displayed 
resistance and delay in regards to the implementation of EC Environmental Directives. For 
example, in 1980 the EC set out the maximum concentrations of smoke and SO 2 permitted 
in urban areas through a Directive (80/779/EEC). This Directive, however, was not 
implemented for four years, the reason being that the adoption of the EC strategy on air 
quality standards was different to the then ‘best practicable means BPM’ approach to
8 The main contributors to the creation of acid rain are SO 2, NOx and photochemical pollutants (see Elsom 
1992: 310-317).
9 As explained by Elsom (1992: 263), lead in petrol became a national issue in the United Kingdom in 
1982 due to the lobbying of a pressure group called CLEAR Campaign for Lead-Free Air. British action on 
phasing out leaded petrol started before this year but increased with this public campaigns and further EC 
Directives.
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pollution control adopted in the UK. The UK approach relied on voluntary compliance by 
the polluters (industrialists) with unclear and non-mandatory guidelines or reference levels, 
rather than more clearly defined and mandatory standards (Elsom 1992: 260; 274). The 
‘new’ approach adopted in Part I of the EPA in 1990, known as ‘Best Available 
Techniques Not Entailing Excessive Cost BATNEEC’, embraces a similar non-mandatory 
system and, thus, seems to suggest further delay on the implementation of EU Directives 
on the part of the UK government (see Ball & Bell 1994: 21-22; Elsom 1992: 240-241).
Finally, although concern about vehicle emissions emerged in the 1970s, there was no 
evidence in Britain that such emissions would seriously damage human health (Ashby & 
Anderson 1981: 143). This, however, led to a considerable coverage on specific health 
aspects, such as asthma. Again, without reliable and sufficient data on levels of emerging 
pollutants and their impact on human health, policies centred on stationary sources. It was 
not until the 1990s, particularly with the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
RCEP Eighteenth Report, that the link between air pollution and transport became more 
pronounced (RCEP 1994). While during the 1980s and 1990s media and increasing public 
concerns put some pressure on the British government to respond to air pollution, it was 
not until the mid-1990s that the latter identified urban air quality as a priority area for 
improvement within its 1994 sustainable development strategy (see Ball & Bell 1995: 327; 
Bell 1993: 7; DoE 1994: 49-57; Elsom 1996: 185).
The need to improve London’s air quality has recently led the British government to 
develop diverse traffic management and public transport policies as well as to draw a new 
air quality strategy by the mid-1990s. For instance, in 1995, variable speed limits were 
introduced in London’s orbital motorway - the M25 - to smooth traffic flow and reduce 
congestion in order to decrease the number of stop-start occasions when vehicles are 
moving slowly or stationary with engines idling and emitting higher emissions. Another 
example is the creation of the Red Routes system throughout London, which consists of 
designating urban clearways where stopping is banned during working hours. This 
measure (initiated in 1991 with a pilot scheme in north and east London) aims at shortening 
car and bus journey times so as to ease traffic congestion (see DETR 1997a: 7; Elsom 
1996: 188-189). Early in 1995, a new air quality strategy was outlined in a Consultation 
Paper called ‘Air Quality: Meeting the Challenge’ (see DoE 1995). Later that year, the 1995 
Environment Act EA, laid down the principles of a coherent air quality management 
strategy and introduced the UK National Air Quality Strategy NAQS which was adopted by 
the beginning of 1997 (see DoE 1997). The 1995 Environment Act and the 1997 NAQS 
provide not only for the further development of local air quality assessment and 
management, but new regulatory powers for the improvement of air quality giving London 
authorities the powers they need to tackle London’s episodic and long term air quality
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problems. The achievement of the specified air quality standards targets, though, have been 
put off until 2005, allegedly, to allow EU directives to come into force and to implement 
other measures such as adapting refined fuel to new vehicles. According to the central 
government, such delayed targets are “reasonable and justifiable on consideration of the 
costs and benefits” according to the standards and objectives laid down in the strategy (DoE 
1996: 17; Elsom 1996: 192-193).
Undoubtedly, over the last 30 years, under-investment in public transport, the UK 
government’s long-standing commitment to road building, and the growth of car 
ownership and car use, have largely influenced air quality in London. For instance, despite 
an increase of government spending in the London Underground system over the last 
yearsio, the road building programmes - which have included proposals to widen 
London’s orbital motorway - have remained as an investment priority. Indeed, road 
transport is an area where not has only public expenditure risen sharply - more than 50% 
for 1994/95 in real terms on the level in the 1980s - but where there exists the only long­
term programme of investment within the government policy framework (Elsom 1996: 14 
and 191; RCEP 1994: 82). Hence, further investment on public transportation systems in 
London has been continuously called upon from the central government (see, for example, 
Bell 1993: 38; Dobson 1995?: 11; LRC 1993: 114-115; RCEP 1994: 15-16 and 244).
2.3.2 The case of Mexico City
Environmental transformation in the Valley of Mexico arguably started approximately six 
centuries ago. According to recent sources, during Pre-hispanic times, the capital of the 
Aztec Senorio Tenochtitlan (1324-1521), could not sustain itself with the existing natural 
resources of the valley mainly due to its population growth (c.a. 300,000 ha. by 1500) and 
had to import maize, beans, tropical fruits, salt, wood, and so on from other regions 
(CMPCCAVM 1994c: 9; Gamboa de Buen 1994: 19-22). It was not until the Colonial
10 Since the mid-1980s, investment in the London Underground system increased from around £250 
million a year to a stable level of a little over £500 million a year over the last three years. Although 
London Underground currently accounts for the largest share of investment in transport in London, there 
have been some significant cuts during the 1990s as opposed to an untouched road building spending 
programme: whereas investment for London Transport was cut by one-third in 1992, the roads programme 
remained intact. In 1993, the UK government announced that the M25, was to be widened to 14 lanes along 
its busiest road; the following year, in 1994, another cut to London Underground core investment was 
implemented. Before the general election of May 1997, the then DoT announced that other parts of the M25 
would be widened within a longer term scheme (see Bell 1993: 38; DoT 1996: 63-64; 90; 212; Elsom 
1996: 188).
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(1521-1810) followed by the Independent (1810-1910) and Revolutionary (1911-up to 
present days) periods, though, that environmental degradation of the valley began: frequent 
droughts due to the new city-planning; desiccation of surrounding lakes; soil erosion; forest 
devastation; shortages of water supply and contamination; and, more recently, high levels 
of air pollution (Ezcurra 1995; Fried 1972: 647-654; Schteingart 1989: 44).
The existence of air pollution was detected and contested in Mexico City during the 1950s 
and 1960s. The origins of air pollution in Mexico City derive from a rapid industrial 
development growth together with urban and population expansion which have resulted in 
a permanent and intense energy (fuel) consumption for maintaining industrial productivity, 
electricity generation, public services, household amenities, transportation, and so on 
(Bravo Alvarez 1987: 127; CMPCCAVM 1994b: 4; Collins & Scott 1993: 120; Diaz Diaz 
& Perlo Cohen 1994: 44; Pezzoli 1991: 205-207; Schteingart 1989: 44). The particular 
geographical location and meteorological conditions of the city 11 have also played a major 
role in the formation of certain pollutants, such as 03.
Emission of pollutants in Mexico have been usually associated with three type of sources: 
fixed, moving and natural sources (Bravo Alvarez 1987: 136-164). Although the Mexican 
legislation has classified and defined them in different ways (see LFPA 1982; LGEEPA
1988), fixed sources are commonly identified with all types of industry or any combustion
11 The climate conditions and the geographical location of the Basin of Mexico contribute enormously to 
the formation or dispersion of certain pollutants. For example, due to high surrounding mountain chains on 
all sides except North, wind speed and ventilation are limited constraining the dispersion of pollutants. The 
predominant wind pattern, from North to South, carries pollutants emitted by heavy industry, urban and 
transportation activities localised in the most concentrated areas to the rest of the urban conglomerate, i.e. 
Northern and Central parts. Additionally, the atmosphere is badly affected by the frequent ‘thermal 
inversion’ phenomena which is produced when a mass of cold air, at a certain height, impedes the renewal 
of warmer air making the pollutants stagnate at surface level during the early morning hours until the 
inversion is broken at midday. Whereas during the rainy season (May-October) the inversion is upset when 
a cold air mass penetrates, during the dry season (November-April) the inversion is more often and lasts 
several hours. The high solar radiation experienced in the basin also intensifies photochemical reactions 
between NOx and HC which all three elements combined favour the formation of 03. Another important 
factor is that due to its altitude (2,244 metres above sea level) oxygen content in the atmosphere of the 
basin is 23% less than at sea level provoking, as a consequence, all processes of combustion less efficient. 
Fuel combustion by vehicles is certainly affected by this situation. For a more detailed description of the 
latter, see Bravo Alvarez (1987: 127-136); Bravo Alvarez & Torres Jard6n (1995: 2-3); Collins & Scott 
(1993: 120-122); CMPCCAVM (1992: 7-13; 1994a: 1/5; 1994b: 5 and 1994c: 16-19); Fried (1972: 647); 
Schteingart (1989: 44); STI (1990: 13).
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process that generates pollution; moving sources refer to all types of motor vehicles; and 
natural sources are associated with ‘tolvaneras’ which encompasses dust and soil particles 
(see Bravo Alvarez 1987: 136-164; CMPCCAVM 1994a: 1/4; Gamboa de Buen 1994: 
139). The 1989 Emissions Inventory for Mexico City, identified emission sources by 
sector dividing them up into energy, industry and services, transport, and environmental 
damage. As shown in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, according to governmental reports, moving 
sources - i.e. transport - appeared by the late 1980s as the main source of pollution in 
Mexico City by weight (76.7%) and by toxicity (42.4%) as oppose to natural 
environmental degradation (15.0% by weight and 29.9% by toxicity) and fixed sources - 
energy, industry and services (8.4% by weight and 27.7% by toxicity).
Table 2.7 Emissions Inventory (1989) by sector (% by weight)
S E C T O R S02 NOx HC CO SPM TOTAL
Energy 35.5 5.6 5.6 1.8 1.0 4.0
Industry & 
services
42.7 18.5 7.0 0.6 2.8 4.4
Transport 21.8 75.4 52.5 96.7 2.1 76.7
Ecological
degradation
0.1 0.5 34.9 0.9 94.0 15.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: STI (1990)
During the late 1980s, the levels of traditional urban pollutants, such as SO 2, SPM, Pb and 
NOx, were all well above, with the exception of CO, the WHO health guidelines (see 
Calderon-Garciduenas 1992: 225; Kandell 1988: 528; Schteingart 1989: 44; WHO/UNEP 
1992: 155-163). By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the high levels of air pollution - among 
other environmental problems - gave Mexico City the status of one of the most polluted 
cities in the world:
“Mexico City, recently referred to as the ‘anteroom to an 
ecological Hiroshima’, has become one of the most 
contaminated, unhealthy cities in the world...some authors 
have declared it a ‘negative urban ecosystem or 
antiecosystem”
(Pezzoli 1991: 205).
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Table 2.8 Emissions Inventory (1989' by sector (% by toxicity)
S E C T O R S02 NOx HC CO SPM TOTAL
Energy 7.2 1.1 1.3 0.2 1.0 10.8
Industry & 
services
8.6 3.7 1.7 0.0 2.8 16.9
Transport 4.4 14.9 12.6 8.4 2.1 42.4
Ecological
degradation
0.0 0.1 8.4 0.1 21.3 29.9
TOTAL 20.2 19.8 23.9 8.7 27.3 100.0
Source: STI (1990)
Within a Latin American context, Mexico City is the most polluted city for several 
pollutants. In one of the most recent comparative reports (see WHO/UNEP 1992) the levels 
of air pollutants - such as SO2, SPM and CO - in Mexico City were higher than in cities 
like Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo. The capital of Chile, Santiago de Chile, 
seems to parallel Mexico City’s bad air quality situation for particulates as it has been found 
that particulate concentrations in Santiago de Chile are among the highest observed in any 
urban area in the world (Ostro et al 1995: 6). In the case of 03, although this pollutant has 
become a serious problem for Mexico City and Sao Paulo, the ambient concentrations in 
Mexico City are exceptionally high compared to any other city (see Medina & Quenel 1993; 
WHO/UNEP 1992). Following Mexican governmental reports on levels of ozone, it has 
been pointed out that the Mexican Air Quality Norm for this pollutant (0.11 ppm / 1 hour) 
was breached 750 and 959 hours in 1987 and 1988 respectively, and from 1989 to the first 
half of the 1990s, more than 1,000 hours on average every year. This amazing figure 
derives from the fact that the threshold limits of the Mexican IMECA index value12 are too
12 The IMECA (Indice Metropolitano de la Calidad del Aire) is the Mexican index value for air quality 
measurement in the MZMC. The IMECA calculation makes the criterion value (either ppm or |ig/m3) for 
each pollutant equal to 100 points. For example IMECA 100 means 0.11 ppm in one hour for Ozone; 0.13 
ppm in 24 hours for S02; 13 ppm in 8 hours for CO; 0.21 ppm in one hour for N02; and 275 |ig/m3 in 
24 hours for TSM. For a good explanation of the IMECA index value and its conversion for most 
pollutants for the MZMC, see SEDESOL (1993: 155 and 1994: 217); STI (1990: 29); WHO/UNEP (1992: 
157-158).
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high compared to international values (Bravo Alvarez & Torres Jardon 1995: 10; Calderon- 
Garciduenas etal 1992: 225; Calvillo 1993: 5; Campos Ruiz etal 1993: 71; Collins & Scott 
1993: 123-124; Quadri 1994: 24). Indeed, whereas the Mexican value norm for ozone is 
100 IMECA points which means a concentration of 0.11 ppm or 216 |Xg/m3 in one hour, 
the WHO standards are 150-200 p.g/m3 in one hour (time-weighted average). Although the 
latter may not represent a big difference within a comparative worldwide guidelines (see 
Table 2.9), the contingency plan in Mexico City only starts operating when ozone levels 
reach 250 IMECA points which means a concentration of 0.29 ppm in one hour 
(CMPCCAVM 1995b: VE/19; SEDESOL 1993: 166-167; WHO/UNEP 1992: 226).
Table 2.9 Guidelines for 03  (ppm / 1 hour)
WHO EU USA MEXICO
Guidelines 0.05-0.10 0.076-0.10 0.12 0.11
Source: INEGI (1994a: 3951
Despite the existing poor air quality situation in Mexico City, there are very few studies that 
have reviewed the relation between air pollution and increased mortality rates. The first 
study of time series analysis carried out in the MZMC for the period 1987-1989, showed a 
positive and significative autocorrelation between SPM and S02 with mortality (Santos- 
Burgoa & Rojas Bracho 1992: 229). A second study-analysis carried out by the Pan 
American Health Organization PAHO and the Mexican Secretary of Health Ssa, estimated 
that the concentrations of pollutants in Mexico City could be producing a mortality rate of 
5% annually for all pollutants. The latter could have meant that during the early 1990s, air 
pollution led to an increased number of 800 excess deaths in the Northwest area (Xalostoc) 
and of 600 excess deaths in the Southwest region (Pedregal) annually (Calvillo 1993: 27). 
In another study, elaborated for the World Bank in 1992, conservative calculations 
suggested that there was a significant relation between total suspended matter TSP and 
mortality rates. Based on the levels of TSP pollution in Mexico City during 1990, the 
estimated total number of (statistical) lives saved would have been 6,400 - equivalent to 3.8 
lives per 10,000 people (Margulis 1992: 13).*3
13 It is important to note that the three cases quoted here contain a lot of methodological limitations which 
are an obvious result of the kind of analysis that is being used.
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The number of health studies on morbidity in the MZMC surpasses by large those on 
m o r t a l i t y .  14 Over the last years, epidemiological studies have concentrated on respiratory 
illnesses and other human health effects during the occurrence of air pollution episodes or 
environmental contingencies in Mexico City. Most health studies, though, have focused on 
the analysis of the effects of lead, ozone, and more recently, particles (see, for example, 
Calderon-Garciduenas eta l 1992; Calvillo 1993; DDF 1996; Hernandez Avila 1995?; 
Margulis 1992; Medina & Quenel 1993; Restrepo 1992; Ssa 1993). For example, ozone 
studies have included the cases of school absenteeism among children and childhood 
asthma in Mexico City. In both cases the results have suggested that ozone exposure may 
have adverse effects on the respiratory health of children and that they are positively 
associated with the number of children’s emergency visits for asthma in Mexico City (see 
Romieu eta l 1993 and 1995?).
Undoubtedly, the high levels of air pollution that have been experienced in the MZMC has 
become one of the main preoccupations for all sectors of Mexican society (Cancino Aguilar 
1994: 105; CMPCCAVM 1992: 7; Diaz Diaz & Perl6 Cohen 1994: 43-44; Ezcurra 1990: 
583 and 1995; SEDESOL 1993: 153). Despite a rapid increase of around 45% in total 
emissions to the atmosphere during the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 2.10), though, it was 
not until 1986 that polluted air became a priority for the Mexican government. Previous 
official attempts to control air pollution - from 1972 (when the Subsecretana de 
Mejoramiento del Ambiente was created) to 1986 - were scarce and insufficient (Schteingart 
1989: 47-48). The latter can be explained partly because recognition and concern about 
environmental issues in the Mexican government did not come until the last years of the 
six-year mandate ‘sexenio ’ (1982-1988) of ex-President Miguel de la Madrid. Before the 
years of 1987 and 1988, the government response to environmental issues was 
characterised for being heavily centralised, specific or ‘sectorial’, and non-democratic 
(Branes 1994: 157; Nuccio etal 1993: 270).
14 Some of the most important non government-led organisations that have carried out studies on air 
pollution and health effects in the MZMC include the Pan American Health Organisation PAHO, Hospital 
ABC, and the Centre of Public Health Research (see Hernandez Avila 1995?). The central government 
Secretariat of Health has also participated and coordinated some research on air pollutants and their effects in 
Mexico City through the ‘Sistema National de Salud’ (see, for example, Ssa 1993).
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T able  2.10 T o ta l a tm ospheric  em issions 
accord ing  to official figures (tons/yr)
(S 0 2 , NOx, H C , CO, SPM ) fo r M ZM C
Y EA R TO N S
1972 2,653
1973 2,868
1974 3,244
1975 3,394
1976 3,431
1977 3,438
1978 3,449
1979 3,521
1980 3,600
1981 3,672
1982 3,757
1983 3,851
1984-1987 n.a.
1988 4,900
1989 4,356
1990 n.a.
1991 4,300
1992-1993 n.a.
1994 4,009
1995-1997 n.a.
Source: CMPCCAVM (1992); DDF (1996); Schteingart (1989); STI (1990) 
n.a. = not available
During the de la Madrid’s administration, in 1986, a series of plans were set out to 
overcome the increasing air pollution problem. For example, some of the new proposals 
for the MZMC included an industry relocation programme, vehicle emissions control 
system, the establishment of an automatic air quality monitoring network, unleaded petrol 
for motor vehicles, and the change-over to natural gas in power plants (Bravo Alvarez 
1987: 237-255; Diaz Dfaz & Perlo Cohen 1994: 46; Gamboa de Buen 1994: 138). It was 
not until President Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) came to power, though, that a much 
stricter plan to control air pollution than that of his predecessor was launched in 1990 for 
the MZMC: the Comprehensive Program Against Air Pollution PICCA (Programa Integral 
Contra la Contaminacion Atmosferica de la Zona Metropolitana de la Ciudad de Mexico). 
This programme, containing 41 measures focused on five main areas of concern: better 
quality of fuels, expansion of public transportation and strict vehicles emissions control, 
improvement of combustion processes and emissions control in industries and service 
establishments, environmental restoration, and environmental education and research as 
well as social participation. As a number of legal and economic measures took place, a new 
inter-governmental agency was also created: the Metropolitan Commission for Pollution 
Prevention and Control in the Valley of Mexico CMPCCAVM (Comision Metropolitana
15 For a detailed description of the 41 measures see STI (1990: 34-41).
40
para la Prevention y Control de la Contamination Ambiental en el Valle de Mexico). This 
body - which changed its name in 1996 to the current Environmental Metropolitan 
Commission CAM (Comision Ambiental Metropolitana) has since been in charge of 
coordinating air pollution prevention and control activities in the MZMC (see CMPCCAVM 
1994a and 1994c; DDF 1996; SEDESOL 1993 and 1994; STI 1990). With such a 
responsive attitude, no one would have doubted that the Salinas administration had shown 
political will to overcome the problem:
“I am giving precise, urgent and imperative instructions to 
the Mayor of the Federal District to act immediately and 
efficiently to promote community participation in the fight 
against pollution” 16
(STI 1990: 2).
The results that are being exhibited after a six-years period of dealing with polluted air in 
MZMC, though, raises the question whether the speech given by Salinas in 1988 
represented only good intentions seeking short and immediate positive results for socio­
political reasons,17 rather than properly addressing and responding to the problem. 
Although serious governmental policy response commenced only in the late 1980s 
following the first detailed 1989 Emissions Inventory, and more properly, since 1990 
through the PICCA, policy on air pollution control has already been contested (see Diaz 
Diaz & Perlo Cohen 1994: 46; Gamboa de Buen 1994: 138-139; STI 1990: 31-33). 
Criticisms have focused on the fact that much of the latter had been formulated without 
following scientific recommendations and previous international experiences on combating 
some air pollutants - such as Pb and SO 2 - where control has resulted in unexpected side- 
effects. Indeed, the strategies for reducing Pb and SO2 through changes on the content of 
petrol for motor vehicles and the change-over from fuel oil to natural gas in power plants 
during the late 1980s, respectively, have increased the emissions of HC and NOx 
contributing to the formation of high levels of ozone (Bravo Alvarez & Torres Jardon 1995: 
3-4; Ezcurra 1990: 583).
16 Ex-President Salinas de Gortari inauguration speech in December 1988. Quote taken from WHO/UNEP 
(1992: 163); the original quote could be seen in STI (1990: 2): “...doy instrucciones precisas, urgentesy 
energicas al Jefe del Departamento del Distrito Federal para que actue de inmediato con acciones eficaces 
alentando la participation de la comunidad para abatir la contamination ”.
17 The 1988 Presidential elections were the most contested ever in Revolutionary Mexico’s history and 
have been regarded as fraudulent: Mr. Salinas’ popularity and political legitimacy were well below all his 
predecessors (Ward 1990: 66-67).
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Although measurements of Pb are now well below international standards (1.5 micrograms 
per cubic metre) and NO2, SO 2 and CO occasionally exceed the Mexican air quality norm, 
Mexico City still experiences heavy air pollution (see CMPCCAVM 1994c: 40-64; DDF 
1996; SEDESOL 1994: 223-232). For instance, two of the main pollutants that were not a 
serious problem before the implementation of the 1986 and a posteriori regulations but are 
now constantly present in Mexico City’s air, include suspended particles (such as PM 10) 
and 03 (combination of HC + NOx + solar light) (Bravo Alvarez & Torres Jardon 1995: 3- 
7; Campos Ruiz e ta l 1993: 73; CMPCCAVM 1994c 40-64; Collins & Scott 1993: 123- 
124; Ezcurra 1990: 583; Hardie et al 1995).
Another criticism of the Mexican air pollution control system lies in the fact that the 1989 
Emissions Inventory and subsequent official publications have mistakenly argued and 
informed on the sources of some pollutants, and consequently, inadequate policies have 
been adopted and implemented. For instance, the Mexican government has said that 95% of 
suspended particles are generated due to natural sources (environmental degradation or 
deforestated areas) in the Basin of Mexico. The latter led the government to elaborate a 
reforestation programme in 1990 which meant seeding 41.6 million trees in the urban and 
rural areas of the basin; 40% of these trees have already disappeared (CMPCCAVM 1994a: 
11/39 and 1994c: 60, 86). However, it has been argued that the primary sources of 
emission of particles are combustion processes and fixed sources, and not ‘tolvaneras’ 
(see Bravo Alvarez & Torres Jardon 1995: 7). The 1994 Emissions Inventory shows that 
the per centage by weight of suspended particles from environmental degradation is still the 
same in comparison to the 1989 Emissions Inventory (see Tables 2.7 & 2.11). If the 
government is right in saying that the main source of particles is ‘tolvaneras’ and that the 
strategy for bringing down their ambient concentrations is by seeding trees, then its 
approach has not worked out.18 Suspended particles in MZMC are still above the Mexican 
air quality norm and has become the second biggest problem in Mexico City’s atmosphere 
after ozone (see Bravo Alvarez & Torres Jardon 1995: 7; Calderon-Garciduenas etal 1992: 
225; CMPCCAVM 1994c: 60-63; Hardie etal 1995).
18 Apparently, some of the information provided for the 1994 Emissions Inventory in relation to 
particulates has been taken from studies done in 1990. If this is the case, then the Mexican government has 
failed to update the emissions inventory and the follow-up to PICCA seems difficult to realise (see DDF 
1996). Other figures which are hard to believe are those in relation to HC. While environmental degradation 
contributed to a 34.9% of HC in 1989, in less than 6 years, by 1994, it came down to 3.8% (see Tables 2.7 
& 2 .11).
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Table 2.11 Emissions Inventory (1994) by sector (% by weight)
S E C T O R SPM S02 CO NOx HC TOTAL
Industry 1.4 57.3 0.4 24.5 3.2 3.0
Services 0.2 15.9 0.1 4.2 38.9 10.0
Transport 4.2 26.8 99.5 71.3 54.1 75.0
Ecological
degradation
94.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 12.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: DDF (1996)
Most of the factors that have largely contributed to Mexico City’s current air quality 
situation are still playing a major role within the policy-formulation process. For example, 
despite the governmental efforts to contain urban sprawl through land-use regulations and 
the creation of a green belt, urban and population growth continues to expand in the MZMC 
including land zones for environmental conservation (CMPCCAVM 1994c: 85-86; 
Gamboa de Buen 1994: 123-138; Nava Escudero 1992: 114-116; Pezzoli 1991: 207). 
Although some industries in Mexico City have been closed - such as the 18 de Marzo oil 
refinery - or have moved out of the city - such as General Motors - industrial relocation 
programmes have not succeeded and emission-control equipment has not been thoroughly 
installed due to high costs (see Collins & Scott 1993: 126). Government attempts to 
relocate industry by the end of the Salinas administration, failed due to the economic crisis 
of 1994. Only few large companies are financially prepared to move out of Mexico City 
once economic stability returns to Mexico.
By the time the Zedillo administration (1994-2000) came to power in the mid-1990s, it was 
clear that the air quality situation in Mexico City was still considerably poor. While 
previous pollution control measures did actually bring some improved air quality by the end 
of the Salinas administration, the high concentration levels of such pollutants as 03, 
Particles and VOCs remain as an unresolved problem. So, for example, although the peak 
levels of ozone have not exceeded more than 300 IMECA points over the last few years 
(this band was breached 11 days in 1992) and the number of times the contingency plan 
has been implemented has diminished from 7 in 1996 to 3 in 1997, the Mexican air quality 
norm -100 IMECA points - is being breached annually more than 90% of the total number
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of days (see DDF 1996). The increasing concentration levels of diverse organic compounds 
- in particular aldehydes which contribute to the formation of photochemical pollution - 
during the period 1993-1996, constitute another example of continuous poor air quality in 
Mexico City (see Garcia etal 1998: 31). This situation led the Mexican government to 
launch, in 1996, a more integrated and even stricter air quality strategy: the Air Quality 
Improvement Programme (Programa para Mejorar la Calidad del Aire en el Valle de 
Mexico). This new strategy (which updates and enhances the previous air pollution 
programme PICCA), focuses on four main areas of concern: industry, private vehicles, 
public transport, and environmental restoration. In doing so, it seeks to diminish the 
number and concentrations of pollutants per day as well as to reduce the number of 
contingency of emergency situations per year.
Undoubtedly, the growth in car ownership and car use, the Mexican government’s long­
standing commitment to road building, and the lack of a more integrated and enhanced 
public transport system for the whole Metropolitan Zone of Mexico City MZMC have 
largely influenced the air quality situation in Mexico City. Energy consumption continues to 
increase through rising levels of gasoline, fuel oil, diesel and natural gas consumption (see 
Bauer & Quintanilla 1995). For instance, in the first four years of this decade daily petrol 
consumption in MZMC augmented 13.66% from 16.1 million litres every day in 1990 to 
18.3 by late-1994 (CMPCCAVM 1995a: 9). This is partly explained due to the rapid 
growth of car ownership: the annual car sales in the MZMC grew from c.a. 100,000 units 
in 1983 to almost 250,000 in 1992 (see Table 2.12). Although these figures started to 
decrease for the years 1993-1995 (the sales dramatically fell down due to the 1994 
economic crisis), car ownership and car use are expected to increase after financial recovery 
(see CMPCCAVM 1994c: 27; DDF 1996: 86).
Table 2.12 Vehicles growth and inhabitants/vehicles percentages in the Federal 
District (1940-1990)__________________________________________________________________
YEAR 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Vehicles 46 361 72 189 234 638 676 005 1 803 559 2 200 000 
(c.a.)
Inhabitants 
per vehicle
37.1 42.6 20.7 19.1 4.9 4.0
(c.a.)
Source: Diaz Dfaz & Perl6 Cohen (1994); Excelsior (June 1st, 1995)
Whereas the use of the private vehicle has been favoured through diverse road building 
programmes over the last few years (see Ward 1998: 145), the public transportation system
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in Mexico City has been insufficient, corrupt, and at times, subjected to significant financial 
cuts. So, for example, during the periods 1972-1976 and 1989-1990 the expansion and 
improvement of the underground system Sistema de Transporte Colectivo STC - Metro, 
stopped. While the underground system has been systematically enlarged since the early 
1990s, it has failed to discourage motorists from using their cars (see Navarro 1993: 41- 
55). Although the recent transportation plan for Mexico City - launched by the government 
in 1995 - contemplates the expansion and improvement of the public transportation system 
(e.g. underground, trolleys and trams, buses) it will continue to favour private vehicles 
(see Chapter VII). This ambitious programme includes the creation and enlargement of 
highways within Mexico City and of motorways around the metropolitan zone: new road 
rings are already under construction within and outside Mexico City (see Calvillo 1995; 
DDF 1995).
2.4 Conclusion
Within the context of the current environmental debate with regard to cities, air pollution 
represents an issue of significant urban environmental concern in countries of the North 
and the South. Diverse ways of approaching air quality management (both similarities and 
differences) within a North-South context constitute a major justification for carrying out a 
comparative exercise on London and Mexico City. As seen in this chapter, the two local 
case studies both suffer from poor air quality - albeit the scale of the problem is different in 
each of them. While the levels of air pollution are far higher and more alarming in Mexico 
City than in London, the way to improve air quality seems to point in the same direction: 
tackling the use of the car and other road vehicles. The challenge for urban centres like 
London and Mexico City is to improve air quality without compromising the need to meet 
the demands for urban mobility. Measures such as traffic calming, vehicles’ emissions 
control, banning of cars, or improvement of fuels, may assist in ameliorating the problem. 
However, as long as car ownership and car use continue to increase, traffic management 
policies and better public transport systems may be offset by increasing levels of road 
transport emissions. Thus, while short-term policies may be desirable for preventing 
present generations being exposed to high levels of pollution, medium to long-term policies 
are essential if future generations are to meet their own needs for air quality.
While an adequate and integrated response to achieving and maintaining healthy air quality 
in urban centres requires the participation of diverse actors of society, participants at the 
local level play a crucial role in this. As seen in the following chapter, local authorities 
constitute the institutional means at the local level for ensuring an efficient, coordinated and 
legitimate response for dealing with urban environmental issues, particularly regarding air 
quality management. The next chapter sets out the significant role that local authorities have
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for improving the environmental conditions of urban centres, and outlines the debates on 
models for reforming local government to improve air quality. The following chapters 
(Chapters IV-VII) then describe and analyse how London and Mexico City’s systems of 
local government operate in relation to air quality management.
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C H A P T E R  III
Models of Local Government
“Obviously times and conditions change and governmental institutions are 
always likely to change to match societal changes. However, it would be a shade 
premature to write off the metro idea just yet”.
L.J. Sharpe (1995) on the future o f 
metropolitan government.
3.1 Introduction
The need to reorganise local government in countries of the North stemmed primarily from 
the considerable growth of urban centres beyond the existing boundaries of their local 
governments, and from the expansion of local government’s service functions especially 
during the post-war period. Reviewing the organisation of local government, thus, has 
implied improving structures of government in metropolitan areas where the enlargement or 
scale of local units has been at the core of the debate. There exist three set of assumptions 
that have attempted to explain and understand the need for local government reorganisation 
in relation to metropolitan areas. These three are the metropolitan model, which underlies 
much of the orthodox tradition, the public choice theory, which is a critique to that 
traditional model, and the local governance approach, which draws upon and also criticises 
the public administration model without being, in itself, a new normative theory. This 
chapter seeks to outline the debates on reforming local government by focusing on these 
three perspectives. While the analysis focuses on the need for an area-wide coordinating 
authority at the local government level (without excluding lower tier authorities’ 
participation) for dealing with air quality management issues, this chapter starts by 
examining the role of local governments within an urban environmental context.
3.2 The role of local government
In the quest of how best to govern urban centres, the role of local governments has been 
increasingly recognised around the world. At the international level, for example, such
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organisations as the WCED or the OECD have acknowledged the importance of local 
governments for being the best placed for both dealing with local needs (WCED 1987: 17) 
and managing diverse urban environmental problems (OECD 1990: 43). Additionally, at 
UNCED, the capacity local authorities have for making sustainable development happen 
was endorsed in Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 (see UN 1993: 233-234). More recently, at 
Habitat n , the action plan of the Habitat Agenda has also embraced the significance of local 
governments by outlining in section D of Chapter IV the need for action on the issues of 
decentralisation and the strengthening of local authorities and their associations/networks 
(Hundsalz 1996: 8).
At the same time, the role of local governments itself has developed and changed. This 
changing role has taken place due to a range of global, national and local forces (political, 
economic, social) which have challenged the traditional participation and organisation of 
local governments. At the global level, for example, some of these forces include the 
internationalisation of the economies (i.e. globalisation), the integration of trading blocs, 
and the persistent of the international debt and its consequential imposed austerity measures 
to developing countries. At the national level, increased efforts of decentralisation and 
democratisation have also contributed to this change. Finally, at the local level, urban 
growth, the politics and distribution of power, the growing participation of other actors - 
e.g. civil society, NGOs, the private sector - and local government incapacities and service 
failures have certainly impacted on the role and ways of working of local authorities (see 
Ben-Elia 1996b: 1-7; Humes IV 1991: 1-12; McCamey 1996b: 6-12 and 1996d: 7-15; 
Norton 1994: 15). The literature on these emerging forces affecting traditional patterns of 
local government is substantial in the North but still poor in the South (see, for example, 
Ben-Elia 1996a; Bennet 1993a; Borja 1992; Clarke & Stewart 1990; Edralin 1996; 
McCamey 1996a and 1996c; Morse & Hardoy 1992; Sharpe 1993a; Stewart 1986; Stewart 
& Stoker 1995a; Stoker 1991).
Converging global and national forces as well as diverse existing types of institutions, 
behaviour and representation at the local level in each country, defy broad generalisations 
on the role and organisation of local government (Marcou 1993: 53; Norton 1994: 15). It is 
possible to depict, though, some recent common directions of change. In the North, for 
instance, the dominance of national governments during the second part of the twentieth 
century - i.e. the growth of the welfare state after the Second World War - emphasized the 
role of local governments as local service agencies. While provoking an increase of local 
government expenditure, personnel and functions (e.g. health, education, strategic 
planning), the provision of services seemed the main and only role of local authorities -
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though in the case of Britain, municipal entrepreneurialisation took place in the nineteenth 
century (Clarke & Stewart 1990: 3; Humes IV 1991: 2; Sharpe 1993b: 10-11; Stewart 
1986: 9). The emergence of the post-welfare model during the 1970s and 1980s based on 
market theories, though, started to conceive local authorities - particularly in Europe - as 
enablers, partners and facilitators instead of providers of service delivery (Bennet 1993b: 
15-17; John 1990: 19; Welch 1997: 19).
Although more recent, more rapid and more traumatic than in the North (Humes IV 1991: 
1), there is also a process of change in the traditional role and organisation of local 
government in countries of the South (Ben-Elia 1996b: 1). Like in the North, much of this 
recent changing process has come from global forces, state reforms and particular local 
development problems (Edralin 1996: 4; McCarney 1996d: 5-15). Historically, local 
governments have been usually neglected within the development effort and have been the 
‘weak* partners in the process of governing in the highly centralised, single-party, or 
military dictatorship systems of the South. In Latin America, for instance, while the latter 
has been a dominant characteristic in the majority of the countries, the modernisation of the 
nation-state during the past two decades has slowly started to give political importance to 
the role of local and municipal governments. This modernisation process has included such 
issues as democracy and decentralisation of state structures and functions (see Borja 1992: 
130-133; McCamey 1996b: 6-14; Neira Alva 1995: 32; Satterthwaite 1997: 1682). This 
process of change on the role and nature of local government in the South is not only about 
recognising the participation of local authorities - something which was commonly denied 
in the past. It is also about their key role for implementing policies, directly (or indirectly) 
providing services, facilitating community participation and, more recently, for enabling 
service delivery and for coordinating different political institutions and emerging social 
groups (see, for example, Borja 1992: 137-141; Edralin 1996: 17-18; Marcondes 1996: 
225-226; Rodriguez & Winchester 1996: 33-34; Stren 1996: 33-39).
The existing literature on urban sustainability recognises local authorities, first and 
foremost, as essential actors for leading urban centres to some form of sustainability (see, 
for example, Blowers 1993a; Breheny 1992a; Elkin etal 1991; Gilbert eta l 1996; Gordon 
1993; Hardoy et al 1992; Haughton & Hunter 1994; Richardson 1992; Serageldin & 
Cohen 1995; Stoker & Young 1993; Stren 1992b; UNCHS 1996a). There exist three 
common issues that have emerged from the urban sustainability discourse which are linked 
to the debate on the changing role and reorganisation of local authorities. First, local 
authorities are regarded as key agencies for implementing, promoting and designing urban 
environmental policies. Based on the assumption that it is at the local level where
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knowledge and expertise on local needs and environmental conditions exist, local 
authorities are viewed as the most appropriate for that task as opposed to central 
government (Gordon 1993: 13; Haughton & Hunter 1994: 300; Keating 1993: 47). This 
assumption, however, does not seem to apply for many countries in the South where 
strong centralised forms of government have limited the role of local authorities to only 
ensuring certain basic services. For example, in Latin America, because local authorities 
have barely acted as agents for development, they lack the required technical and political 
qualifications as well as the resources and the experience in directly managing public 
services (Borja 1992: 133-134). Although it has been argued that municipal staff do not 
always have the required expertise to address the conceptual as well as the practical issues 
related to urban environmental policy, training programmes and professional education 
have been encouraged (see OECD 1996: 167).
Second, while local authorities are not the only key players for managing urban 
environmental issues, they are seen as one of the many components of the broader concept 
of local governance (see Gilbert et al 1996: 16-17; Hardoy et al 1992: 23). The emphasis 
now given to the positive role of local governments, has also included that of community- 
based and non-governmental organisations (Stren 1992b: 312). The importance of 
transferring powers and resources (e.g. financial, technical) to the local level and the need 
for adopting an integrated (management) approach to urban environmental problems have 
also been stressed. Hence, the capacity of local authorities is to work in partnership with 
other agencies in the pursuit of sustainable development, for example, with the private 
sector, community organisations, central government bodies, and citizens in general 
(Hardoy et al 1992: 196-197; Serageldin et al 1995: 1-2). The active participation of 
communities, for instance, has become essential for achieving urban sustainability and 
solving urban environmental problems. Being closest to the communities, local 
governments are regarded precisely as the most appropriate institutional mechanisms for 
enhancing individual participation within an entire urban centre (see Gilbert et al 1996: 30; 
Serageldin & Cohen 1995: 29-30). As endorsed in Agenda 21, local authorities play a vital 
role in educating and mobilizing individuals for increasing people’s awareness of 
sustainable development issues. While developing and adopting ‘a local Agenda 21* 
through a process of public consultation, local authorities gather information from the 
citizenry to build consensus on urban environmental policies and reshape their 
sustainability strategies (see Keating 1993: 47; UN 1993: 233-234).
Finally, the changing nature of local government that has resulted in an increased call for 
local authorities to think of themselves as ‘enablers’ rather than as direct providers of
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services, has been adopted by the sustainable urban development discourse. Being 
incorporated into the field of urban sustainability, the recommendations on the issue of the 
role and organisation of local government are similarly for local authorities to increasingly 
act as coordinators, facilitators and enablers of environmental strategies and policies (see, 
for example, Hardoy et al 1992: 197; Haughton & Hunter 1994: 300).
Certainly, there exist diverse competing theories and approaches on the role of local 
government which, as argued by Wolman (1996: 158), “vary from country to country and 
are embedded in each country’s history and political culture”. Unsurprisingly, the number 
of theoretical traditions and approaches - particularly derived from the North - is quite 
substantial, and a comprehensive review of them is not possible. As it has been said that 
countries like Britain and the United States have had the longest and best established 
traditions of local self-government and representative democracy (Magnusson 1986: 1), 
much of the discussion on local government has focused on these two English-speaking 
countries.
3.3 The local government reorganisation debate
This section attempts to explore three diverse sets of assumptions of local government 
reorganisation in relation to the structures of metropolitan areas: the still influential 
traditional orthodoxy, the public choice theory, and the emerging system of local 
governance.
3.3.1 The traditional orthodoxy: the metropolitan model
As cities in the North started to expand, concerns were expressed in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century in relation to the political fragmentation of local governments in 
metropolitan areas. A good example which early in this century provided with a diagnosis 
of the problems arising from metropolitan political fragmentation in the United States is the 
book ‘Metropolitan Government’ by Victor Jones (1942). In this work, the author 
identifies three main aspects that have resulted from a system of disintegrated local 
government in metropolitan areas: unequalised services, disparity between need and fiscal 
ability to meet that need (i.e. uneven distribution of tax resources), and dispersion and 
dissipation of political control of the development of social, economic and political 
institutions. While the debate on metropolitan fragmentation has been largely about these 
three issues, Jones analyses diverse cases that exemplify the scale of fragmentation that 
existed by the 1930s in the USA. Two of the seventeen metropolitan districts are, for
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instance, the New York-North-Eastem New Jersey area and the Cook County part of 
metropolitan Chicago. In the former, within a land area of around 350 square miles, there 
were around 289 incorporated municipalities, 14 counties, plus the five counties within 
New York City and innumerable school districts, special authorities and other 
governmental units. In the latter, the responsibility of local government was divided among 
358 separate units: 89 cities and villages, 1 county, 30 townships, 195 school districts, 45 
park districts, 1 forest preserve district, 4 sanitary districts, 2 mosquito-abatement districts, 
and 1 health district. The land area of Chicago comprised around 210 square miles, i
By giving a few selected examples in relation to the fragmentation of local government, 
Jones (1942: 52-84) illustrates the effect upon urban life in the USA of what he calls the 
present chaos of governmental units. One of the many cases that he cites regarding 
unequalised services and uneven distribution of tax resources, is transportation and traffic 
management - particularly, the highway and traffic system. According to the author, the 
problem was that in some of the seventeen metropolitan districts (each containing a 
population of 750,000 or more by 1940) there were two or more groups of governmental 
units involved in this issue under the authority of two or more bodies of statutory law. The 
ease and speed with which people could move about a metropolitan area depended on 
highways not only built and maintained by separate jurisdictions, but on the enforcement of 
traffic policies by independent police agencies. In the case of the New York-Northeastern 
New Jersey area, for example, Jones (1942: 57) states that concerted action “is possible 
only when two hundred and eighty-four diverse and conflicting units of government are 
willing to cooperate”. According to the author, though, local governments have failed to 
cooperate in providing traffic facilities mainly because the suburbs know that the central 
city would be forced, without waiting for cooperation, to provide some degree of 
accommodation for the daily swing of population in and out of the city. Thus, the suburban 
motorist would escape the taxes that the central city would have to levy to finance such 
projects. The costs of the construction of a traffic circuit in a city jurisdiction that would 
benefit people living outside that area, would be borne by the city alone. This fragmented 
system of authorities led Jones (1942: 57) to assert that such “a congeries of authorities” 
was inadequate to meet the problem of providing an articulated system of highways for 
metropolitan traffic.
During the long phase of local government reorganisation of the 1960s and 1970s in many
1 The facts and figures of fragmentation were taken from Jones (1942: 16; 124). The land area in square 
miles correspond to the year 1930.
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Western countries, the metropolitan problem was defined as how to achieve the greatest 
efficiency in production and the greatest equity in distribution. Thus, the urban 
governmental question referred to “which organisational and/or procedural arrangement 
will produce most efficiently and distribute more equitably the services to be rendered 
locally” (Dente 1990: 59). Solutions to political fragmentation, though, encompassed two 
diverse methods: those requiring fundamental structural changes in government, and those 
involving few or no structural changes in existing units of local government. Some 
examples of the former include annexation of contiguous territory or consolidation of 
municipalities, merger of special authorities with either the central city or county, and the 
establishment of a two-tier municipal government for the metropolitan area. For the latter, 
some examples are the establishment of ad hoc authorities, intergovernmental 
arrangements, and the extension of state or federal/central administration (see Jones 1942: 
85-185).
According to Bollens & Schmandt (1965: 371-399), two different approaches through 
cooperation among local governments - i.e. with no structural changes in government - 
have been devised in metropolitan areas to confront political fragmentation: interlocal 
cooperation and metropolitan councils. Taking many forms, interlocal cooperation goes 
from informal, verbal understandings where administrators of two local governments 
exchange information on the same service, to the formal, written agreements among diverse 
local units that decide jointly to build and operate a major service. Formal agreements can 
be of three kinds: a single government performing a service or providing a facility for one 
or more other local units, two or more local governments performing a function jointly or 
operating a facility on a joint basis, and two or more local governments assisting or 
supplying mutual aid to one another in emergency situations. A metropolitan council is a 
voluntary but permanent association of governments that is convened regularly to discuss 
and try to agree on solutions to common difficulties and needs. As an area-wide 
mechanism, it constitutes a forum for deliberation and discussion and an advisory, and 
coordinating organisation. Neither the interlocal cooperation nor the metropolitan council 
approaches are imposed by the central government but arise from local institutions.
Certainly, the method of integration by major structural change in government involves 
more legal and political barriers than the approaches outlined above (Jones 1942: 122). The 
increased recognition that individual municipal governments were unable to cope with the 
new social and economic needs of the metropolitan condition resulted in the idea of 
consolidating all local governmental units into a single jurisdiction for each metropolitan 
area (see Barlow 1991: 28-36). Although consolidations of local government existed in the
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late nineteenth century (e.g. London County Council LCC and New York City), it was not 
until the 1960s and 1970s that the first great movement to consolidation took place in 
Europe and North America (Keating 1995: 118).
Much of the discussion and principles for consolidation had its origins in the United States 
with what has been called the ‘good government reform movement’ - also known as the 
‘political reform tradition’ or simply the ‘old reform tradition’ (see Bish 1971: 148; Bish & 
Ostrom 1973: 7). This reform movement - which dominated the thinking and 
recommendations of most analysts of urban government in the USA until the 1960s - was 
about the modernisation of structures of local government in order to tackle the economic 
and social challenge of the twentieth century city. Some examples that have explained the 
principal recommendations of this reform tradition include Anderson (1925 and 1934), 
Anderson & Weidner (1950), the Committee for Economic Development’s ‘Modernising 
Local Government’ (1966), and two of the pioneers on formulating the concept of 
metropolitan government, Jones (1942) in the USA, and Robson (1939) in B ritain.2
In the first quarter of this century, Anderson (1925: 641-642) identified the organic 
principles of the traditional reform movement: the complete consolidation of the local 
government, the short ballot, the unification of powers, the separation of functions and the 
centralisation of administrative supervision (either by a city manager, a commission or an 
elected mayor). In briefly explaining each of them, the author stated that despite the many 
disagreements upon details and the varying personal preferences among forms of 
government, the reformers were in substantial agreement upon those fundamental 
principles.
The first of these principles - as explained by Anderson (1925) - states that in each unified 
urban area there should be only one unit of local government; in metropolitan areas, 
though, some powers of local self-government may well be left to the other local units. The 
latter eliminates much overlapping and duplication of effort. The second principle indicates 
that a consolidated unit of government simplifies the problem of the voter, i.e. centring the 
responsibility on a single governing body rather than on many local units. Here, it is 
assumed that governmental organisation becomes simpler, more visible, and more 
responsible. Anderson continues to explain that there is no perfect unanimity among all 
reformers upon the points in relation to the third principle, unification of powers, which is 
linked to the two other remaining principles, i.e. separation of functions and centralisation
2 For an extended list of references on the old reform tradition literature, see Bish (1971: 148-149).
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of administrative supervision. On the one hand, while most reformers advocate the 
abolition of the separation of powers in local government, on the other hand, they 
recognise the need to separate the functions of legislation and control from that of 
administration: politics must be separated as much as possible from administration. In other 
words, while the political or council branch should exercise control, the administrative one 
should be enabled to do its work without political interference. In order to achieve this, 
there exist three different proposals or plans for controlling the city government. Two of 
them - the commission and the city manager - unifies the powers of government in 
municipal affairs by means of restoring a council with complete control over the 
government. The other - the strong-mayor plan - seems to be less favoured as it implies 
leaving the entire power of local government in the hands of an elected mayor. 
Nevertheless, whereas most traditional reformers advocate an administration organised 
under the hierarchical principle, they tend to abandon the commission plan and favour the 
manager plan. This is because the former not only fails to separate politics from 
administration, but it does not allow a completely unified administration: it has five heads 
instead of one. By contrast, the manager plan enables the city council to select the most 
capable administrative head to be hold singly responsible for the entire administration.
During the post-war period, the orthodox reform movement, which advocated the case for 
consolidation, increasingly resembled what in the USA has been called the ‘metro scheme’ 
- also known elsewhere as the ‘metro model’. Whereas consolidation usually implied 
eliminating and replacing existing governments by a single city-wide government unit, the 
‘metropolitan model’ or ‘two-tier approach’ started to be associated with the idea of an 
area-wide metropolitan authority sharing powers with smaller local governments within its 
area (Self 1982: 61). This idea of a metropolitan government with an upper and lower tiers 
achieved widespread consensus during the post-war period (see, for example, Barlow 
1991; Hicks 1974; Miles 1970; Norton 1983; Robson and Regan 1972; Sharpe 1995a). In 
this sense, metropolitan government or the two-tier system of government means the 
creation of a new governmental unit with jurisdiction over the whole metropolitan area 
while retaining smaller governmental units for local areas. Each level of government has its 
own functions and responsibilities: whereas the area-wide unit has control over those 
activities which are best suited to large scale management, the local units deal with those 
which demand small scale management close to individuals. This system captures the 
advantages of consolidated government without incurring its flaws: public services for 
which there are scale economies can be produced efficiently, spillovers are eliminated, 
services which demand area-wide coordination can be organised effectively, and the city’s 
tax base can be used equitably (see Barlow 1981: 122-126).
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Both, theoretically and in practice, the metropolitan model has numerous variants or types 
of solutions for political fragmentation (see, for example, Anderson & Weidner 1950: 192- 
200; Barlow 1981: 119-178; Bollens & Schmandt 1965: 371-490; Dente 1990: 59-71; 
Jones 1942: 122-154; Jones & O’Donnell 1980: 546-549; Leemans 1970: 158-165; Norton 
1983: 3-51; Self 1982: 66-78; Sharpe 1995b: 17-20). So, for instance, in the United 
States, Bollens & Schmandt (1965: 440-448) identify three variations of the two-tier 
formula solution: metropolitan district, comprehensive urban county plan, and federation. 
The first, represents a governmental unit encompassing a substantial part or all of the 
metropolis but generally authorised to perform only one function or a few closely related 
activities of metropolitan character. As the latter represents a limited functional (but not 
territorial) role for a metropolitan authority, it is the mildest variation with respect to the 
concept of metropolitan government. The second, calls for the simultaneous transfer of 
selected functions from local authorities and sometimes other local units to the county 
government. The functional shifts are comprehensive in scope and occur at the same time: 
the county assumes functions of an area-wide nature and the rest of the local units 
(municipalities and other local governments) remain in existence to perform local services. 
Finally, the third implies the creation of a new area-wide government. Here, the local 
authorities or municipalities continue to exist, perform local functions for which the 
metropolitan government is not responsible, and retain their governing boards. 
Additionally, there exist provisions for local representation in the lower tier.
There exists some disagreement on whether a formula in which a metropolitan-wide 
authority that has been created simply by extending the boundary of the existing core city 
authority can be included under the metro rubric. For instance, Sharpe (1995b: 12-20) 
explains that such a formula - also known as the ‘unitary version’ - can be an example of 
the metropolitan model. The author argues that, in fact, it may display more resemblances 
to a more normal metro model as it may have a second tier in the form of neighbourhood 
councils, such as Oslo and Winnipeg. He recognises, though, that the unitary type is not an 
option that is easily open to the very largest cities simply because of scale. Thus, for this 
author, the degree of restructuring the government in practice varies from an area-wide 
body based on voluntary cooperation between existing units of local government in the 
metropolitan area, to the entirely new structure with full independent powers. By contrast, 
Self (1982: 61) asserts that metro theories reject the concept of simply expanding the 
boundaries of a major city (big urban areas with populations of perhaps a million or more) 
as this is assumed to be “politically impracticable and democratically undesirable”. 
Although he recognises that the structure of the metro authority can vary, if this is no more
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than a coordinating committee of the other local governments with no or very few executive 
powers (i.e. a system of intermunicipal cooperation), then it is only a step toward metro 
government rather than its achievement.
Additionally, determining the physical limits of a metropolis is a very contested issue. 
Territorial extension or number of inhabitants represent arbitrary indicators for considering 
any city as a large metropolis. Gottman (1995: 1) illustrates this by saying that in 1900 an 
agglomeration of one million people or more was considered a large metropolis: there 
existed one or two dozen of these. In the 1990s, there are about 200 such agglomerations 
and the really large metropolis agglomerates ten million inhabitants or more. According to 
Bollens & Schmandt (1965: 6-7) a metropolitan area consists of heavily populated land 
whose central city (or cities) and suburban or outlying parts have a high degree of 
economic and social interaction. These authors explain that although most people and 
organisations that have studied metropolitan areas agree that those are the basic 
characteristics, there is disagreement over what specific criteria should be applied to 
determine the boundaries of the metropolis. Overall, they conclude that a metropolitan area 
is a unit in an economic and social sense, but not in a governmental one.
While there might be some difference of opinion on which formula (functional and/or 
territorial) can be framed under the metropolitan model, the two-tier approach has been the 
most popular, appealing to traditional reformers in order to overcome the problem of 
political fragmentation (see, for example, Barlow 1981: 128 and 1991: 23; Bollens & 
Schmandt 1965: 439-440; CED 1970: 44-46; Gunlicks 1981: 14; Hallman 1977: 268; 
Sharpe 1995b: 18). For some time, metro schemes have represented the vanguard of more 
general movements of local government reform in countries such as Britain, Canada, 
France and the US (Self 1982: 78-79). In the United States, for instance, although practical 
applications of metropolitan governments have been few in number (Barlow 1981: 148), 
the two-level concept received increased advocacy and use during the 1960s (Bollens & 
Schmandt 1965: 439) where it was recognised the need for both a community and a 
metropolitan level of government:
“In principle a governmental system for America’s 
metropolitan areas must recognise the need for both a 
community level and a m etropolitan level of 
government...To gain the advantages of both centralisation 
and decentralisation, we [Committee for Economic 
Development] recommend as an ultimate solution a 
governmental system of two levels”
(CED 1970: 19).
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In Britain, the Herbert Report (RCLG 1960) and the Redcliffe-Maud Report (RCLG 1969) 
suggested the reorganisation of local government in London and in England, respectively, 
by advocating the implementation of the two-tier level approach in some identified 
metropolitan areas. Thus, for instance, the Redcliffe-Maud Report concluded that,
“In the special circumstances of three metropolitan areas 
around Birmingham, Liverpool and M anchester, 
responsibility for services should be divided in each case 
between a metropolitan authority whose key functions would 
be planning, transportation and major development, and a 
number of metropolitan district authorities whose key 
functions would be education, the personal social services, 
health and housing”
(RCLG 1969: 1).
Peter Self’s (1982) important work ‘Planning the Urban Region’, has explained the 
rationale and principles of striving for a two-tier system of metropolitan government. For 
this author, the metro model implies the creation of a metro authority which shares powers 
with smaller local governments within that area where, if it is necessary, the existing local 
governments can be left undisturbed or only reorganised at a later stage, as in the case of 
Metro Toronto. The metro government must have substantial direct powers and must be 
elected indirectly from leaders of the smaller local units or directly by citizens at large or 
through some mixture of the two. Direct election gives more authority and greater 
independence over policy formulation, but may be negated by stronger resistance to the 
policies.
Self (1982: 62-66) identifies five issues about the desirability of metro systems: 
competition and equality, community and lifestyles, area and functions, efficiency and 
planning, and democracy and accountability. First, he argues that local government units 
are shaped by political history and thus cannot grow or shrink like business firms by 
competitive action. This statement comes as a response to a critique that some writers (e.g. 
public choice theorists) make in order to justify a fragmented local government system on 
the grounds that the latter gives citizens a choice between diverse services and taxes offered 
by each competing unit, and then a citizen can choose his/her place of residence partly 
because of this. For Self, freedom of choice over local government services (produced by 
competitive units) may still occur among the various local units under a metro scheme. The 
delivery of public services are anyway correlated mainly with the wealth of an area and are 
probably only a minor factor in the individual’s choice of residence (see 3.3.2). At the 
same time, a metro government seeks to promote equity, by taking over functions such as
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transportation which have broad catchment areas, and others, such as social welfare, which 
have a very uneven incidence of need. Under this scheme, financial equalisation can 
operate for the benefit of its poorer and needier units. A metro body has greater local 
knowledge and accountability than other potential bodies for such equalisation as central or 
state governments.
Second, due to the significance that local communities and their lifestyles (within localised 
units) have acquired for local government, Self argues that the best way to recognise both 
the local and metropolitan importance of a service is to divide it between two levels of 
government in a logical manner. Some examples of such divisions are highways and local 
streets, main drainage and local sewers, refuse disposal and refuse collection, and so on. In 
relation to these examples, the author says that,
“Metro systems can recognise the geographical and political 
logic of these functional divisions, which correspond to 
differences in scale and externalities between the functioning 
of a locality and of a large urban system and to the different 
political interests of the smaller and larger urban community”
(Self 1982: 63).
One crucial aspect that the author highlights in relation to the concept of metropolitan-local 
division is that integrated functional management can be accomplished. The concentration 
of a whole function (or as much of it as possible) in the same hands simplifies coordination 
and reduces boundary frictions within the service in question. Furthermore, such a division 
pinpoints organisational and political responsibility for the service. However, the author 
recognises that this may weaken coordination between services. The issue of functional 
allocation raises the familiar aspects of the conflict between areal coordination (functional 
splits) and functional coordination (weakening areal coordination). In spite of this, Self 
argues that metro schemes give variable answers to that problem either by dividing or 
sharing some functions between the two levels, or by concentrating a whole function at one 
or the other level. Hence, a metropolitan government may be ‘top-heavy’, ‘bottom-heavy’, 
or ‘more or less balanced’.
In relation to the issues of area and functions, Self argues that the combination of a large 
metro government with small local units allows a mix of the advantages of both concepts. 
The problem here is one of size of the smaller units. If the metro scheme as a whole is to be 
‘bottom-heavy’ or ‘evenly balanced’ the author explains that the lower-tier units must have 
the minimum size and resources necessary for functional efficiency. Smaller size implies 
fewer powers: if the units become smaller they may correspond better with community
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issues but can expect few public powers and may become advisory bodies acting as 
pressure groups upon higher levels of government. In the case of the London reform of the 
1960s, for example, it was sustained that a local borough needed about 250,000 population 
if it was to operate strong powers, especially in the locally important services of education, 
health and welfare (see also RCLG 1960).
The fourth element relates to efficiency and planning. Here, Self asserts that some of the 
favourite arguments for reform are the issues of economies of scale and technical efficiency 
which an integrated local government achieves. While emphasizing gains in relation to 
large-scale infrastructure or bulk facilities or where artificial boundaries inflate costs, the 
author admits that often the gains are problematic, especially for personal services where 
the advantages of employing specialists is offset by the loss of personal contacts and 
problems of coordination. Additionally, he recognises that there are considerable 
diseconomies of scale due to the high expenditure per head of large units, as experienced 
by some metro schemes where there is little evidence of overall cost savings. In the case of 
London, after the 1965 reform, local government expenditure per head grew at a faster rate 
than for the country as a whole. Nevertheless, Self explains that the improvement in 
services may have been relatively greater after such reform which encouraged councillors 
and officers of new London boroughs to develop and improve services. As the general 
theme of the book, he also points out the value of overall planning related to the functional 
problems of the urban region as a strong argument for adopting a metro scheme.
Finally, Self makes reference to the issues of democracy and accountability. He starts by 
arguing that if local government remains fragmented, then the responsibility for dealing 
with broader urban problems passes inescapably to central or state governments. Such has 
been the case of London after the abolition of the Greater London Council GLC in 1986 
where the fragmentation of the government of London has been accompanied by increasing 
centralisation achieved through institutional reforms, central government appointments, and 
financial controls (see Newman & Thomley 1997: 967). Such a fragmented situation, 
represents for Self a failure of democratic accountability as traditionally understood. In 
relation to this, the author disagrees with the idea that because urbanisation has become so 
amorphous, then the construction of viable political institutions cannot be accomplished. 
He is also opposed to the fact that as urbanisation is so extensive service provision then 
becomes the primary responsibility of state governments or regional bodies answerable 
primarily to central governments. Furthermore, the author objects to the argument that 
metro government cannot be democratic if it increases electoral confusion or indifference 
and opens up government still more to the influence of special interests. On the contrary,
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Self asserts that metro systems solve problems of functional division and of political 
conflict and apathy: they rest upon the geographic logic of democratic responsibility. The 
democratic argument for a metro authority remains, thus, logical and strong in its own 
terms provided it corresponds to a genuine arena of common problems and interests.
Certainly, there exist some difficulties in the implementation of a two-tiered local 
government system. Some of the more common are the size and boundaries of the 
metropolitan authority and the lower-tier units, functional allocation (i.e. designating 
services to the upper and/or the lower tiers), and intergovernmental relationships. These 
problems have not only been recognised by the advocates of a two-tier system of 
government but by some of its critics, mainly public choice theorists (see, for example, 
Bish 1971: 156-157; Bish & Ostrom 1973: 14-15; Bollens & Schmandt 1965: 488; Jones 
& O’Donnell 1980: 547-548).
In his illustrative work, ‘Metropolitan Government’, Barlow (1991: 24-27) explains that 
resolving those two-tier problems involves further application of the principles and criteria 
for local government reorganisation. In relation to the issue of size and boundaries, the 
author asserts that, on the one hand, the metropolitan authority needs to be large enough to 
contain the metropolitan system (so that area-wide functions can be performed effectively), 
and its boundary needs to take into account patterns of interaction between the metropolitan 
centre and its surrounding suburbs. On the other hand, the size and boundaries of the 
lower-tier units must be determined by the functional and community requirements of the 
most important local services. For example, functional and community principles can be 
used to establish a minimum and a maximum size, respectively. The units need to be large 
enough to perform a wide range of functions, but small enough to serve the interests and 
requirements of localities within the metropolitan area. While it is desirable to establish 
lower-tier units of similar size to ensure comparable capabilities and resources, their 
boundaries need to include patterns of interactions associated with issues such as shopping 
centres, community facilities and so on.
In relation to other problems, Barlow argues that when considering the issue of functional 
allocation, it is necessary to split such functions between the two levels of government. 
Here, it is important to consider the possibility of transferring functions from higher-levels 
of government to the metropolitan authority. Designating services to either the upper or the 
lower-tier represents one of the most difficult problems to be solved in the two level system 
of government. The question of size has become an essential element for determining the 
latter. Some authors that have developed a useful procedure and criteria for assigning
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functional responsibilities include Bollens & Schmandt (1965: 308-338), Hallman (1977: 
177-190), and Hirsch (1964: 332-338). By way of illustration, Werner Z. Hirsch (1964: 
332-336) has addressed this question by considering four separate issues as a guideline to 
help on the distinction of which urban government services can best be performed on a 
area-wide or local basis. These issues include economic considerations (scale economy), 
political considerations (people-government proximity) administrative considerations 
(multi-functional jurisdictions to solve conflicting interests), and welfare considerations 
(financial arrangements). What can be learned from the proposals of analysis of this author, 
is that all services need to be considered one by one based on certain criteria to determine 
which functions can be carried out more efficiently on a large scale than on a small scale 
and vice versa. Even more, when the picture is not clear, then some functions may operate 
more efficiently if both tiers of government operate concurrently. However this procedure 
may help for allocating functions on a small or area-wide scale, the author asserts that,
“...each situation would have to be analysed on its merits 
and the advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
arrangements investigated and compared. In general, 
financing could be done by the same unit that provides the 
service”
(Hirsch 1964: 337).
Regarding the basis of representation for the metropolitan authority, Barlow (1991) 
explains that an area-wide government can be either comprised by representatives from the 
lower-tier units or directly elected by citizens. The former is easier to set up, does not over­
burden the electorate, and reduces ideological differences between the two levels of 
government. The latter leads the government to make policies in the metropolitan interest 
without inter-local rivalries and conflict. Inter-governmental relations can follow three 
different ways. First, lower-tier units may subordinate to the metropolitan authority; 
second, lower units may be superior, i.e. primary agents of local government; and third, 
the two levels may be complementary. Depending on the nature of representation at the 
metropolitan level and on the degree of local autonomy, inter-governmental problems may 
increase or decrease and thus it can be determined whether or not shared functions can be 
performed effectively.
In analysing Selfs five elements for a two-tier system of government within the context of 
the problem of air pollution, it is important to determine if they are relevant or not for 
ensuring an adequate air quality management system. If they are, then the normative 
prescriptions of the metro model need to be taken into account when reorganising local 
government structures in metropolitan areas. At this point, it is essential to bear in mind that
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controlling air pollution suggests taking an urban-wide approach over the whole ‘air-shed’ 
or ‘air-basin’ of a metropolitan area (see Bish & Ostrom 1973: 24; Bollens & Schmandt 
1965: 330).
To begin with, the issue of competition in relation to air quality management cannot be 
taken as a relevant case to argue for either a fragmented government or a metro system. 
This is because of the nature of the problem of air pollution. Citizens cannot have a choice 
of residence among diverse local units in a metropolitan area because air pollution may exist 
over the entire area regardless of existing administrative boundaries. Air pollution in an 
urban area usually expands beyond the limits of local units and sometimes, beyond the 
boundaries of the own metropolitan area. Thus, competition among fragmented or second- 
tier local units in the case of the metro scheme may prove useless as local units are helpless 
to protect themselves against the failure of their surrounding neighbours to control it (see 
Bollens & Schmandt 1965: 329).
More relevant is the issue of equity and financial equalisation in relation to air pollution 
control. Here, a metro system, as opposed to a fragmented one, promotes equity (and can 
provide financial aid) among those components of an air quality management system that 
have broad catchment areas, such as emission inventories, monitoring systems and 
emergency plans. So, for instance, the ideal monitoring network for air quality 
management consists of an automated network measuring all major pollutants and 
providing continuous up to the minute data to a central control (see Elsom 1996: 71). Due 
to the high costs of real-time monitoring equipment, a metro body can operate a system of 
financial equalisation benefiting the poorer local units. Although financial equalisation may 
be operated by the central government, the issues of local knowledge and accountability of 
lower and upper tier authorities may be greater than that of central government. The latter is 
particularly relevant in those countries where diverse air pollution functions (such as 
monitoring) have been traditionally allocated to local authorities. There is no reason to 
believe that in practice, a metro authority would show less political impartiality for financial 
aid than the central government.
The issues of community and lifestyles play not only a major role in managing air quality 
but in determining which aspects have a metro or localised character within an air quality 
management strategy. As metro schemes recognise the importance of area-wide and 
localised functions (i.e. the concept of metropolitan-local division), it may be the case that 
lower-tier authorities could share or have their own functions for certain components of an 
air quality management system. This is certainly tme regarding air pollution control policies
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for better public transport and improved traffic management policies. The analysis of 
community organisation and urban mobility in different local units within a metro area 
assists in deciding whether public transport is required or not for that local unit. If it is, 
then it also helps to decide which tier of government can provide this and what type of 
public transport should this be. For instance, there are some type of areas which due to its 
particular characteristics (e.g. residential location, low urban mobility), do not require the 
expansion of some means of public transport such as underground or trains. Instead, a 
system of local buses can operate in these areas and fulfil the needs for public transport. 
While short-distance routes may be provided and/or coordinated by the lower-tier authority 
(e.g. by a system of local buses), long-distance routes which require an area-wide 
coordination mechanism (as they may cover two or more local units) can be provided by a 
metro body. The creation, enlargement, or improvement of existing means of public 
transport is also very much associated to the socio-economic structure of diverse local areas 
within the whole city as it relates to the main source of air pollution, i.e. car ownership and 
car use. The lifestyles of some richer or busy areas may induce a far greater use of private 
cars than poorer or more isolated areas within the same metropolitan area.
Another example that allows recognition of a metropolitan-local division of a service is the 
case of air quality monitoring sites. Here, the upper and lower units can concurrently 
collect data through similar or dissimilar methods of measuring pollutants: e.g. automated 
or manual systems. It may be also the case that local units can concentrate on certain 
aspects of the whole function. So, while the area-wide unit may concentrate on measuring 
pollutants which represent a situation of unacceptable health risks, the local unit may 
concentrate on those whose levels are acceptable but where there is still a need to continue 
monitoring them to be assured they will remain so (see Elsom 1996: 68).
Most importantly, and in connection with the issues of area and functions, the arguments 
for an integrated functional management embedded in a metro scheme as explained by Self 
(1982) match with the prime aim of a comprehensive or integrated approach to air quality 
management. Indeed, the concentration of diverse aspects of this function in a metropolitan 
unit - e.g. air quality monitoring networks, emission inventories, air quality standards and 
public information bands, emergency plans and so on - enhances coordination and 
standardisation. An integrated response to air quality management in the case of air quality 
monitoring networks, for example, needs some central control. Without a central head, the 
information provided by local units through diverse monitoring systems will fail to provide 
an urban-wide air quality situation, which, in turn, is required for the implementation of an 
emergency plan when rising levels of pollution pose a threat to human health. Such a
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comprehensive response to air pollution may improve if other determinant functions like 
public transportation and traffic management issues are also coordinated by the central or 
area-wide unit.
Thus, according to the orthodox model, the issue of air pollution can be a good example of 
a ‘top-heavy’ metropolitan authority where the concentration of a whole function is more 
evident at the upper level than at the lower. It follows that, if this is the case, discussion on 
the size and financial resources of local units may not be essential. Nevertheless, if local 
authorities are expected to participate under a concurrent functional basis or by means of 
implementing and enforcing air quality management measures (such as informing the 
public, stopping cars, or running their own system of local buses), then size and finance 
become significant issues. Certainly, whether a metro scheme for air quality management 
may be ‘top-heavy’ or ‘evenly balanced’, depends not only on the political and organisation 
weight accorded to or accumulated by each governmental level (see Self 1982: 64). It may 
also depend on whether local authorities (particularly lower tier) are expected to represent a 
channel for putting citizens’ air quality management concerns and demands into urban 
environmental policies.
The benefits of economies of scale and technical efficiency that can be achieved through a 
metro scheme as argued by Self, are present in the case of air pollution control (see also, 
Hirsch 1964: 333). Due to the needs of a large-scale air quality management infrastructure, 
a metro scheme can exploit large scale economies. Thus, far from being unimportant, large 
scale operation may bring, at least in theory, more efficiency. While measuring efficiency is 
often difficult (see Travers et al 1991b: 3), it can show, for example, how much automated 
air quality monitoring sites cost and whether or not there can be overall cost savings for the 
entire area.
In relation to the issues of public participation and scale economies, Hirsch (1964: 332- 
338) argues that while air pollution control benefits from major economies of scale - as the 
populations exceeds 50,000-100,000 - it does not require close proximity between people 
and government (see above). This urban issue resembles a case where, while an effective 
dialogue between citizen and authority can encourage responsible government action, it can 
also lead to chaos and often to inaction. Here, the advantages of close proximity does not 
seem to outweigh the disadvantages. It is important to note, though, that Hirsch may not 
have thought about the importance of citizen’s participation (people-govemment proximity) 
in relation to car ownership and car use as at the time he published his article, motor 
vehicles were not as yet the main source of pollution. Regardless of this, major benefit
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spillovers could be expected anyhow from air pollution control; these can extend into an 
entire basin, sometimes covering a metropolitan complex plus the surrounding countryside. 
The size of the spillover area, in turn, indicates the proper unit for fiscal interrelation; 
income distribution does not play an important role. Topography and population 
distribution favours air pollution control to be assigned to a government unit under an area- 
wide basis. Similarly to air pollution control, Hirsch considers that transportation enjoys 
major economies of scale. Nevertheless, proximity has mixed benefits as citizen 
participation enriches democratic procedure but at the same time prevents decisive socially 
desirable action from being taken. So, political proximity can and cannot be considered 
essential: in the absence of clear-cut proximity advantages, scale economies may take more 
importance. Again, major benefit spillovers could be expected and income redistribution 
plays only a limited role.
Finally, without a city-wide coordinating authority at the metropolitan level, the 
responsibility of area-wide functions may pass to central government or any other non­
governmental area-wide bodies. While diverse functions may go to central government in a 
fragmented situation and thus represent a failure of local democratic accountability as 
explained by Self, such failure may increase if those functions are taken over by ad hoc or 
non-governmental authorities. The question here is whether democratic accountability is 
relevant for managing air quality. In principle, there seems to be a positive relationship 
between democratic institutions and environmental protection. This is because with 
democratic systems there can be a relatively quicker response to air pollution problems than 
with authoritarian or non-democratic systems. Additionally, democracy can ensure access 
to air quality information and allow more open forms of public policy making (see Barry 
1996: 116). As already seen, it has been argued, though, that a close proximity between 
people and government is not essentially required for controlling air pollution mainly 
because while citizens’ participation may be desirable it can frustrate action (Hirsch 1964: 
337). In relation to this, if it is true (as Self argues) that with a genuine arena of common 
issues and interests problems of political conflict and apathy may be solved, then the 
democratic argument for improving air quality management strategies through a metro 
authority becomes relevant.
3.3.2 The public choice theorists
After decades of approaching urban government through a conventional public 
administration model, a different logical-deductive model emerged during the 1970s 
providing guidance for policy analysis and normative recommendations for reform as well
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as offering a distinctive way of explaining how governmental agencies behave (Dunleavy: 
1991: 147). This new model - which uses concepts and methods derived from economics 
to understand political occurrences - is variously known as collective choice, rational choice 
theory, social choice theory, mathematical political theory, but most frequent, public choice 
theory (Dunleavy & O’Leary 1987: 75).
Public choice developed primarily in the United States but its influence has spread 
worldwide, particularly to other English-speaking countries (Self 1993: 1). The main 
principles and assumptions of this school of thought are usually associated with the early 
works of Buchanan & Tullock (1962), Downs (1967), Lindblom (1965), Niskanen (1971 
and 1973), Olson (1965) and Tullock (1976). The discussion that follows is based on the 
writers that have attempted to apply public choice theory to the analysis of local government 
in metropolitan areas, mainly US authors such as Bish (1971), Bish & Ostrom (1973), 
Ostrom et al (1961), Ostrom & Ostrom (1971), and Tiebout (1956). It is important to 
note, though, that while public choice theorists discuss orthodox views about local 
government, such an approach “tends to generalise excessively from American experience, 
rooted in a specific set of assumptions and historical traditions” (Keating 1995: 127).
Bish & Ostrom (1973: 18-21) identify three sets of assumptions within the public choice 
theory: assumptions about individuals, about goods and services, and about organisations. 
First, individuals are assumed to be self-interested, rational and maximizers possessing 
information about their preferences which can be perceived, ranked and compared easily. 
Second, there exist purely private goods (highly divisible that can be provided under 
competitive market conditions), purely public goods (highly indivisible where once 
provided for some they can be enjoyed by others), and an intermediate continuum (goods 
that involve spill-overs not isolated or contained within market transactions, e.g. air 
pollution). Third, governmental organisations are not only the means for individuals to 
communicate their own preferences through such mechanisms as elections, but for 
ensuring that individuals contribute their share for the provision of goods and services (e.g. 
through payment of taxes). Here, the question to solve becomes one of getting the best 
results by having all public goods and services delivered either by a single integrated 
bureaucratic structure subject to the control and direction of a single chief executive, or by 
having access to a number of individual collectivities capable of providing them in response 
to a diversity of communities of interest (see Dunleavy 1991: 3; Ostrom & Ostrom 1971: 
203-206; Ostrom eta l 1961: 833).
Public choice theorists argue that urban needs cannot be adequately met by a simple
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consolidated system, nor by a two-tier system of government. Rather, they recommend a 
governmental system of multiple, overlapping jurisdictions which can take advantage of 
diverse economies of scale for different public services. Furthermore, they argue that a 
public economy composed of multiple jurisdictions is likely to be more efficient and 
responsive than a public economy organised as a single area-wide monopoly (see Bish & 
Ostrom 1973: 2). According to Dowding (1996: 53), most of the public choice literature 
which recommends small jurisdictions derives from Tiebout’s model of small-scale units in 
metropolitan areas competing for ‘consumer-voters’ by the package of tax and services 
those units offer. For Tiebout (1956: 419-421), local governments are firms and citizens 
consumers. The latter are assumed to be fully mobile and may move to that community 
where their preferences can be best satisfied: there is a large number of these communities 
to choose from. Each community has an optimal size where services are supplied according 
to the preferences of that community - public services show no external economies or 
diseconomies on the supply side.
While public choice theorists advocate a system of fragmented local government units, they 
also recognise that both small and large jurisdictions are needed for providing some goods 
and services, such as for the development, maintenance and use of a network of streets, 
thoroughfares and highways which serve diverse communities of interest. Bish & Ostrom 
(1973: 21), for example, explain that some goods and services may be most efficiently 
provided by large organisations where economies can be realised by serving large 
populations and areas, and others by small jurisdictions where diseconomies are likely to 
occur when goods and services are organised on a large scale (e.g. education, police). 
Although it is acknowledged that some services are more efficiently provided by large 
organisations, public choice theory favours the multiplicity of governmental units in 
metropolitan areas with the consequent various legal and informal relationships which exist 
among them (see Hallman 1977: 62).
One of the main public choice criticisms to large-scale systems has focused on the orthodox 
assumption that coordination can be achieved through a single, hierarchically organised, 
area-wide authority. In relation to this, Bish (1971: 151-152) argues that such a 
conventional premise is theoretically and empirically false. In his case-study of Los 
Angeles County, the author asserts that the problems of area-wide coordination can be dealt 
by small political units through cooperative or bargained agreements where there is no 
imposition from a single, larger, and ‘outside’ political unit. The author concludes that,
68
“The observation that communities will cooperate on an area- 
wide basis when all parties benefit, either from the action 
itself or from compensation by gainers to losers from the 
action, is an indication that the polycentric system is capable 
of dealing with area-wide problems as well as meeting the 
demands of relatively small homogeneous groups within it - 
through cooperative effort for mutual gain rather than 
through an imposed political solution by some outside unit”
(Bish 1971: 93).
In the same vain, Bish found that many independent municipalities in the Los Angeles 
County have considerable power to prevent the imposition of costs by other units of 
government. So, a city can prevent the construction of a through freeway that will 
predominantly benefit users on either side of the city rather than the citizens in areas 
through which it passes. The problem where high-income neighbourhoods can prevent the 
imposition of costs on themselves but where low-income ones seem to be ideal places for 
highway construction and the like, cannot be solved by a single political unit as it may be 
through cooperative effort of diverse units. If non-hierarchical relations provide 
coordination, then the question becomes, according to this author, one of efficiency in the 
delivery of goods and services to meet individual preferences.
Again, as in the case for coordination, it is argued that there is no reason to assume that a 
hierarchical area-wide unit would always be the most efficient organisational arrangement 
to meet citizen preferences (see Ostrom & Ostrom 1971: 204). According to Bish (1971: 
45) the starting point is the assumption that individuals have different interests and that one 
of the major functions of political organisation is to assist individuals to articulate those 
interests. This is framed under two basic economic concepts: demand and supply. On the 
demand side, Bish & Ostrom (1973: 22-26) argue that as individuals’ interests vary within 
an urban community, the problem of having only a single vote to express preferences on a 
wide variety of issues (through a large-scale unit), is diminished as governmental units 
become more numerous and specialised in their range of functions. An optimal situation is 
one in which each of several units performs multiple services. As Cox and Nartovicz 
(1980: 198) explain, “fragmentation is viewed as an efficient institutional mechanism for 
the expression of individual preferences...the individual shops among local governments 
for public goods in much the same way as he/[she] shops among firms for private goods.”
According to Bish & Ostrom (1973: 22-24), there are different ways in which citizen 
preferences or demands for public goods and services can be expressed. Some of these 
include lobbying, public opinion polls, petitions, demonstrations, court proceedings,
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pressure groups, political party organisations, and so on. Although accessability to them 
vary, all provide individuals with convenient ways of expressing their preferences on 
single issues. Among all these diverse ways, much emphasis has been placed on voting. 
These authors explain that either directly or indirectly, voting offers opportunities to 
individuals, and even though it has weaknesses (voters do not usually agree with a 
candidate on all issues so their votes do not reflect all their preferences) they are diminished 
under an organisational arrangement in which each of several units performs multiple 
services.
On the supply side, the critique to a large-scale organisation has focused on its 
monopolistic position when providing certain goods and services. Such a governmental 
behaviour leads to a lack of motivation to innovate, improve, or reduce costs when 
delivering goods and services: “monopoly suppliers do not have to be responsive to the 
demands of those they cater for” (Cox & Nartovicz 1980: 197). Since the same level of 
production for all goods and services cannot be expected under a fully integrated unit of 
government under monopoly conditions, it has been suggested that rivalry and competition 
can alleviate some of the most adverse consequences of monopoly behaviour. If ample 
fragmentation of authority and overlapping jurisdictions exist, sufficient competition may 
be engendered to stimulate a more responsive and efficient public economy in metropolitan 
areas (see Bish & Ostrom 1973: 29-30). Just as happens in the private market, in the local 
public economy model, public entrepreneurs and citizens seek out the best way of 
providing services through a mixture of cooperation and competition (see Keating 1995: 
126-127). By revealing preferences (allocative efficiency), the market produces productive 
efficiency through competition (Dowding 1996: 53).
Finally, Bish & Ostrom (1973: 30-31) identify several ways in which competition can 
constrain the monopolistic behaviour of public officials. First, there is political competition, 
where elections of public office posts are determinant. When responsiveness and efficiency 
decreases, citizens can vote for new officials which may improve governmental outputs. 
Second, there is the ‘voting with the feet’ proposal (Tiebout’s model), where dissatisfied 
individuals with the public goods and services production can move to other places (e.g. 
districts, municipalities) to meet their preferences. Third, there is a system of alternative 
producers of public goods and services. This implies availability of different options for 
diverse services without moving or changing location. Fourth, there is contracting out, 
where producers can be public or private agencies. Producers will have incentives to 
improve quality of services, innovate, increase efficiency, and reduce costs. Competition 
between diverse producers ensures that those goods and services most intensely desired
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will be the ones produced, and that they will be produced at minimum cost (see also Cox & 
Nartovicz 1980: 197).
Apart from criticising large-scale systems of government, public choice advocates have also 
rejected the traditional reform proposal of a two-tier formula. Although in principle a two 
tier arrangement may enhance efficiency and responsiveness, it has been argued that such a 
system may be insufficient to deal with the diverse demand and supply schedules for all 
public goods and services over large urban regions (see Bish & Ostrom 1973: 33). 
According to Bish (1971: 156-157) the problem is that with a two level structure, local 
communities surrender veto rights to area-wide functions rather than bargaining among 
themselves to create mutually satisfactory solutions so as to impede the imposition of 
political externalities. The assignment of certain functions to specific units limits the 
opportunities to seek alternative structures for solutions to unanticipated problems because 
the flexibility of governmental apparatus is restricted. Obtaining agreement on just what is 
primarily local and what is primarily area-wide constitutes one of the main problems of the 
two-tier proposal. Overall, the main problem with the metro model is that it is viewed as a 
deviation from the ideal single-centred hierarchical type of unit rather than as having any 
underlying rationale.
Some interesting criticisms to public choice theory include Bollens & Schmandt (1965: 63- 
67); Cox & Nartovicz (1980: 196-198); Dowding (1996: 59-64); Golembiewski (1977: 
1488-1507); Gunlicks 1981: 15-17); Hallman (1977: 62-63); Rose-Ackerman (1983: 55- 
57); Self (1993: 176-197). Such criticisms of public choice arguments are related to 
technical arguments against fragmentation and to a rejection of how economists have 
attempted to explain political phenomena. By way of illustration, Gunlicks (1981: 15-16) 
argues that a tremendous intellectual gap separates consolidationists from public choice 
advocates: the tendency of these theories to ignore some of the major arguments or 
concerns of the other theory. For instance, on the one hand, public choice tends to sweep 
over the issues of coordination and equality of services and to ignore evidence that 
organised interests tend to be middle and upper class in composition (discrediting the 
personality politics of local elections). On the other hand, consolidationists do not seem to 
know how to react to diverse economies of scales, learn that efficiency is not necessarily 
the result of scale, and that bureaucracies may be self-serving and defeat the goals of 
reformers. In spite of this, Gunlicks (1981: 16) says that, “it is the model of the free- 
market economy of the public choice advocates that disturbs critics perhaps more than 
anything else”.
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According to Dowding (1996: 59), the problem for public choice theory is the problem it 
has in understanding market failure. The use of economic and economic-like tools “involve 
some tools which are only applicable to market situations; they use a hammer to drive in a 
screw”. In addition to this, the fact that public choice has been taken up by key intellectuals 
and pressure groups to draft arguments, policy proposals and speeches for conservative 
politicians (i.e Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in the UK) has led to further questioning 
from across all the political spectrum (see Dunleavy 1991: 4-5). Despite the clear neo­
conservative bias of public choice, though, the surprising thing is the lack of critical 
challenge to this model.
In his work ‘Government by the Market?’, Self (1993: 176-197) reviews the influence of 
public choice thought upon some events in the USA and in Britain in relation to such issues 
as bureaucracy, democracy, and centralised or decentralised systems of local government in 
the UK and the USA, respectively. In his conclusion, this author asserts that such an 
influence has been ambivalent. On the one hand, if the market system is seen as 
intrinsically superior, privatisation of government services seems the most effective policy. 
Governmental attempts to reduce public expenditure and impose priorities from the centre 
can lead to restrictions on democratic choice and an increased role for the central 
government bureaucracy. According to Self, this seems to be the direction in which the 
British government has been moving. On the other hand, a more positive evaluation of 
political choice, combined with a wish to restrict and disperse the powers of government, 
favours a decentralised and pluralist system - some public choice theorists would like to 
reduce the scope of central bureaucracy. For this author, while central bureaucracy may be 
unnecessarily large, such a theory is weak on understanding the distinctive contribution to a 
democratic society provided by a bureaucracy trained in strong and impartial values of 
public services.
Although the public choice critique to traditional views may, in fact, ignore some of the 
major arguments or concerns of the consolidationist or two-tier approaches, some of its 
assumptions allow a more in-depth analysis of the structural response that is required for 
managing air quality in metropolitan areas. One first point relates to the public choice 
assumption that the problems of area-wide coordination can be achieved by small political 
units through cooperative or bargained agreements. Such assumption has two major 
implications in relation to air pollution control. First, there exists the orthodox view - put 
forward by Jones (1942) several decades ago - that in such a fragmented system concerted 
action is only possible if diverse and conflicting units of government are willing to 
cooperate. As an air quality management strategy includes several functional areas (for
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example, public transport, traffic management, environmental health, police, and so on), 
the amount of participating units is likely to be quite numerous. Thus, the bigger the scale 
of fragmentation is, the higher the difficulty to achieve concerted action. Second, even if 
diverse units of government are willing to cooperate and coordination is eventually 
achieved, as they are likely to have different views and priorities to air pollution control 
(i.e. some may be more affected than others), such concerted action may be obtained only 
through a long-term bargaining process. If an unexpected air pollution episode occurs (i.e. 
outbreak of high levels of pollution) during or even after such bargaining process, there 
exists the risk that, as local units cooperate in a voluntarily basis, some may react slowly or 
fail to deal with the situation.
Another problem that public choice theorists have identified with the traditional approach, 
particularly with the two-tier proposal, is that local communities would inevitably surrender 
veto rights to area-wide functions. It is then argued that if diverse local units bargain among 
themselves to create mutually satisfactory solutions, they would impede the imposition 
from a single, larger and ‘outside’ political unit. This assumption would certainly be true if 
the upper tier of government in a metro scheme had exclusive powers on the whole air 
quality management strategy and if it remained as a non-elected unit. Nevertheless, a 
conventional assumption of metro schemes is that these are, precisely, democratically 
elected (both upper and lower tiers) authorities. Furthermore, diverse functional aspects 
that constitute an air quality management strategy show that there exist area-wide, 
concurrent, and localised functions. While as a whole function, air pollution may be a good 
example of a top-heavy metro model, there are sub-functions which may be either 
concurrently allocated or exclusively assigned to lower tier authorities. Some concurrent 
sub-functions may include air quality monitoring networks and public transport - 
specifically bus systems. Exclusive powers to lower tier authorities may include traffic 
management measures (such as stopping cars, or vehicles’ emissions tests) or health 
programmes for vulnerable people (such as asmathics or the elderly). Clearly, obtaining 
agreement on just what is local and what area-wide - as argued by public choice theorists - 
remains as an unresolved problem within some aspects of an air quality management 
strategy.
The two basic economic concepts (i.e. demand and supply) used by public choice theorists 
to explain why a hierarchical area-wide unit is not always the most efficient organisational 
arrangement to meet citizen preferences, do not seem to apply to air pollution control. First, 
on the demand side, while it is argued that citizen preferences can be more precisely 
indicated in smaller rather than larger political units, it has been acknowledged that there are
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some problems which are uniformly experienced by everyone, and thus, both large and 
small units of government are necessary if those citizens are able to express their demands. 
Such are the cases of the quality of the atmosphere or the conditions of major transportation 
networks, which seem to appear only as exceptional cases (see Bish & Ostrom 1973: 24- 
26). Second, on the supply side, the critique to a large-scale organisation for its 
monopolistic position does not contemplate that, invariably, an air quality management 
strategy includes several sub-functional areas which require local units involvement. In a 
two-tier proposal, for instance, both monopolistic and competitive practices can take place. 
On the one hand, a monopolistic situation can occur within those sub-functional areas (such 
as trains, underground, air quality bands, emergency plan, police) that are exclusively 
allocated to the metro body. This kind of monopolistic behaviour, though, can be 
constrained (as public choice theorists argue) if political competition exists. According to 
the traditional orthodoxy, metro schemes include either directly or indirectly such political 
competition, i.e. elections of public office posts at the upper level. On the other hand, 
competition among lower-tier units can take place within those sub-functions (such as local 
buses, stopping cars, vehicles’ emissions tests, parking spaces) that are distributed among 
each of them. It is important to consider, though, that neither monopolistic nor competitive 
and rivalry practices necessarily ensure improved air quality, policy innovation, increased 
efficiency, and reduced costs.
3.3.3 The local governance approach
While public choice has definitely become more relevant to US administration than to the 
more collective European style of administration, the new ideas of governance have started 
to shift attention away from a hierarchical or command made of government action to a co­
operative or partnership mode, and from centralised control to decentralised initiatives (Self 
1997: 17). This new approach to the study of local government is now being used by 
international organisations (see Edralin 1996: 5-6; UNCHS 1996a: 161), and among local 
government comparative studies (see, for example, Barlow 1991: 35-36; Gilbert et al 
1996: 16-17; Humes IV 1991: x-xii; McCamey 1996b: 4-6). Furthermore, it has also been 
used as an innovative way for addressing and explaining current systems of local 
government in countries such as in Britain (see Cochrane 1993: 69-80; Goodwin & Painter 
1996: 635-637; Johnston & Pattie 1996: 672; Stoker & Mossberger 1995: 211-214; Tickell 
& Peck 1996: 595-596).
Current analysis and discussion on the role and organisation of local government, thus, is 
increasingly being framed under the umbrella of the term ‘governance’. There exist three
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diverse connotations of this term at the city level: ‘metropolitan’, ‘urban’ and ‘local’ 
governance. One of the earliest references to this concept, appeared during the beginning of 
the 1980s when attempts were made to define the essence of governance in metropolitan 
areas: “the structure of relationships among governmental and other organized actors with 
interests in completing or preventing activities with interjurisdictional impacts” (Jones & 
O’Donnell 1980: 541). Analogous definitions to this concept have developed over the years 
under the labels of ‘urban’ and ‘local’ governance all sharing the same underlying idea. By 
way of illustration, the UNCHS (1996a: 161) notes that ‘local governance’ is a more 
inclusive term than local government as it encompasses a wider range of other actors 
(public, private, individual) as well as their relationships. In the same vain, and within the 
context of developing countries, McCamey (1996b: 4) explains that the term governance 
broadens the space to include the essential role played by organisations in civil society 
where formal structures of the state are weak and unable to provide services. For this 
author ‘urban governance’ refers to “the relationships between civil society and the state, 
between rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed” (quoted from McCamey et 
al 1995).
Local governance includes key players (such as ad hoc authorities, NGOs, the private 
sector, and so on) that in the past were not thought of or simply were not actually involved 
in the process of governing metropolitan areas. While governance implies less hierarchical 
and bureaucratic structures of decision-making and more forms based on local networking 
and negotiation, these new actors have usually been business-oriented:
“Although the traditional conduits for local politics and 
policy implementation - the local authorities - remain 
important, increasingly they are having to coexist, 
collaborate and compete with a plethora of new agencies, 
networks and organisations, all jostling for local resources, 
power and influence. One of the defining characteristics of 
these new structures of local governance is that in different 
ways and to different degrees they are business-led”
(Tickell & Peck 1996: 595).
According to Self (1997: 17-18), there exist two diverse approaches to governance. The 
first approach is exemplified by Jan Kooiman’s (ed., 1993) ‘Modem Governance: New 
Govemment-Society Interactions’. Here, government must be renovated to match the 
variety, complexity and dynamism of modem societies where neither traditional 
bureaucracy nor market-based reform packages are equal to the task. Rather, what is 
needed is the maximum devolution of powers to largely self-regulating institutions or 
public-private partnerships coupled with the strategic design and motivation of complex
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inter-organisational networks. Coordinated planning at the centre will help to design and 
steer the operation of largely autonomous decentralised institutions. The second approach 
(as explained by Self) is exemplified by Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) ‘Reinventing 
Government’. This work envisages decentralised public agencies co-operating with 
business, community and voluntary groups to improve public service delivery and meet 
new or urgent social demands. The emphasis is upon developing a culture of local initiative 
and problem-solving by entrepreneurial officials in partnership with other local actors and 
stakeholders. As Stoker (1996b: 3) notes, their work “is about how a government might 
make sensible and effective use of a wider range of tools beyond the direct provision of 
services. Governance for them is about the potential for contracting, franchising and new 
forms of regulation”.
It is this last idea of governance as presented by Osbome and Gaebler (1992) that has been 
associated with what it is known as the new public management (see, for example, Clarke 
1997: 39; Hood 1991: 5-8; Stoker 1996b: 3). The new management of local government 
discusses the way local authorities organise themselves to carry out its work, how they 
determine and implement their policies, and how they plan, choose, influence and act. The 
characteristics of the new management involve a commitment to openness, learning and 
innovation (Stoker 1991: 236). Unlike the orthodox position which sees local authorities 
mainly as providers of services, the new management approach considers them both as 
agencies for the delivery of services and as political institutions with a capacity for local 
choice. The consideration of structures is a distraction from the real issues of the role and 
way of working of local authorities. It is only when the nature of local government is 
known that it is meaningful to discuss such issues as structures, tiers, and boundaries. 
Furthermore, unlike public choice theory, it regards local authorities as public sector and 
not market organisations; that is to say, local authorities decisions are subjected to political 
control rather than market discipline (see Stewart 1983: 1-4; 1986: 2-4 and 1995: 250). The 
evolutionary nature of public management has recently embraced new emphases and trends 
(such as focus on performance, disaggregation, empowerment) and new approaches (such 
as competition and markets) (Clarke 1997: 41-42; Clarke & Stewart 1996: 48). The 
literature on such an approach has considerably expanded during the 1990s (see, for 
example, Ben-Elia 1996a; Clarke & Stewart 1990; Davis etal 1997; Leach 1992; Leach et 
al 1994; Stewart & Stoker 1995a).
While the assumptions of the new local public management and the contribution of the local 
governance perspective provide a reference point which challenge many of the assumptions 
of traditional public administration, none of them conform to a coherent or consistent
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theory (Clarke 1997: 41; Stewart 1986: 3; Stoker 1996b: 4). Rather, the governance 
approach draws upon diverse theories, such as institutional economics, international 
relations or public administration, and is regarded as an organising framework for 
understanding the changing processes of governing (Stoker 1996b: 3-4).
Instead of making a series of statements than can be shown to be either true or false, Stoker 
(1996b: 1-15) outlines five diverse propositions or aspects of governance for consideration 
- each with a certain dilemma or critical issue. These include: multi-agency partnerships, a 
blurring of responsibilities between public and non-public sectors, power dependence 
between organisations involved in collective action, the emergence of self-governing 
networks and the development of new governmental tasks and tools. First, governance 
refers to a complex set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond 
government. While highlighting an increased involvement of different agencies in service 
delivery and strategic decision-making (public, private, voluntary) it challenges 
conventional assumptions which focus on government as if it were a ‘stand alone’ 
institution divorced from wider societal forces. Here, the dilemma of governance is one of 
legitimacy as there exists a divorce between the complex reality of decision-making 
associated with governance and the normative codes used to explain and justify 
government. On pragmatic grounds, to be effective in the long run implies that power- 
holders must be seen to be legitimate. In Britain, for example, the latter has created tension 
concerning unaccountable quangos, the difficulty of separating policy and operational 
matters, the influence of faceless bureaucrats and nature of ministerial accountability. Thus, 
the issue to be considered is whether or how governance can obtain enhanced legitimacy.
Second, governance recognises the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling 
social and economic issues. The starting point is that there exists a shift in responsibility, a 
stepping back of the state, and a concern to push responsibilities on to the private and 
voluntary sectors and more broadly to the citizen. The agencies or sectors that governance 
recognises include voluntary groups, non-profits, non-governmental organisations, 
community enterprises, coops, mutuals and community-based organisations, and the 
private sector. The dilemma suggested by the blurring of responsibilities is that it can lead 
to blame avoidance or scapegoating. In other words, the latter creates a situation whereby 
government actors can pass off responsibility to privatised providers or other organisations 
when things go wrong and then blame others for failures and difficulties. The blurring of 
responsibilities creates an ambiguity and uncertainty in the minds of policy-makers and 
citizens about who is responsible for what.
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Third, governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between 
institutions involved in collective action. Power dependence implies that organisations 
committed to collective action are dependent on other organisations and need to exchange 
resources and negotiate common purposes in order to achieve their goals. The outcome of 
exchange is determined by the resources of the participants and the rules of the game and 
the context of the exchange. In a governance relationship no one organisation can easily 
command, although one organization may dominate a particular process of exchange. From 
the governance perspective, governing is always an interactive process because no single 
actor (public or private) has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems 
unilaterally.
Governance as an interactive process involves diverse forms of partnership: principal-agent 
relations, inter-organisational negotiation and systemic coordination. First, the principal- 
agent form rests on one party (the principal) hiring or contracting another (the agent) to 
undertake a particular task. Second, the inter-organisational form involves organisations in 
negotiating joint projects in which by blending their capacities they are able to better meet 
their own organisation’s objectives. Finally, the systemic co-ordination form sets up a level 
of mutual understanding and embeddedness that organisations develop a shared vision and 
joint-working capacity that leads to the establishment of a self-governing network. The 
critical issue in this third proposition is that power dependence exacerbates the problem of 
unintended consequences for government, i.e. intentions do not always match outcomes. 
In principal-agent relations the principal does not have complete control over the agent and 
has only partial information about its behaviour. In the inter-organisational form, negotiated 
relationships can lead to ambiguous outcomes which can be interpreted appropriately by the 
various participants. Unintended results, however, are not necessarily undesirable nor 
perverse.
Fourth, governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors. Governance 
networks imply influencing government policy and taking over the business of 
government. Under governance, actors and institutions gain a capacity to act by blending 
their resources, skills and purposes into a long-term coalition - sometimes called ‘regime’. 
A regime can be defined as an informal yet relatively stable group with access to 
institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions. 
Although participants are likely to have a domain of command power, the regime is formed 
as an informal basis for coordination and without an all encompassing structure of 
command. Here, the dilemma with such self-governing networks is that of accountability. 
This can be seen at two levels. First, members of particular groups may be dissatisfied with
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the network arrangements agreed by their leaders and yet find it difficult to express or act 
on the dissatisfaction due to the powerful nature of the network of which their group is 
part. Second, even if all members of the groups are satisfied, a problem of accountability 
can arise because all networks are to a degree exclusive. Networks are driven by the self- 
interest of their members rather than a wider concern with citizen’s interests or more 
particularly those excluded from the network. The solution to this seems to bring 
government back in some form. While the networks have a significant degree of autonomy 
(which is required to achieve their purposes), government can indirectly or imperfectly 
steer them without occupying a sovereign position.
Finally, governance recognises the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the 
power of government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use 
new tools and techniques to steer and guide. In the context of governance, government has 
to learn an operating code to challenge past hierarchical modes of thinking. The terms used 
to describe this new form of governing include, for example, enabler, catalytic agent, 
commissioner. In this proposition, Stoker (1996b: 14) uses Kooiman and Van Vliet’s 
classification of governance in order to explain the three tasks of government. First, 
‘(de)composition and coordination’ which involves defining a situation, identifying key 
stakeholders and then developing effective linkages between the relevant parties. Second, 
‘collibration and steering’ which is concerned with influencing and steering relationships in 
order to achieve desired outcomes. Third, ‘integration and regulation’ which involves 
thinking and acting beyond the individual subsystems, avoiding unwanted side effects and 
establishing mechanisms for effective coordination (see also Kooiman 1993). The dilemma 
here is that even if governments operate in a flexible way to steer collective action, 
governance failure may occur. This is because of existing tensions and difficulties with the 
institutions of civil society and inadequacies in the organisations that bridge the gaps 
between public, private and voluntary sectors. Likewise, failures of leadership, differences 
in time scale and horizons among key participants and the depth of social conflict can also 
lead to governance failure.
The need for an adequate response by local authorities to urban environmental concerns has 
been addressed by Stoker & Young’s (1993: 5-17) ‘Cities in the 1990s’. Their case for 
local authorities under an emerging system of governance is based on four arguments. 
First, urban problems require local solutions and local knowledge: local authorities can 
provide the latter in order to tailor policies to meet particular challenges in their localities. 
Second, urban problems require an integrated response from a range of agencies and 
interests. The diversity of players and interests raises the issues of coordination which can
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be secured through a system of networks. Local authorities are precisely regarded as 
valuable contributors to such local network-building - as long as they are involved in an 
active and substantial way. Third, urban environmental policies require strategic leadership 
and vision: local authorities can provide that leadership balancing the concerns of diverse 
interests. Fourth, decisions on how to deal with urban problems need to be accountable and 
legitimate: local authorities can provide a forum for ensuring the legitimacy of urban 
decision-making.
As an organising framework, the governance perspective assists in identifying diverse 
governing issues concerning the participation of local authorities in their dealings with air 
pollution control. As explained in past chapters, in order to secure urban sustainability there 
is a fundamental need for environmental issues to be tackled in an integrated fashion (which 
means the inclusion of all sectors of society). While this assumption recognises local 
authorities as one of the many components of a system of local governance when dealing 
with urban environmental problems, it also implies that an adequate air quality management 
strategy may benefit from the participation of diverse actors. These participants may include 
local government agencies, central authorities, political parties, NGOs, the private sector, 
citizens, and so on. It follows that due to the increased number of agencies that may be 
involved in a system of air quality management, the problems of legitimacy, accountability 
and responsibility (as explained by the governance perspective) are likely to appear.
In the context of local governance, the tasks of government outlined by Kooiman and Van 
Vliet (quoted in Stoker 1996b) - that is to say, (de)composition and coordination, 
collibration and steering, and integration and regulation - are essential for managing air 
quality. This is because the diverse functions and subfunctions in a system of air quality 
management - particularly public transport, traffic management (motorways), air quality 
monitoring data, emergency plan (stopping and banning cars) - demand a great deal of area- 
wide coordination. Hence, in order to build and coordinate local networks, protect and 
regulate air quality, local authorities are expected to provide strategic leadership. 
Nevertheless, while political or civic leadership is required in order to balance the concerns 
of diverse interests, there is a strong tendency for leadership to seek to impose order and 
issue directives. If local authorities only indirectly and imperfectly steer networks without 
occupying a relative sovereign position, or at least some form of command mode of 
governing, some governance failure may occur. Weak local authorities, for instance, may 
fail to give leadership and coordination in the implementation of traffic management 
measures (such as banning cars) when an air pollution episode occurs. Whereas some 
relative imposed leadership may be required for this and other related issues, other
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functions and sub-functions within an air quality management strategy may only need 
steering and guidance.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined three diverse set of assumptions for reorganising local 
government: the traditional orthodoxy (hierarchy), the public choice theory (market) and the 
local governance approach (networks). First, the orthodox public administration model 
advocates a systematic hierarchy of local administrative bodies, relatively autonomous and 
multi-purpose, providing a wide range of services. In analysing local authorities in 
metropolitan areas, it sees political fragmentation as a problem and thus advocates for 
consolidating existing units of local government either by creating a single city-wide unit or 
by adopting a two-tier system of government called metro model. With numerous variants 
of types, the metro model is usually associated with the idea of an area-wide metropolitan 
authority sharing powers with smaller local units within its area. Second, public choice 
theorists argue that urban needs cannot be adequately met by a single, hierarchically 
organised, area-wide authority (consolidated unit), nor by a two-tier system of 
government. By using concepts and methods derived from economics (i.e. economic-like 
tools which are applicable to market situations) to understand political occurrences, they 
recommend a governmental system of multiple jurisdictions which can take advantage of 
diverse economies of scale for different public services, and be more efficient and 
responsive than a public economy organised as a single area-wide monopoly. Third, the 
local governance perspective shifts attention away from a hierarchical or command made of 
government action to a cooperative, partnership or network mode. This approach explains 
that local authorities, while remaining important, they are having to coexist, collaborate and 
compete with a wide range of agencies, networks and organisations (e.g. NGOs). Thus, 
local authorities need to be reorganised or renovated to match the variety, complexity and 
dynamism of contemporary societies which neither the traditional orthodoxy nor market- 
based reform packages are equal to that task.
In the following chapters, I analyse the way in which the government of London and 
Mexico City have been responding to the problem of air pollution. In doing so, I will return 
to the models of local government outlined in this chapter in the last part of this thesis, the 
conclusions.
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C H A P T E R  IV
Local Government Organisation in London and Mexico City
“Yet people wish to know what part Local Government fulfils in the general 
scheme o f our lives, its functions, how it evolved, the principles that govern its 
conduct, and the problems that face those anxious to make it even more 
serviceable than it is at present”.
Herman Finer (1933) in the Preface o f his 
book ‘English Local Government\
4.1 Introduction
The geographical area of London has never been easy to determine. London can be as big 
as the observer or analyst may want it to be: its physical extension could go from Poole 
Harbour to the Suffolk coast, from the middle of Northamptonshire down to Sussex (Hall 
1989: 3-6). Nowadays, London or Greater London refers to a physical area of 1,578 sq. 
kms., currently covered by 33 local units (32 boroughs and the City of London). With a 
total population of 6,933,000 (the London boroughs, with the exception of the City of 
London, are evenly matched units with populations in the range of 130,000-300,000 see 
Table 4.1) the London area corresponds not only with the statistical and physical 
(continuously built-up) definition of the metropolis, but with that of its local government 
(see Map 4.1). Since 1965, the boundaries of London have remained basically the same, 
and in spite of the 1986 major reorganisation of its governmental structures - i.e. abolition 
of the GLC - London government still presents ‘a remarkably compact appearance’ 
(Hebbert & Travers 1988: 192; Hebbert 1992: 139; Hoggart & Green 1991: vii).
The geographical area of Mexico City has been commonly identified with the contiguous 
built-up area regardless of the limits of the DF and/or its surrounding federated state called 
the State of Mexico EdoMex. Before 1950, the built-up area of Mexico City was within the 
territory of the Federal District, but since that year, that area expanded beyond those limits. 
Thus, Mexico City has been associated with the ‘First Quarter’ or inner city (four central 
delegated units within the DF), the Metropolitan Zone of Mexico City MZMC (the DF and
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17 conurbated municipalities), and the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City MAMC (the DF 
and 27 conurbated municipalities) (see Burgoa 1985: 914; Diaz Diaz & Perlo Cohen 1994: 
111; Fried 1972: 647; Hall 1984: 214-215; IcazuriagaMontes 1992: 30; Ward 1990: 19).
Table 4.1 Population in London by borough (1993) and in Mexico City by delegacion 
(1990)________________________________________________________________________________
Borough Population Borough Population
(000s) (000s)
Barking & Dagenham 146 Kensington & Chelsea 149
Barnet 305 Kingston upon Thames 138
Bexley 220 Lambeth 259
Brent 248 Lewisham 240
Bromley 292 Merton 175
Camden 181 Newham 226
Croydon 323 Redbridge 233
Ealing 286 Richmd upon Thames 167
Enfield 262 Southwark 229
Greenwich 215 Sutton 173
Hackney 191 Tower Hamlets 170
Hamrsmith. & Fulham 155 Waltham Forest 220
Haringey 212 Wandsworth 266
Harrow 207 City of Westminster 189
Havering 232 City of London 4
Hillingdon 240
Hounslow 207
Islington 175 TOTA L 6,933
Delegacion  Population Delegacion  Population
(000s) (0 0 0 s)
Alvaro Obregdn 642
Azcapotzalco 474
Benito Juarez 407
Coyoacdn 640
Cuajimalpa de Morelos 119
Cuauhtemoc 595
Gustavo A. Madero 1,268
Iztacalco 448
Iztapalapa 1,490
Magdalena Contreras 195
Miguel Hidalgo 406
Milpa Alta 63
Tlahuac 206
Tlalpan 484
Venustiano Carranza 519
Xochimilco 271
TO TA L 8,235
Source: INEGI (1994b); Newman & Thomley (1997)
Due to a 1993 constitutional reform, Mexico City is now politically and formally regarded 
as the Federal District with a physical area of 1,499 sq. kms. (Constitution 1997). This 
area (with a total population of 8,235,744) was created in 1898 and is currently covered by
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a city hall - the GDF - which is territorially and politically divided into 16 delegated units 
(see Map 4.2). All 16 local units (with populations ranging from 63,654 to 1,490,499) are 
hierarchically subordinated to a Mayor, head of the City Hall or GDF (see Table 4.1). 
While the MZMC refers to a physical area of 3,399 sq. kms. (with a total population of 
14,582,708), the MAMC refers to an area of 4,620 sq. kms. (with a total population of 
15,047,685) which corresponds with the statistical definition of the metropolis (see INEGI 
1992 and 1994b).
This chapter describes and analyses two systems of local government (London and Mexico 
City) and discusses, from a historical perspective, the debates and experiences on 
governmental reform in both urban centres as well as the relationship of their organisational 
structures with air quality management. The main purpose of this chapter is to pull the two 
cities into a single scheme of interpretation.
4.2 London: the struggle for reform
The geographical area and local government arrangement that exists in current London has 
been the result of special historical circumstances originated with the transition of British 
city government from the pre-industrial closed corporations to modem city governments 
(Sharpe 1995c: 113). Physical limits and entire systems of local government have been 
since changed or abolished due to socio-economic growth and political interests in order to 
assure effective politico-electoral control over particular areas (see, for example, Dunleavy 
1991: 120-123). In 1991, the Greater London Group at the London School of Economics 
succinctly described two hundred years in the history of London government:
“It is easy to assert...that virtually all possible models of 
structure, have, at one time or another, been proposed.
Increased central government responsibility, London-wide 
authorities with very different boundaries, appointed and 
elected authorities, urban parishes and large boroughs, 
partial reforms and full reforms, and radically different 
service allocation have all been suggested or tried during the 
past two hundred years”
(Travers et al 1991a: 56).
The debate on creating an area-wide government unit for London began in the nineteenth 
century with the second report by the Royal Commission on Municipal Corporations in 
1837. This report emphasized the need for a single and unified system of local government 
in London. Nevertheless, the Commission did not explain whether such a unit would 
resemble the then newly-established municipal corporations in the provincial boroughs or
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whether it would come under the jurisdiction of the central government (Robson 1939: 22- 
23). While being ignored by the central government, this report found a chaotic and 
confusing pattern of government with a prevalence of corruption and inefficiency (see 
Barlow 1991: 49). According to Robson (1939: 54-55) the condition of the metropolis was 
one of utter chaos and a “veritable jungle of areas and authorities and a nightmare of 
inefficiency”. The division of local administration among different districts of London was 
considered at the time by some commentators as detrimental to the public interest, including 
such functions as lighting and paving of streets, traffic regulations and public health (for 
details, see Barlow 1991: 49-52; Gibbon & Bell 1939: 3-26; RCLG 1960; Robson 1939: 
23-53; Young & Garside 1982: 11-22).
It was not until 1855, though, that the first form of city-wide administration or government 
in London was established: the Metropolitan Board of Works MBW. This body (with 
similar boundaries to those of ‘Inner London’) has represented not only one of the three 
metropolitan Londons - the other being the London County Council LCC and the Greater 
London Council GLC - but a major step towards metropolitan government (Barlow 1991: 
52). Indeed, while the MBW constituted an indirectly elected upper tier with the main 
purpose of improving Victorian London’s sewerage system, the elected local units - 38 
parishes - had responsibility over local sewers and drains, road maintenance, and 
pavements and street lighting (Travers et al 1991a: 49). Although allegations of corruption 
and scandal contributed to the Government’s decision to abolish the MBW, Robson (1939: 
64-65) has argued that the real cause of its dismissal was that it failed to awaken civic spirit 
in the minds of London’s inhabitants. Being an indirectly elected authority it precluded the 
possibility of accountability from the central body and of “watchfulness or interest on the 
part of the public”.
In 1889, the London County Council LCC replaced the MBW becoming responsible from 
time to time for services such as the poor law, fire services, housing, bridges and tunnels, 
building control, health services and education; the new authority had almost the same 
physical boundaries of its predecessor. Later on, in 1899, a system of two-tier government 
appeared when, within the LCC area, 27 metropolitan boroughs and Westminster City 
were created taking over some of the responsibilities of the parishes (see Travers et al 
1991a: 50). The discussion in reforming local government concentrated on the need to 
create a municipal and representative body for the whole built-up area in London as well as 
on the issue of functional distribution where certain local government services were not 
suitable for central authority administration but for smaller authorities’. The problem of air 
pollution was neither explicitly included in the late nineteenth century proposals as a case
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for reorganising local government nor regarded as an area-wide or metropolitan issue (see 
Robson 1939: 62-99; RCLG 1960: 12-13). Two years after the LCC emerged, powers to 
deal with nuisances from smoke were transferred from the police to the sanitary authorities 
(vestries and district boards) and later on in 1899 to the newly created 28 metropolitan 
borough councils (Gibbon & Bell 1939: 559).
The long existence of the LCC, which served until 1965, never enjoyed the prestige, 
status, and degree of citizen allegiance that should have accrued to the city government. It 
was always overshadowed by the existence of a more popular City of London which has 
retained its medieval non-democratic structure and boundaries, thus remaining unreformed 
and with the same status as a London Borough to this day (Sharpe 1995c: 113-114). The 
area of jurisdiction of the LCC was not only an artificial creation with no historical basis 
but it failed to embrace the entire of the built-up area in London when it was established in 
1889 (Rhodes 1970: 3). As London continued to expand, soon the LCC’s jurisdiction 
became an ever smaller proportion of the whole (Regan 1972: 512). In spite of this, the 
LCC has remained internationally famous among comparative local government studies and 
has been regarded as “the grandfather of metropolitan government” (Hebbert & Travers 
1988: 174). Some of the best accounts on the history of the LCC, its structure and 
functional responsibilities, party politics, debates and ideologies for government 
reorganisation are to be found in Gibbon & Bell (1939); Jackson (1965); Robson (1939); 
Saint (1989); and Young & Garside (1982).
During the LCC’s existence two official reviews on the structural arrangements for local 
government in the Greater London area took place first, in 1921-23 and then, in 1957-1960 
(Travers etal 1991a: 51). In the first one, a Royal Commission was set up in 1921 to see 
whether any alterations were needed in the local government of the administrative county of 
London and its surrounding districts. This Commission (chaired by Lord Ullswater) came 
out as a result of the increasing problems for London’s government due to the growth of 
London beyond the boundaries of the LCC. The main concern focused on whether certain 
services ought to be administered over a much larger area than that of the LCC (Rhodes 
1970: 4-5). One of the themes which brought much attention before and during the 
proceedings of the 1921-1923 Commission were the problems derived from the growth of 
London regarding two interrelated functions: town planning and traffic and transport (see 
Barlow 1991: 68-70). The debate on traffic and transport problems, for instance, was 
surrounded by the need of a Greater London authority in order to increase coordination and 
efficiency and improvement on existing conditions (see Rhodes 1970: 7; Young & Garside 
1982: 109-110).
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Although the majority view of the Ullswater Commission (1921-23) concluded (through 
one majority and two minority reports) that no changes were needed in the areas, status or 
functions of the authorities in the Greater London area, some of the themes and arguments 
foreshadowed much later debate about London government (Rhodes 1970: 4-5). During 
the 1930s and 1940s, though, the debate on government reform diminished and the idea of 
a Greater London authority was only argued in relation to planning. Nevertheless, one of 
the most relevant outcomes of the government reform debate during this first part of the 
twentieth century, was that the argument for expansion of metropolitan government 
geographically brought into the political arena several new players - mainly outer suburbs 
of London (i.e. counties, county districts, and county boroughs). As it is explained later 
on, the issue of widening the spatial context of London significantly contributed to the 
1965 government reform (Barlow 1991: 67).
It is important to note, however, that during the 1950s the idea of a metropolitan 
government for the Greater London area had become obsolete in the context of political 
agendas. As explained by Barlow (1991: 73), on the one hand, the Conservative party was 
publicly against any large-scale local government and were pressing for abolition of the 
LCC and for a reconstitution of larger and stronger boroughs in the whole area. On the 
other hand, the Labour party realised that any larger metropolitan government than the LCC 
would jeopardize its electoral control of London. Additionally, the surrounding local 
authorities had demonstrated enough opposition to the creation of a Greater London 
government.
Thus, with such political scenario, the Government’s announcement in 1957 to appoint a 
Royal Commission to look into the problems of Greater London came as a surprise. While 
the government unexpectedly showed concern of the effects of London’s growth on local 
government areas outside the county in 1957, particularly in relation to Middlesex (see 
Rhodes 1970: 17), it was largely “the Conservatives’ political ambition in the 1950s to 
strike a blow at Labour’s LCC heartland which led to its demise in the [1963] London 
Government Act” (Hebbert & Travers 1988: 174). Hence, it was both, the county borough 
problem and a secret plan by the Conservatives to improve the party’s electoral prospects in 
the metropolis, which led to the establishment of the Royal Commission on Local 
Government for Greater London RCLG, also known as the Herbert Commission (see 
Barlow 1991: 73-76; Young & Garside 1982: 298-317).
The 1960 Herbert Report proposed the creation of a Greater London Council as an upper 
tier covering an area six times larger than the LCC, and of 52 London Borough Councils as
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a second or lower tier of local government within the same GLC area. While the upper tier 
would be responsible for education, planning, main roads, refuse disposal, the fire service, 
ambulance service, traffic management and research, the lower tier would be for personal 
social services, environmental health, local roads and libraries. In addition, both tiers 
would have concurrent powers for housing, recreation, arts, sewerage and land drainage. 
This time, the issue of air pollution was included in the Herbert Report for reorganising 
local government, although it remained as a localised aspect (see also, Rhodes 1970),
‘The efforts of one authority to control the air in its area may 
be to some extent nullified by lack of smoke control in an 
adjoining area; and it is for consideration whether there is a 
need for a more comprehensive approach to this problem and 
whether it should be dealt with on a wider basis. On the 
other hand the implementation of a clean air policy is 
essentially local”
(RCLG 1960: 174).
The recommendations for government reform by the Herbert Commission had two 
underlying principles. First, the need for a local authority to attend the common problems 
and needs of the entire metropolis (i.e. administrative efficiency). Second, the desirability 
of revitalising local government at a lower level (i.e. the health of local government) by 
increasing the responsibilities of the lower tier local authorities (see RCLG 1960: 59; Self 
1962: 146). According to Rhodes (1970: 230-233), there exist three arguments about the 
London government reform during the 1960s. First, the functional argument, where the 
debate was almost entirely concerned with the effective provision of services. On the one 
hand, there was the need for effective delivery of services such as traffic, planning, and 
overspill housing in Greater London. On the other hand, it was argued that the existing 
system was providing a good service in areas such as education and child care and thus 
would be a mistake to destroy it. Second, the argument about the value of local self- 
government which meant reinvigorating local government in London. This idea was seen 
not in the size of authority (as was implicitly argued by the Herbert Commission) but in the 
existence of distinct communities which may be as large as a county or as small as a parish. 
Thus, from that point of view, the creation of the GLC and the London Boroughs 
represented a strengthening of local government. Third, the political argument, where all 
parties involved - i.e. local authorities, professional bodies, the Conservative and Labour 
parties - each sought certain specific aims. For this author, more than an argument in itself, 
these aims conformed to the underlying motives for reform; the only political argument was 
that the Labour Party charge the Conservatives for “gerrymandering and seeking a purely 
party political advantage in destroying the LCC” (Rhodes 1970: 232).
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The two basic principles in the Herbert Report portray how primary concern and 
affirmation of the traditional values of local self-government - i.e. pluralism, participation 
and efficiency in the delivery of local services - have been influential in Britain. The debate 
during and after the period of the Herbert Report focused on the structural and institutional 
changes that would increase efficiency of public service delivery as the value local 
government was to pursue. The emphasis placed in the traditional value of ‘local 
democracy* by this, and subsequent reports, led to a series of criticisms as local 
government was pictured as democratic but inefficient (see, for example, Cochrane 1993: 
116; Dearlove 1979: 56-59; Dunleavy 1980: 7-8).
The central government did not fully endorse all the proposals made by the Herbert 
Commission. While at the upper tier a Greater London Council was set up in 1965, at the 
lower, the Government established 32 boroughs (plus the City of London) with an average 
population of about 250,000 rather than the 52 authorities with a population of 150,000 
envisaged by the Herbert Report. The newly-created GLC was responsible for services 
such as strategic planning, housing, the Fire Brigade and major roads taking control over 
London Transport in 1970. The new boroughs were to provide social services, housing, 
local roads, libraries, recreation and parks. The new two-tier system of government (which 
came into existence in April 1965 after the enactment of the London Government Act in 
1963) allowed central and local authorities’ participation (at the upper and lower tiers) 
regarding diverse air pollution functions. As seen in Table 4.2, few years before the GLC 
was abolished, responsibilities for air pollution were spread across all tiers of government. 
A good description and analysis of the history, arrangements and functional distribution of 
the GLC and London boroughs until 1985 include Barlow (1991); Regan (1972); Rhodes 
(1970 and 1972); Ruck & Rhodes (1970); Sharpe (1995c); Smallwood (1965); Travers et 
al (1991a); Young & Garside (1982).
According to Barlow (1991: 87-88), after 1965, the system of government in London went 
through several phases: from an initial period of adjustment to the new structure to the 
questioning of the role of the GLC and its abolition in 1985. This author identifies three 
main problems that influenced the way in which the new structure operated: the weaknesses 
of the reform, the changing nature of metropolitan issues, and the course of events in 
London’s politics (see also Flynn et al 1985; Rhodes 1972; Sharpe 1995c; Young & 
Garside 1982). First, the weaknesses of the structure are related to the functional allocation 
between the two tiers of government and the nature of the relationship between the tiers. 
One weakness refers to the fact that while the boroughs were given responsibility for a 
number of important functions that were familiar to the local government system and
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relatively easily coordinated, the GLC was given functions that were novel and difficult to 
integrate - e.g. planning. A second weakness involved concurrent functions between the 
two tiers of government. While some responsibilities were clearly spelled out in the 
London Government Act, others were vague. For instance, services that could be easily 
divided were refuse (disposal and collection) and drainage (main and local). Services that 
were more complex included planning, housing and transport. As it was not clear where 
responsibility lied on these last set of services, the result was that in some areas 
performance suffered as consultation and cooperation were not effective. One last 
weakness was the lack of subordination from one level of government to the other as the 
rationale of the reform was to create separate and distinct types of local government unit. 
Thus the boroughs tended to undermine the authority of the GLC and reduce its 
performance and efficiency as a strategic body, again, particularly in services such as 
transport, housing and planning.
Table 4.2 Government responsibilities on air pollution control before the GLC’s 
abolition
Central government Greater London Council London Borough Councils
• General advice • General advice • General advice
• Air pollution monitoring and 
measurement
• Air pollution monitoring and 
measurement
• Air pollution monitoring and 
measurement
• Air pollution data bank
• Enforcement powers
• Legislation
• Air pollution data bank
• S trategic planning and 
development control
• Enforcement powers - Local 
p lanning and developm ent 
control
• Standardisation of test methods
• Advice in form of Codes of 
Practice
Source: GLC (1983)
A second problem that influenced the new system of government was that during the late 
1970s concern over metropolitan issues shifted from housing and planning towards the 
state of the metropolitan economy. Thus, such aspects as unemployment and inner city 
problems came to the top of the government’s agenda. In addition to this politics in London 
was a determinant problem for the existence of the new London’s governmental structure 
(see Barlow 1991: 95-97). Changes in the balance of power in the GLC and several
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boroughs passing back and forth between Labour and Conservative provoked serious 
confrontations between the GLC and individual boroughs and between the GLC and the 
central government. Such confrontations caused discontinuities in policy and political 
direction, especially over the issue of housing. During the 1970s there was a growing 
movement among Conservatives to press for a review of London’s government and there 
were calls for removal of the GLC’s housing powers and its abolition. It was not until the 
late 1970s, though, that the proposal for abolition was not only supported but also 
advocated by the central government. As Barlow (1991: 97) states “abolition of the GLC 
became an election promise and the focus of a personal crusade by the Prime Minister 
(Thatcher)”.
Sharpe (1995c: 120) identifies three main reasons outlined by the central government for 
abolishing the GLC. First, it was argued that the GLC had been irresponsible financial 
overspender in terms of the government’s stated policy of reducing total government 
expenditure as well as compared with the expenditure of local government as a whole. 
Second, that the primary function of the GLC, the planning role, was no longer relevant or 
necessary because it was the government’s intention to downgrade that function and instead 
to let market forces largely determine land use. Third, that the case for establishing fully 
fledged, elected, tax-raising bodies was weak because they did not have enough functions 
to sustain themselves as viable local governments. Albeit these technical reasons argued by 
the government, there is wide consensus that the underlying motif for abolition was merely 
a political one (see, for example, Cuchillo & Morata 1991: 250; GLC 1984; Hebbert & 
Travers 1988: 1-3; Sharpe 1995c: 120-128). The Thatcher Government proceeded to 
abolish the GLC without any public consultation and despite an increased public support 
for keeping it in operation:
“The proposed reform of local government is unlike 
previous ones; it has emerged without detailed analysis of 
the present system and the possible alternatives”
(Flynn etal 1985: ix).
So, what it was gained in the past in terms of discussing the importance of the structure of 
government and distribution of functions regarding air pollution and related issues was 
ignored in the 1983 Government White Paper ‘Streamlining the Cities’ and in the 1985 
Local Government Act for abolition of the GLC. The proposals to reorganise local 
government in London did not address the issue of pollution control, i.e. failed to say 
which agency was going to be in charge of London-wide pollution prevention activities 
(see DoE 1983; GLC 1984 (31); LGA 1985).
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Table 4.3 The governance of London: partic ipan ts and  functions
M ain p artic ip an ts Selected agencies F u n c tio n s
C en tra l governm ent
Cabinet sub-committee for 
London (all central departments)
Government Office for London 
GOL
Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions 
DETR
Coordinate activities of central 
government affecting London
Regional authority for London: 
contact point with boroughs, 
voluntary & private bodies
Strategic planning, housing, 
urban programme schemes, 
public transport & road systems
C en tra lly -a p p o in te d
bo d ies
London Transport LT
Metropolitan Police
London Docklands Development 
Corporation LDDC
London Residuary Body LRB
Underground and buses 
Police Authority 
Urban development scheme
Remaining assets GLC, ILEA
B oro u g h s Diverse local units
Arts, environmental health, 
libraries, housing, refuse 
collection, education, social 
services, planning, roads and 
street lighting, cemeteries
B oroughs’ jo in t bodies
Association of London 
Government ALG
London Fire and Civil Defence 
Authority LFCDA
London Planning Advisory 
Committee LPAC & London 
Research Centre LRC
South East Regional Planning 
Conference SERPLAN
Boroughs’ representative in a 
range of London-wide bodies
Firefighting and civil defence
Planning and research functions 
London-wide
Policy-monitoring, major 
planning and transport issues
P rivate  sector 
(p a rtn e rsh ip s)
London First 
London Pride Partnership
Economic promotion & tourism 
City development plan
Source: After Travers & Jones (1997)
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Finally, the abolition of the GLC and the current system of local government in London is 
also very much the product of a mixture of liberal and conservative ‘New Right’ values 
adopted by the Thatcher Government (Stewart & Stoker 1995b: 192). The poll tax and the 
introduction of compulsory competitive tendering by local authorities are two good 
examples of liberal Right ideas which imply decentralisation and considerable powers of 
local government. For the liberal New Right, the value of allocative efficiency has no 
concern with redistribution for social justice. Instead, for the conservative new right, the 
value of allocative efficiency preempts those of liberty and participation. New right 
associated with conservatism, as opposed to liberalism, implies a centralist position where 
the central government specifies local functions, the constitutional position of local 
authorities, their taxation levels, standards and allocative efficiency in local service 
provision (see King 1995: 234-238).
The system of government in London is now best described as a simple, single tier of 33 
unitary authorities: London government is essentially borough government (Hebbert 1991: 
191). After the abolition of the GLC, the boroughs emerged as the main responsible 
authorities for the provision of local services in London becoming “the sole remaining tier 
of representative, multipurpose local government within the capital” (Hebbert & Travers 
1988: 109). The governance of London, though, includes several other bodies, such as 
central government departments, centrally-appointed bodies, private sector agencies, and 
borough joint committees, all serving a wide range of different functions (see Table 4.3).
In their book ‘The New Government of London’, Travers & Jones (1997: 10-28) provide a 
brief description of how London is currently governed. First, the boroughs have become 
the strong basic unit of London’s elected local government. The three main ways in which 
the boroughs operate are either by carrying out their own specific functions, by jointly 
constituting a number of London-wide organisations (by statute or voluntarily), or by 
forming partnerships with other central bodies, community groups, or local businesses. 
Second, like most borough joint arrangements, government-appointed bodies provide 
many services London-wide. While enhancing central government intervention in 
London’s local affairs, these centrally-controlled bodies are not locally accountable to the 
electorate and do not seem always to operate in a coordinated way. Third, the central 
government has many direct responsibilities for the government of London by means of 
appointing all the board members described earlier, and of determining the funding for the 
bodies concerned. The purpose of existing agencies within Whitehall is to coordinate the 
activities of central government as they affect the capital, to act as coordinators and 
sponsors of some policy areas in London (e.g. transport), and to bring together all relevant
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bodies in London to encourage them to operate in a more effective collective manner. 
Finally, there are a number of London-wide and more localised partnerships that are 
business oriented. While their income is largely derived from the private sector (although 
some public authorities may give support to individual initiatives), they have focused 
particularly on the economic promotion and the encouragement of tourism in London. By 
operating and encouraging partnerships, these bodies allow diverse organisations to 
network and to build common agendas filling a gap in the London machinery, but without 
executive powers, they do not substitute governmental action.
With the existence of a borough system of government, joined by a multiplicity of bodies 
(joint committees and partnerships) and an increased central government intervention 
achieved through institutional reforms, appointments and financial controls, the governance 
of London looks fairly fragmented. This situation has raised concerns on such issues as 
coordination, representation and local democratic accountability across London (see 
below). When the GLC was abolished, many of the roles and responsibilities were 
redirected to either the boroughs or the central government which has directly participated 
by means of appointing London-wide organisations. With more central control, the 
government has set out a framework for ensuring the implementation of its own objectives 
and the involvement of the private sector (see Newman & Thomley 1997: 967-969). So, 
for example, in the case of air pollution, while as from 1986 the boroughs continued to be 
the environmental health authorities (which includes pollution control responsibilities), 
other air pollution-related functions such as road traffic (all local roads) and planning (each 
borough is a local planning authority) were transferred from the GLC to the boroughs. 
Nonetheless, the central government (now through the DETR) has kept some relevant 
intervention in both issues: local plans follow strategic guidance and there exists 
‘considerable reserve powers’ concerning roads and traffic (see Chapter VI).
At the local government level, while it has been argued that the boroughs include the best 
and the worst of the local authorities in Britain, most concerns relate not to the boroughs 
themselves, but to the ways in which they operate through diverse area-wide joint bodies 
within the overall system of government (Hebbert 1992: 142-143). Given the fact that the 
government of London is a borough government, boroughs and its joint committees play 
an important role not only for coordination purposes, but toward citizen’s participation and 
representation. In terms of democratic structures, the London boroughs go into elections 
one year in four where new authorities (councillors) are elected for the whole city. While 
no borough is accountable to any other borough, they are to the local electorate. As shown 
in Table 4.4, while during the 1980s London was more or less politically balanced, it has
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not been so during the 1990s, where the Labour Party has gained political control of many 
more boroughs. While the boroughs are the directly-elected units of government in 
London, the boroughs joint bodies are regarded as indirectly-elected units since they are 
formed by the boroughs as constituent members. Democratic accountability within these 
bodies operates in distinct ways and dependant on the type of joint arrangement: some 
report to their own local authorities, others to central government. 1 So, for example, in the 
case of the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority LFCDA, accountability of its 
members and other joint authorities are to their constituent local councils. The level of 
accountability might increase depending on the area - whether fire, civil defence and so on. 
While the general public has access to the Committee meetings and papers, it also reports to 
the Home Office and it is scrutinised by the Local Government Ombudsman (Hebbert & 
Travers 1988: 72-77).
There are some joint arrangements in which the boroughs compulsorily have to be 
members without the possibility of opting out. An example of these bodies is, again, the 
LFCDA, a statutory joint authority with the right to precept on the boroughs for local tax 
resources and such functions as firefighting and civil defence. Members of this area-wide 
body must be elected local councillors; the LFCDA renders account to their constituent local 
councils. There are others in which membership is voluntarily and a matter of political 
choice, thus lacking a complete coverage of London’s interests and / or failing to be a real 
voice for Londoners as they have little or no power. Regarding the lack of complete 
coverage, the cases of the former London Boroughs Association LB A (Labour dominated) 
and the Association of London Authorities ALA (Conservative dominated) constituted a 
good example. While the former (regarded as a real forum for discussing London-wide 
problems) represented only 17 boroughs and the City of London, the latter represented the 
interests of the rest 15 boroughs (Hebbert & Travers 1988). The amalgamation of these 
two rival local authority organisations in 1994 into the Association of Local Government 
ALG covers now the whole area of London. Nevertheless, while the ALG potentially 
represents a stronger voice area-wide in London it still remains as a networking and
1 According to Flynn & Leach (1984: 1-13) there is a distinction between joint boards and joint 
committees. Joint boards are corporate bodies, created by order of a Minister, with independent financial 
powers including the power to borrow and obtain the money it needs from constituent authorities by means 
of precepts. Joint committees have no corporate status independent of their constituent authorities, and 
cannot hold property, borrow or precept. They are creatures of the authorities creating them and their 
constitution and powers are controlled by and may be terminated by the constituent authorities; expenses are 
defrayed amongst constituent authorities as agreed.
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lobbying body and thus may have influence but limited power.
Table 4.4 Political control of London (Before & after 1986; 1995)
Before May 1986 After May 1986 1995
Conservative 18 13 5
Labour 13 14 21
Liberal Democrat 1 (alliance) 3 3
No overall control - 2 2
Independent 1 1 1
Lab>Lib Coalition - - 1
Source: Hebbert & Travers (1988); Newman & Thomley (1997)
The principle of indirect election and variable accountability of borough’s joint 
arrangements have been criticised for being cumbersome and, above all, locally 
undemocratic (see Flynn & Leach 1984: 43; Hebbert & Travers 1988: 74). While there 
does not seem to be any form of ‘reporting back’ from these bodies to citizens, the process 
of accountability diminishes even more due to the augmented existence of new networks 
where the public sector has a minority voice in a particular partnership. It is the private 
sector together with the central government who have been increasingly taking the lead on 
discussing London’s governance. Such has been the case with the newly created (1996) 
Joint London Advisory Panel JLAP constituted by twelve Ministers of the Cabinet Sub- 
Committee for London and the members of the London Pride Partnership (a business- 
oriented body including such bodies as ALG and LPAC). While the JLAP meets in private 
with the London Pride Partnership, the line of accountability from these meeting back to 
ALG or LPAC, and then to London boroughs and to the local electorates, has been 
‘tenuous’ (see Newman & Thornely 1997: 983). Hence, any process of democratic 
accountability in the new partnerships or networks is to be considered indirect.
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The government of London obtains financial resources through central government grants, 
local taxation and from the private sector. While around a 75% to 80% of the boroughs’ 
budget is transferred from the central government, not all of them get the same amount of 
resources. All London boroughs, for example, get a share of the Uniform Business Rate 
UBR, a national tax levied by the central government and then reallocated to local 
authorities based on population rates. Another important way to rise resources in order to 
deliver local public services is the council tax which has become the main source of local 
income for the boroughs. While financial resources have also been sought through the 
participation of the private sector, the London boroughs, like the rest of the local authorities 
in Britain have both their revenue and capital spending capped (Travers & Jones 1997: 37). 
Like the boroughs, London-wide joint bodies also have financial constraints from the 
centre: their budgets are allocated depending on political-party participation. Hence, these 
joint organisations also get their resources from the boroughs themselves, for example, the 
LPAC, and or by other minor sources, such as from petroleum licences in the case of the 
LFCDA (see Hebbert & Travers 1988).
In the years since 1986 - particularly during the 1990s - debate has continued about the 
reorganisation of the system of local government in London (see, for example, Travers et al 
1991c; Travers & Glaister 1997). By way of illustration, Travers & Jones (1997: 10) 
distinguish six arguments that have been put forward for changes to the local government 
system in London. These arguments are: the need for a London-wide local authority and/or 
mayor; the lack of direct democratic accountability to Londoners for many public services 
provided; over-use of appointed boards and ad hoc bodies; poor standards of service 
provision in some boroughs; a lack of coordination of land use and transport provision; and 
the failure to tackle many key social and economic problems for lack of resources and/or 
political capacity.
Before the general election of May 1997, there existed two distinct approaches to the future 
of the reform of London government. The first one, put forward by the Conservatives, 
involved little or no change from the current arrangements. The second one, supported by 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats, implied the creation of a new London-wide elected 
authority (see Conservative 1997; Labour 1997; Travers & Jones 1997: 32-34). After the 
Labour Party came to power in 1997, the new administration published ‘New Leadership 
of London’, a consultation paper setting out the government’s proposals for an elected 
strategic authority for London: the Greater London Authority GLA made up by a directly 
elected Mayor and a separately elected Assembly of 24-32 members (DETR 1997b). 
According to the government, the creation of a GLA seeks to restore democratic city-wide
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Government to London, preserve and enhance London’s competitiveness providing firm 
leadership, tackle London’s problems (e.g. economic, social) and speak up for Londoners 
and their interests. While making repeated reference to the need of a strategic authority for 
London, the Green Paper included air quality management concerns - specifically regarding 
transport issues - as part of the arguments for creating a GLA:
“The GLA would be well placed...[to develop]...a London- 
wide strategy on air quality, designed to achieve national air 
quality targets within London, properly integrated with GLA 
strategies on the environment, transport and land-use 
planning”
(DETR 1997b: 29).
While the government has highlighted that the GLA would not be duplicating the work of 
local authorities (the latter would continue to have responsibility for implementing the 
resulting strategy locally), it has been argued that there is a need to take account of the work 
of the boroughs and existing collaborative arrangements when managing air quality. So, 
for example, according to Rydin (1997: 17-19) the GLA’s role in air quality management 
should include responsibility for a London Air Quality Strategy and its integration with a 
London transport strategy. While continuing and consolidating the work of the London Air 
Quality Network LAQN on monitoring in London, the GLA should also have powers 
regarding the restriction to traffic in certain spatial areas as this cannot be effectively 
undertaken by individual boroughs. The latter could include both physical ‘bans’ on road 
traffic and road pricing. At the same time, the London boroughs should continue to have 
powers to declare local air quality management areas within their areas (taking account of 
the London Air Quality Strategy) and to monitor air quality across London.
At the time of writing, the British government published the White Paper ‘A Mayor and 
Assembly for London’ proposing the new arrangements for London (see DETR 1998). A 
new GLA would be made up by a directly elected Mayor with powers on transport, 
economic development, strategic planning, police, fire service, and the environment 
(including air quality management) and by a separately elected Assembly (formed by 25 
members) which would act as a check and balance body with wide ranging scrutiny powers 
to investigate important issues on behalf of Londoners and to call the Mayor to account. 
Londoners will vote on the government proposals in a referendum on May 7 this year.
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4.3 Mexico City: a lifespan under federalism
Since Mexico became a Federal Republic in 1824, the boundaries and structures of the 
current government of Mexico City have been largely determined by two interlinked 
aspects.2 First, by the co-existence of the Federal District DF in Mexico City’s physical 
limits and beyond them (see Tena Ramirez 1970: 312-313). Second, by the resistance of 
the central government to reform such a special political entity - particularly during the 
twentieth century (see Ward 1990: 85). While during pre-hispanic and colonial times 
Mexico City represented the most important political and economic urban centre, the 
decision to place the Federal District - seat of the federal powers - in the core of Mexico 
City, reinforced its socio-economic and political position as the national’s capital city. It is 
precisely because Mexico City continued to be the political and economic centre of the 
nation that,
“Mexico’s leaders have denied the capital’s local residents 
their own independent structures for democratic participation 
[preventing] residents with neighbourhood or other more 
parochial concerns from interfering with urban 
administrative goals and national development plans. This, 
in turn, has meant that until recently, Mexico City’s 
populations have been forced to use national political 
structures to express local concerns”
(Davis 1994: 5).
Major accounts of the history of the city capital have not only concentrated principally on 
the origins and evolution of the Federal District, but in doing so, they have often reviewed 
the extension of its boundaries, its territorial location, and the political rights of its 
inhabitants (see, for example, Burgoa 1985; Tena Ramirez 1970; Zavala 1992). From 1824 
to 1854, the territorial extension of the DF covered an area of 8.8 sq. kms (a radius of two 
leagues or five miles around the central square of the city). These boundaries started to 
expand in 1854 as new surrounding local units ( ‘distritos') were incorporated. The last 
major boundary reorganisation that took place during the last part of the nineteenth century 
came about due to a neighbourhood petition in 1880 on extending the limits of the capital. 
This petition was based upon the fact that the city had expanded and thus the services 
provided by local authorities within those extended territorial limits were not enough (see
2 After obtaining independence from Spain in 1821, Mexico has been governed in diverse ways. While the 
federalist structure has been predominant, Mexico has been also ruled twice by a monarchy (first during 
1821-1824, and then during the French Intervention 1864-1867), and by a centralist republic (see Kandell 
1988).
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DDF 1992: 53). It was not until 1898, that the definite boundaries of the DF (as they exist 
now) were established covering an area of 1,499 sq. kms. (Gamboa de Buen 1994: 43). 
By the end of the last century, Mexico City was confined to what it is still referred as the 
‘First Quarter’ - ‘Primer Cuadro’ - within the Federal District boundaries covering an area 
of 20 sq. kms. (Ward 1990: 35).
The increase of the physical limits of the DF, though, ignored the federal principle that the 
seat of the federal powers should be placed on a small territory - as it happened in 1790 
with the creation of Washington D.C., capital of the USA (see Burgoa: 1985: 913). 
According to Tena Ramirez (1970: 313), while augmenting Mexico City’s socio-economic 
and political hegemony over the whole nation, the DF’s territorial expansions of 1857 and 
1898 went beyond such a federal rationale which was originally adopted in the early years 
of independence with the 1824 Federal Constitution. The fact that the DF has been seen not 
only as the seat of the federal powers, explains why such a special entity has had over the 
past two centuries a changing and diverse politico-administrative status. Thus, this author 
(1970: 314-321) explains that sometimes the DF has been a variant of any other Mexican 
federated state with the possibility of self-regulating its own governmental structures, and 
others a unit whose organisational structures and authorities were originally created by the 
federal government but in charge of local functions and with its own local judiciary 
tribunal.
The issue of the location of the DF has been more prominent than that of its physical 
boundaries (see, for example, Burgoa 1985: 916). The discussion that took place during 
the nineteenth century on whether the Federal District should remain or not in Mexico City 
has overshadowed the debate on the governing structures not only of Mexico City but, in 
fact, of the Federal District. The system of government in Mexico City and the Federal 
District did have diverse structural arrangements in terms of size, boundaries, 
representatives, service functions, and so on. For example, from 1824 to 1835, there 
existed in the same territory both, the DF and Mexico City’s local unit of government: the 
‘ayuntamiento’. The ‘ayuntamiento’ was responsible for services such as health, police and 
administration but it was accountable to the Governor of the DF. In 1829, the ayuntamiento 
divided the Municipality of Mexico into diverse politically fragmented areas known as 
‘cuarteles mayores’ and ‘cuarteles menores’ (see DDF 1992: 21-22; Gamboa de Buen 
1994: 42).
Map 4.2 The Metropolitan Zone of Mexico City MZMC
Delegated units 
(Federal District)
URBAN SPRAWL 
LIMITS OF 
FEDERAL DISTRICT
SS-1 LIMITS OF 
^  DELEGATED UNITS & 
MUNICIPALITIES 
Municipalities 
(State of Mexico)
1. Alvaro O breg6n
2. A zcapotzalco
3. Benito Juarez
4. C oyoacan
5. Cuajimalpa 
6 Cuauhtem oc
7. G. A. Madero
8. Iztacalco
9. Iztapalapa
10. M agdalena Contreras
11. Miguel Hidalgo
12. MilpaAlta
13. Ttehuac 
14 Tlalpan
15. V enustiano Carranza
16. Xochimilco
17. Atizap^n de Zaragoza
18. C oacalco
19. Cuautitlein
20. Cuautitten Izcalli
21. Chaleo
22. Chicoloapan
23. Chimalhuac«in 
2 4  E catep ec
25. Huixquilucan
26. Ixtapaluca
27. La Paz
28. Naucalpan d e  Juarez
29. Nezahualcdyotl
30 . N icotes Romero
31. T ecam ac
32. Tlanepantla
33. Tultitten
Source: CMPCCAVM (1994a)
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From 1846 to 1857, when the federal system was re-established in Mexico, the DF (re­
named as the District of Mexico in 1847) co-existed once again with the then local unit of 
government in Mexico City: the municipality. The DF was divided up into 8 central units - 
‘prefecturas’ - and 3 foreign units - ‘prefecturas foraneas’ (see DDF 1992: 33-34). The 
new 1857 Constitution reassured that the seat of the federal powers would remain in 
Mexico City and confirmed the territorial extension of the DF (Gamboa de Buen 1994: 42- 
43). Again, the debate on reorganising local government at that time focused on whether 
the DF should go to another city or not. Once the French Intervention (1864-1867) 
concluded, the municipal system was reinstated in Mexico City and thus the possibility of 
the DF’s inhabitants to elect its local government authorities (Burgoa 1985: 918). Overall, 
the basic framework of government throughout that century was the municipality despite 
numerous changes of regime and patterns of state and local government which shifted back 
and forth between centralisation and decentralisation. For strictly local matters, Mexico City 
and the other municipalities in the district retained their local units of government: the 
‘ayuntamientos’ (see Fried 1972: 653).
The debate on reforming local government in Mexico City during the twentieth century has 
focused on two main issues. First, the political legitimacy of Mexico City’s government 
which addresses two distinct aspects: the co-existence of the federal and the local 
governments in the same territory, and the political rights of its inhabitants (i.e. direct 
elections of local officers after the municipality was abolished in 1928). Second, the 
delivery of public services which includes a review of structural issues such as politico- 
administrative arrangements, intra- and inter-relationships with other public and private 
bodies, and the coordination, efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation and 
enforcement (see Burgoa 1985: 913-936; Diaz Alfaro 1992: 198-199; Fried 1972: 684-686; 
Nava Escudero 1992: 111-116; Tena Ramirez 1970: 311-325; Ward 1990: 85-91). 
Thoroughly, the discussion on reorganising the structure of local government in Mexico 
City has concentrated on issues of democracy and political rights and thus has 
overshadowed those related to city administration (Diaz Alfaro 1992: 198-199). Mexico 
City is not an exception to the rule that in most developing countries unrepresentative and 
(usually) repressive government structures are stressed more than efficiency and 
effectiveness within local government (Akin Aina etal 1991:4-6)
After the Mexican Revolution ended (1910-1917), the Federal Constitution of 1917 
specified the creation of a government unit to run the DF; it was not until 1928, though, 
that a major reorganisation took place in the capital. First, the DF emerged as a special 
political entity within the Federation and was divided into a central department (City Hall)
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comprising a number of quarters and 13 delegated units ( ‘delegaciones'). Second, the 
municipal system of government in the Federal District and the local unit of government of 
Mexico City - the ‘ayuntamiento ' - were abolished. Third, the newly created department 
and delegated units took over the government of Mexico City and the rest of the 
municipalities within the territory of the DF, respectively. The non-elected central 
government department - called Federal District Department DDF in 1941 - acted until 1997 
as the area-wide authority for the DF. Fourth, the President of Mexico became the 
responsible for the administration of the government of the DF. A presidential appointee 
would act as a ‘mayor’ or head at the central department to assist the President in carrying 
out his/her duties concerning DF’s local affairs. Finally, within the structural arrangement 
of the central department, a neighbourhood or consultative council ( ‘Consejo Consultivo') 
would serve as a representative mechanism for all concerns and demands of the inhabitants 
of the Federal District and with the official purpose of aiding Mexico City’s mayor in 
governing the capital. This organisation, though, would only give recommendations 
without any executive or legislative powers (Burgoa 1985: 921-922; DDF 1992: 61; Ward 
1990: 73).
According to Ward (1990: 73) there existed two main reasons for reforming the DF in 
1928. First, the municipalities within the DF were in major financial difficulty and 
incapable of delivering essential services. Second, the intense political in-fighting among 
political parties was being played out through the local government unit in Mexico City, the 
‘ayuntamiento'. The reform would achieve two diverse things: to marginalise the then 
Labour Party’s strength in the municipalities and to create a less anarchic structures capable 
of improved city administration. In the same vain, Davis (1994: 23) explains that the 
administration, construction and revival of Mexico City after the revolutionary period 
required “fancy footwork” and “crafty political alliance-making”. The reform came about 
due to the ambition of ex-president of Mexico, Alvaro Obregon (1920-1924) who struggle 
to regain the presidency in 1928. During the late 1920s, one of the main opponents to 
Obregon’s intentions was an organisation constituted by labour unions ( ‘Confederacion 
Regional de Obreros Mexicanos CROM') who had political control over Mexico City’s 
municipalities, the local police and was an ally to his contender P. Elfas Calles. While the 
latter meant for Obregon a real challenge to his candidacy, the constant conflicts between 
the CROM and other labour unions, between different municipalities over diverse political 
ideologies, and between the local police and striking workers, were posing a threat to the 
efficient delivery of services and living conditions in the capital. This ‘chaotic’ situation led 
Obregon to urge to reform the system of government in Mexico City:
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“In an effort to restore order to the capital city and limit the 
CROM’s capacity to damage both local politics and the 
national labour movement, Obregon and his political allies 
successfully introduced an initiative in the National Congress 
in July 1928 to abolish the system of popularly elected 
municipal rule in the nation’s capital”
(Davis 1994: 61).
Although Obregon was assassinated shortly after the reform, and P. Elias Calles came into 
power in 1928, the non-democratic system of local government in Mexico City prevailed 
until the early 1990s. In 1941, the DF was territorially organised within the same 1898 
boundaries. It was legally ascertained that the DF was constituted by Mexico City (formed 
by 4 ‘cuarteles' and considered as a politico-administrative unit) and 12 delegated areas 
( ‘delegaciones *) (see DDF 1992: 61). Between 1940 and 1980, the built-up area in the DF
grew 7 times from c.a. 99.2 sq. kms. to 750 sq. kms, going beyond its limits into the
territory of the surrounding federated state EdoMex (Gamboa de Buen 1994: 44-45; 
Icazuriaga Montes 1992: 29-30; Ward 1990: 40). In spite of this increase, the system of 
local government remained the same as that of 1928.
Once again, in 1970 under the Organic Law of the Federal District Department (LODDF 
1978), some re-organisation took place and Mexico City disappeared as a politico- 
administrative unit and was replaced by 4 more delegated areas. From 1970 to 1997, the 
Federal District was constituted by a central department or City Hall (the DDF) and by 16 
politico-administrative or delegated units altogether under direct control of the DDF (DDF 
1992: 61). During this time, the Mayor and the heads or local mayors of the delegated units 
continued to be appointed by the President like as from 1928. In practice, though, many of 
these local mayors were usually nominated by the Mayor for confirmation by the President 
(Ward 1990: 73).
From 1970 to 1987, many formulas were introduced in order to expand to scope of citizen 
representation. Thus, for example, in 1970, the ‘Consejo Consultivo ’ instead of being 
constituted by different labour or civic associations, it was formed by diverse groups of 
neighbourhoods called ‘Juntas de Vecinos’. The mere recommendatory functions that this 
body originally had, continued without any granted executive or legislative powers (DDF 
1992: 62-63). The long life of the Consultative Council (1928-1995) served as an 
important body through which the Partido Revolucionario Institucional PRI assured a
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relatively stable one-party rule in Mexico City for several decades.3 The establishment of 
the ‘Junta de Vecinos' further added to political and institutional fragmentation of local 
structures for political participation, rather than remedying the problem of lack of 
democracy in the capital (see Davis 1994: 216). The need to reform the non-democratic 
system of Mexico City governance led to the creation in 1988 of a local assembly with 
responsibility on creating ‘bandos\ setting-up local regulations, monitoring local 
authorities and so on. This body - the Representative Assembly of the Federal District 
ARDF (Asamblea de Representantes del Distrito Federal), was set up as an elected party- 
political representatives assembly with limited functions: merely as a ‘watchdog’ on City 
Hall expenditures and policy (see Ward 1990: 87).
After the fraudulent presidential elections of 1988, the pressure to democratise Mexico City 
considerably grew. Although city management issues started to be included in the debate 
for reforming local structures of government in Mexico City (see, for example, DDF 1993; 
Gamboa de Buen 1994: 158-159), it was the main concerns on democratic issues which 
prevailed on the governmental political agenda for change. The debate during the first half 
of the 1990s - commonly known as ‘Reforma Politica del Distrito Federal ’ - focused on 
four main issues. First, direct elections of both the Mayor and the local mayors or 
delegados (which also included devolution of power to their ‘delegaciones ’). Second, 
further reform of the ARDF, i.e. the creation of a proper local legislature or congress. 
Third, jurisdictional fragmentation of the DF by creating five more delegated units within 
its territory. Finally, whether or not Mexico City should become a 32nd federated state. 
Nevertheless, the only two issues that were finally addressed and included in the 1993 and 
1996 reforms were the direct elections of the mayor and the creation of a local legislature 
(see DDF 1993; Diaz Diaz & Perlo Cohen 1994: 72-73; Gamboa de Buen 1994: 151-161; 
Ward 1998: 121-122).
While the issues of local accountability and social participation have been the hallmarks 
within Mexico City’s government debate (see Diaz Diaz & Perlo Cohen 1994: 72-73), air 
quality concerns have not awakened discussion on the need to reform the organisational 
structures of local government. So, for example, the 1990 air pollution strategy - PICCA - 
did not address the issue of carrying out structural changes in existing units of local 
government in Mexico City. However, the need to coordinate environmental action against 
pollution in the MZMC, led the Mexican government to create in 1992 an inter­
3 For a good review of the importance of the Consultative Council in Mexico City, see Davis (1994).
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governmental agency: the CMPCCAVM (see Chapter II). This metropolitan body4 (now 
called CAM) is a voluntary and permanent association of governments (central and local) 
that is convened regularly to discuss and try to agree on solutions to air quality management 
issues and other environmental problems in the MZMC. The CAM is headed every two 
years by the Mayor of the DF, the Governor of the surrounding federated state EdoMex, 
and the Secretary of State for the Environment (SEMARNAP) under a rotation basis; an 
Advisory Council, which is integrated by the main environmental group leaders, 
universities and research centres, senators and deputies, members of the ALDF, and the 
private sector, provides technical and scientific assistance (see CMPCCAVM 1994b; DDF 
1996). The idea of creating a single metropolitan authority for the whole built-up 
metropolitan zone (i.e. DF and conurbated municipalities) for managing air quality - and 
other city management issues - thus taking over CAM’s responsibilities, has not become 
the focus of debate for reorganising local government in Mexico City (see, for example, 
Ward 1998: 282-283).
The local government in Mexico City - the Government of the Federal District GDF 
(Gobiemo del Distrito Federal) - currently has three main local authorities (branches): the 
Executive (Head of City Hall), the Legislative (Legislative Assembly), and the Judiciary 
(Tribunal of Justice). The system of government in Mexico City (Executive branch) is best 
described as a highly centralised, city-wide and mayor-headed local authority. The City 
Hall of the Government of the Federal District - previously known as the Federal District 
Department DDF - consists of the Mayor’s Office and a large number of hierarchical 
subordinated local units. The organisational structures of the Executive branch are divided 
up into three main areas (see Table 4.5). First, the Mayor’s office and a number of local 
units which include secretariats (secretanas generates), the auditing office (Contraloria 
General), the administrative office (Oficialia Mayor), delegated units (delegaciones), and 
the Attorney Office (Procuraduria General de Justicia del Distrito Federal). Second, 
deconcentrated units which include, again, delegated units (delegaciones), administrative 
units, and other local bodies (comisiones). Finally, public corporations or parastatals 
(entidades paraestatales), which include decentralised units, public-private partnerships, 
and so on. From December 1997, the GDF is no longer an ad hoc central government unit 
but a proper unit of local government (see Constitution 1997; LOAPDF 1994).
4 The CMPCCAVM was preceded by an inter-governmental panel (Secretariado Tecnico Intergubemamental 
STI) formed by diverse central and local government units; this panel - created during the Salinas 
administration - launched the 1990 PICCA (see STI 1990).
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Table 4.5 O rganisational s tru c tu re  of the G overnm ent of M exico City
A gencies F u n c tio n s
1) C entralised  units:
- Mayor’s Office
Policy formulation and 
contracting out of public 
services, budgets approval, all 
appointments within City Hall
- Secretariats & delegated units
Local government, urban, social 
& economic development, 
housing, environment, public 
works & services, education, 
health, finance, public transport 
and traffic management, police
G overnm ent - Auditing Office Auditing
of the - Administrative Office Personnel, technical equipment
F ederal D istric t - Attorney General Justice
(G D F)
2) D econcentrated units:
- Delegated units (delegaciones)
- Comisiones
Public services provision, 
licensing, cultural and civic 
affairs, legal services, parks, 
markets, cemeteries, waste 
collection, roads, libraries & 
museums, urban sub-plans, land 
property
3) P araesta ta ls :
- Decentralised units; public / 
private partnerships
Electric trams, underground
Source: Various
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Table 4.6 The governance of Mexico City: p artic ipan ts  and  functions
M ain p artic ip an ts Selected agencies F u n c tio n s
C en tra l governm ent
Secretariat of the Environment 
(SEMARNAP)
Secretariat of Energy (SE)
Secretariat of Communications 
& Transport (SCT)
Environmental norms & policy 
formulation, industrial 
inspection & control
Energy saving programme
Transport emissions control 
(other than MZMC vehicles)
C en tra lly -a p p o in te d
bod ies
State-owned oil industry 
(PEMEX)
State-owned electricity industry 
(CFE)
Fuels quality improvement, 
research
Electricity (thermoelectric 
plants)
The G overnm ent 
of the DF
Mayor’s Office 
&
diverse local units
Public works, water & drainage, 
planning, medical services, 
sports, fiscal revenue, economic 
development, social welfare, 
transport, traffic management, 
police, cultural and civic affairs, 
parks, cemeteries, roads, street 
lighting, urban plans, land 
property, waste collection, legal 
services, environment
M etropo litan
Jo in t
C o m m iss io n
Metropolitan Commission for 
the Environment CAM 
(Comision Ambiental 
Metropolitana)
Intergovernmental panel for 
environmental policy 
formulation (particular focus on 
air & water pollution, 
contaminated land)
P riv a te  sector Diverse bodies Public transport (taxis, buses)
Source: Various
As the local authority in charge of the city, the Mayor has its own office and 
responsibilities. Those functions that are allocated to its office and cannot be delegated or 
transferred to other local bodies include financial reports to the legislative body, 
appointments within the whole government of the DF, policy formulation and contracting
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out of public services, and so on (see RIAPDF 1995). The majority of the public services, 
though, are delivered by the secretariats, and by other deconcentrated and parastatal bodies. 
The 16 delegated areas in which Mexico City is politically and territorially divided, have the 
same Mayor’s functions except those that have been exclusively allocated to him/her or to 
any other secretariat. The only distinctive characteristic of these deconcentrated units is that 
each delegation can only operate within its own jurisdiction. As seen in Table 4.5, there 
exists an enormous amount of overlapping functions inside the structure of the GDF. In 
addition to this, the governance of Mexico City includes several other bodies, such as 
central government secretariats, centrally-appointed bodies (parastatals and deconcentrated 
units), private sector agencies, and one main metropolitan joint commission, all serving a 
wide range of diverse functions (see Table 4.6).
The mayor or governor of the City Hall is the only directly elected authority within the 
Executive branch: all other authorities within the hierarchical structure of the City Hall are 
appointed by and are accountable to the mayor. For the first time since 1928, direct 
elections for a Mexico City’s Mayor (who had traditionally been appointed by the 
President) took place in July 1997.5 The newly elected mayor, who came to power in 
December 1997, will exercise its executive powers for three years and will become 
accountable to its local electorate. In addition, the Mayor has to report to a new local 
Legislative Assembly ALDF (Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal) on the diverse 
activities carried out by the GDF. In the year 2000 direct elections will take place once 
again for a mayor and all other local mayors, i.e. heads of the 16 delegated units or 
delegaciones.
As part of the political reform process in Mexico City, the legislative body experienced 
major changes in 1993 and 1996 gaining considerable legislative powers and becoming not 
only a proper parliamentary body (in practice since 1993, and formally since 1996), but a 
strong political agency within the decision-making process in Mexico City. The newly 
created ALDF, which has become an important player in democratising Mexico City, 
serves now as a mechanism for representing citizen’s interests and has proved to be more 
effective for the latter than the already extinct Consultative (1928-1995) and Citizen’s 
(1995-1997) Councils. As shown in Table 4.7, while the first legislative congress (still 
called Representative Assembly) was largely dominated by the central government long-
5 From 1928 to 1993 the Head of the City Hall was directly appointed by the President of the country. 
From 1993 to 1996, the President would appoint the Head or Mayor from a member of the DF Legislative 
Assembly, the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies - this formula, though, was never implemented.
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standing political party PRI, in the 1997 elections the left-wing party PRD gained most of 
the seats.
T able 4.7 E lected  m em bers to M exico C ity ’s legislative body (1994 A R D F & 1997 
ALDF) by political p a rty ________________________________________________________________
Political P a rty Seats 1994 Seats 1997
Partido Revolucionario 
Institutional PRI (right)
38 11
Partido de Accidn National 
PAN (right)
14 11
Partido de la Revolution 
Democratica PRD (left)
10 38
Partido del Trabajo PT (labour) 2 2
Partido Verde Ecologista 
Mexicano PVEM (green)
2 4
Source: El National, December 14, 1994; Business Mexico, November 1997.
As with the government of London, the government of Mexico City gets its financial 
resources mainly from the central government, local taxation, and more recently, from the 
private sector. Traditionally, it has been the central government who has given financial 
support by means of subsidies, for example, into public transport, the underground 
system, sewers, and provision of water. Only around 20% of Mexico City’s budget came 
from local taxes. Nevertheless, central government’s economic assistance has been 
considerably reduced over the last years leaving the government of Mexico City to 
continuously depend on both their own resources (tax levy) and on schemes for borrowing 
money from the private sector. While there exists local taxation rates for important services 
or commercial transactions, such as water or house acquisitions, land property is by far the 
most important source for fiscal revenue (see Gamboa de Buen 1994: 107-117). Mexico 
City’s Governor-Elect, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, has assured in a recent interview that his 
administration will seek not only to attract new investment from the private sector but to 
promote public-private partnerships in such areas as public transportation and 
environmental pollution (see Cabannes 1997: 26).
I l l
4.4 Conclusion
The first part of this chapter brought into a comparative framework the main local structural 
arrangements in London and Mexico City. While London local authorities have no 
constitutional status, Mexico City’s are the creation of the Federal Constitution and exist 
within three branches: Executive, Legislative, Judiciary. Each governmental system 
operates with different tiers of government. On the one hand, without a city-wide authority, 
the government of London is constituted by a lower-tier of local elected authorities (32 
boroughs and the City of London); on the other hand, Mexico City has a highly centralised 
upper-tier or city-wide local authority (headed by a Mayor: the Executive branch) with no 
elected lower-tier authorities (see Table 4.8).
Table 4.8 C om parative aspects of local governm ent in London and  M exico City
London 
(as G reater London)
M exico City 
(as the F ederal D istrict)
A rea (sq. km.) 1,578 1,499
P o p u la tio n  (000s) 6,933 8,235
(in 1993) (in 1990)
S y stem Executive: Mayor
of NO legislative body Legislative: ALDF
local governm ent NO supreme court Judiciary: TSJDF
U pper tier: U pper tier:
NO city-wide authority Government of the Federal
T ie rs District headed by a Mayor
of
local governm ent Lower tier: Lower tier:
33 local units 16 local units
(32 boroughs & the City of (16 units without municipal
London) status)
D irect elections: D irect elections:
D em ocratic  system All 33 local units Mayor
(1 year in 4) (1997-2000; then every 6 years)
Source: Various
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While identifying existing differences in each urban centre, the description and analysis of 
the debates and experiences on governmental reform of each system of local government in 
the second part of this chapter, depicts few similarities about the changes or reorientations 
in their organisational structures. First, local authorities in both urban centres are becoming 
not the main, but one of the many players of a wider process of metropolitan governance. 
That is to say, London and Mexico City’s local authorities are operating in a complex and 
growing system of diverse units (central government agencies, area-wide joint bodies, and 
private sector agencies) all providing a wide range of urban services. Second, the current 
British and Mexican national governments have increasingly endorsed, though for different 
reasons, the idea to create more democratic institutions at the local government level. 
Clearly, the intention for London and Mexico City is to develop some type or variant of a 
metro scheme as explained in Chapter IE. In the case of London, while keeping the lower- 
tier of 33 local authorities, the British government seeks to establish or restore a democratic 
upper-tier of government. The Government proposals are to set up a new Greater London 
Authority GLA which will include a mayor and assembly, both directly elected. In the case 
of Mexico City, while huge steps have already been taken to establish a more democratic 
upper-tier of government (by means of directly electing the Mayor from 1997 onwards), a 
lower-tier of elected local authorities (most likely the 16 current delegated units) will 
commence to operate in the year 2000. The principal difference here, however, is that in 
London the new authority will cover the full metropolitan area, not just one-half of it as 
with the case of Mexico City (see also, Ward 1998: 283). Finally, both urban centres are 
undergoing a process of continuous change in the organisation of their structures of local 
government. This ongoing process can be identified by the changes in the labels and 
functions of diverse local units whenever a new elected government comes into power. It is 
possible to affirm that both systems of government are embedded in a process of creation, 
fusion, fission and abolition of diverse local agencies.
While the debate on the creation of a city-wide authority in London has been invigorated by 
air quality concerns, the discussion on reforming local government in Mexico City has not 
included those related to air pollution control. The following chapters aim at examining the 
viewpoints of central and local government authorities as well as all other key actors on 
London and Mexico City’s government organisation response to air pollution control, 
respectively. By exploring the cases of air quality monitoring systems, public transport and 
traffic management, and the application of an emergency plan, the argument centres on the 
need for a variant of metropolitan government.
C H A P T E R  V
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Comparing Air Quality Management Strategies in London and 
Mexico City: the Local Government Perspective
“By studying past and present air pollution problems and air quality management 
strategies UNEP and WHO believe that many o f the problems currently faced by 
megacities can be avoided by the megacities o f the future”.
WHO & UNEP (1992) in their report ‘Urban 
Air Pollution in Megacities o f the World\
5.1 Introduction
This chapter brings into a comparative framework the viewpoints of local authorities in 
London and Mexico City regarding air pollution control and local government structures. 
The data regarding this comparative survey is based upon 29 structured questionnaires (out 
of a total population of 33) for the case of London and 16 (out of a total population of 16) 
for the case of Mexico City (see Appendices I & II). These questionnaires targeted local 
authorities with environmental or pollution responsibilities according to the politico- 
administrative units’ organisation in each city; in other words, the interviews were carried 
out with one local authority at each borough or delegation (see Chapter I). All percentages 
that are shown in this chapter are based upon the total population of interviewees in London 
and Mexico City: 33 and 16 respectively. The four questionnaires that were not responded 
in the case of London are treated as a ‘no response’ answer.
The main purpose of this chapter is to review the lessons that can be learned from each city 
according to their own particular system of local government and air quality management 
regimes in the light of the three approaches outlined in Chapter III. First, it seeks to 
consider past and present experiences to hierarchical structures of local government in 
relation to the various aspects of an air quality management system. Second, it highlights 
relevant points to be made about air quality (as a public good and thus its externality effects 
within a fragmented context) according to the public choice model. Finally, it attempts to 
depict current attitudes and experiences of networks, joint working and a variety of
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stakeholders for managing air quality in connection to the local governance approach.
5.2 Air pollution as an urban environmental priority
The starting point of the survey carried out in London and Mexico City tried to identify 
whether environmental pollution concerns exist in these two urban centres and whether or 
not the problem of air pollution is regarded by local authorities as an urban environmental 
priority. According to the results of the structured questionnaires, more than 73% in 
London and 81% in Mexico City of the local authorities interviewed, responded that 
environmental pollution as a whole (air, water, noise, contaminated land) is an issue of 
concern. However, whereas in London the environmental priorities are in the first place 
noise pollution (67%) and in the second air pollution (52%), in Mexico City the 
environmental priorities are first air pollution (57%) and second water pollution (44%). The 
less important issues are, consequently, water pollution and contaminated land in London, 
and noise pollution and contaminated land in Mexico City (see Figure 5.1). The latter 
shows that whereas local environmental pollution as a whole may be an issue of concern 
for cities of the North and the South, governmental priorities for solving similar 
environmental problems may differ according to scientific data and political and social 
perception.
While considered as an urban environmental priority, air pollution is seen by local 
authorities in London and Mexico City as a local issue. Indeed, when local authorities 
require information about the sources, type, or quantity of pollutants, they usually get in 
touch either with other local authorities or other local agencies, or with central government 
and sometimes private sector bodies. So, for example, local authorities in London go either 
to other boroughs (24%), the central government (27%), the agency NETCEN (21%) or 
local bodies such as LB A or ALA (21%). They only go a limited number of times to the EC 
(6%) or to UN organisations (3%). These figures clearly reveal the lack of a centre to 
which local authorities could go and obtain standardised information about air pollution 
issues. In the light of orthodox views, there is a problem of equity in the distribution of this 
service because some boroughs may get more and better information than others depending 
on which body they get in touch with. The disparities of borough data on diverse pollutants 
(sources, types, levels) that may be found across London increases the difficulty of 
determining the desired performance or tolerance levels (that can be obtained vis h. vis 
standardised databanks) for the efficient provision of public goods as outlined by the public 
choice model. This is because fragmented information on air pollution does not ensure the 
development of effective standards of measurement which in turn are necessary to analyse
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any production process as well as compare different modes of production for their 
efficiency (see Ostrom e ta l 1961: 833).
Figure 5.1 Local au tho rities’ views (‘very seriously’) on d ifferen t types of pollution 
in London and Mexico City
80  - |
8.
Greater London 
Mexico City
Source: Author’s survey
Additionally, such percentages for London show the existence of what the local governance 
approach identifies as the blurring of responsibilities between public and non-public sectors 
and the power dependence issues. On the one hand, the presence of diverse stakeholders 
creates ambiguity and uncertainty about who is responsible for what and thus who should 
be accountable if the requested information is not appropriate or complete. On the other 
hand, the involvement of other sectors of society may bring enhanced knowledge, 
resources and technical efficiency. It seems clear, though, that the existing dependence of 
diverse boroughs on several other organisations for getting information on air pollution 
matters make them one of the many participants without tangible leadership within the 
governance process in London.
By contrast, in the case of Mexico City local authorities go basically to the area-wide body
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DDF (87%), and rarely to other local authorities (19%) and the central government (13%). 
As with the case of London, they actually never go to regional bodies such as CEC (6%) or 
to UN organisations (0%). Information on diverse air pollution aspects can be obtained on 
a more standardised and equal basis which may enhance the possibility to measure and 
quantify data on the delivery of a public good. Nevertheless, a monopolistic position, as 
identified by public choice advocates, may derive from a situation whereby only one 
organisation provides all the relevant data on air pollution.
Figure 5.2 Follow-up by local authorities in London and Mexico City to a ir  pollution 
reduction recom m endations (‘very seriously’ & ‘seriously*)_____________________________
£3  Greater London 
Mexico City
100
Source: Author’s survey
In addition to the fact that air pollution is regarded as a localised matter, local authorities do 
not always consider international air quality policy guidelines nor pollution reduction 
recommendations from regional bodies when tackling air pollution (with the noticeable 
exception of the EC and Agenda 21 in the case of London and of the Rio Declaration in the 
case of Mexico City). As seen in Figure 5.2, existing domestic air quality management 
strategies represent the main focus of attention for local authorities, i.e. the UK air quality 
management system in the case of London (82%) i , and the PICCA in the case of Mexico
1 Although the current UK National Air Quality Strategy NAQS was NOT in operation during the 
fieldwork interviews with local authorities in London (January-May 1995), it amounted for the highest 
percentage (42%) of the ‘very seriously’ responses.
Rio Declaration
Agenda 21
EC (UK)/NAFTA (Mexico)
AQMS (UK)/PICCA (Mexico)
percentage (%)
117
City (57%). Although EC Directives are also a serious matter for London boroughs (82%), 
this may have to do more with legally-enforcing obligation reasons than to a welcoming 
acceptance of EC recommendations. In the case of Mexico City, the fact that local 
authorities do not follow international guidelines is largely explained because delegaciones 
only represent the units through which D D F’s decisions are implemented, i.e. the 
operational administrative bodies.
Figure 5.3 Local au tho rities’ concerns on achieving a ir  quality standards in London 
and Mexico City (‘very im portan t’ & ‘im portan t’)______________________________________
125 -i
100 -
Greater London 
Mexico City
a Social attitudes 
b Political will
c Existing environmental policies 
d Local authorities finance 
e Devolution of power to local authorities 
f Policy implementation & enforcement 
g Current local government organisation 
h Legal and taxation mechanisms 
i Economic model of development
Source: Author’s survey
Interestingly, as seen in Figure 5.3, there exists strong consensus among local authorities 
that the most important aspect that needs to be revised in order to improve air quality is the 
issue of social attitudes, which includes such elements as education, awareness, and public 
participation (82% in London and 100% in Mexico City). However, while in London the
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issue of political will from central and local authorities is similarly very important (82%), in 
Mexico City the second aspect that has to be taken into account is the need for more 
devolution of power to local authorities (94%). At the policy level, while in both urban 
centres current environmental policies also need to be addressed in order to improve air 
quality, in London local authorities seem to be less concerned regarding their 
implementation and enforcement (64%), than is the case in Mexico City (81%). The two 
aspects that are clearly identified as less important for local authorities in both cities are 
legal and taxation mechanisms and the economic model of development.
Results from Figure 5.3 also reveal a few concerns which are relevant to the local 
governance approach (see also Figure 5.4). In the case of London, while local authorities 
are concerned about issues of fragmentation (i.e. current local government organisation), 
they are more concerned about achieving air quality standards through the involvement of 
other actors of society, namely, citizens. Within the local governance approach, it is 
important to consider the participation of community groups or individuals through diverse 
local networks and diverse agencies. Here, concerns are not about pushing responsibilities 
on to the private sector or the citizen but about including other agencies or sectors such as 
voluntary groups, non-profits or non-governmental organisations (all recognised by the 
local governance approach) in managing air quality. Something similar in connection with 
local governance assumptions can be said in the case of Mexico City, where local 
authorities’ concerns over the issue of social attitudes constitute one of the most important 
aspects to be addressed for achieving air quality standards. However, it is important to note 
that local authorities are also concerned about creating a more ‘evenly balanced’ structure of 
local government in Mexico City (as explained by the two-tier approach advocates) by 
demanding devolution of power to delegated units with more limited concerns on making 
the process of managing air quality more inclusive by increasing the participation of 
voluntary groups.
5.3 Local government organisation in London and Mexico City
As seen in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, while the most important factor that has limited local 
authorities on accomplishing their air quality aims has been allocation of resources (67% in 
London and 56% in Mexico City) the latter is followed by two institutional constraints: 
central government intervention and the current organisational arrangements in both 
systems of local government. From an economic point of view, one of the reasons why 
finance seemed to be a limitation for local authorities in London, lied on the fact that air 
quality was not a statutory duty and thus it was not always a council priority, as highlighted
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by diverse London authorities.2 This situation made securing additional funding for 
extension of air pollution activities almost impossible. As the local authority at Hounslow 
pointed out, air quality “ha[d] to contend for finance with all other council functions 
including education, etc.” Under public choice assumptions, this is a clear example of how 
the provision of a public good (i.e. air pollution) may create an externality. W ithout a duty 
to monitor or assess air pollution and without a central unit to financially shoulder local 
authorities across the whole metropolitan area, some boroughs in which emissions are 
produced may benefit from the actions taken by other surrounding boroughs who decide to 
allocate financial resources to improving air quality and thereby deal with the negative 
externality. With a duty to monitor and assess air quality (such powers were actually 
obtained through the 1995 EA) local authorities will now have to allocate resources to 
control air pollution. Yet, those boroughs where the effects of air pollution are tangible or 
where the emissions are created (for example, with common heavy traffic jam s or the 
existence of motorways) may have more incentive than others to carry out air quality 
management measures. More concerned and affected boroughs will only be able to 
internalise the externalities created by less concerned boroughs at a cost.
Figure 5.4 London’s local au thorities main lim itations for carry ing  out a ir  quality 
aims (‘very im portant*)_________________________________________________________________
Central government intervention 
E3 Lack of an upper tier of government 
Finance 
0  Management 
□  Lack of technology 
E3 Lack of political will 
R  Inadequate policies
6.0%
24.2%
Source: Author’s survey
2 For an updated account of London boroughs’ statutory duties on air quality, see Chapter VI.
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Figure 5.5 Mexico C ity’s local au tho rities  m ain lim itations for ca rry in g  out a ir  
quality aims (‘very im portan t’)_________________________________________________________
Central government intervention 
[?il DDF highly centralised functions 
Finance 
F73 Management 
Q  Lack of technology 
M  Lack of political will 
Inadequate policies
Source: Author’s survey
In the case of Mexico City, as delegaciones are only operational units and not ‘proper’ 
local authorities they usually have to follow what the M ayor’s Office decides are the 
environmental priorities to work on during each year and how much money is required for 
that. While delegaciones have little say from a financial resources perspective, the area- 
wide authority - the DDF - has the control of indirect consequences or externalities 
produced by different sources of air pollution across Mexico City. And while efforts to 
reduce air pollution may benefit surrounding municipalities of the federated state EdoMex, 
Mexico City inhabitants can be affected by those emissions produced within some of these 
surrounding municipalities (see Map 4.2). As seen in Chapter VII, the creation of a 
metropolitan council (i.e. CAM) for the whole metropolitan area has helped to coordinate 
environmental measures to tackle air pollution. Ideally, this body should encourage local 
authorities to internalise the externalities - positive and negative - for public ‘bad’ as air 
pollution which producers and consumers are unable or unwilling to internalise for 
themselves.
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5.3.1 Central vs local government intervention
The second greatest factor that has limited local authorities in achieving their air quality 
aims is central government participation (33% in London and 44% in Mexico City). The 
results shown in Figure 5.4 and 5.5 evidence that although the issues of finance and local 
organisational arrangements have been very important on preventing local authorities to 
carry out their air quality responsibilities, they are not keen on heavy central government 
intervention regarding diverse air pollution issues. As seen in Table 5.1, local authorities 
believe that the central government is not the most appropriate agency for coordinating 
efforts between London and surrounding counties and between Mexico City and 
surrounding municipalities when dealing with air quality management issues, respectively 
(see also Figures 5.6 and 5.7 in the next section).
T ab le  5.1 Local a u th o r itie s ’ p re ferences in  L ondon an d  M exico C ity  on cen tra l 
governm ent in terven tion  fo r coordinating  a ir  quality  issues_____________________________
London M exico C ity
i) Local tier of government i) Each of 16 delegaciones
ii) Other specialised agency ii) Local tier of government
iii) C en tra l governm ent iii) C en tra l governm ent
iv) Each of 33 boroughs iv) Other specialised agency
Source: Author’s survey 
NOTE: Preferences are ranked
In relation to such issues as air quality monitoring systems, road traffic, and emergency 
plans, local authorities in both cities also prefer the participation of local government bodies 
to central government units or any other specialised agencies (see Table 5.2). In the case of 
London, the central government intervention option for coordinating and standardising air 
quality monitoring systems, road traffic, and an emergency plan, was put by the 
respondents either in a second or third place as the ‘more appropriate’ agency for carrying 
out those functions. If the option of central government intervention appears in second 
place for the issues of road traffic and an eventual emergency plan above a specialised
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agency, may have to do with the fact that the latter would need considerable powers to 
change and implement road traffic programmes, and to ban or stop cars in the case of an 
eventual contingency plan. The situation in Mexico City looks clearer and more consistent: 
the option of central government intervention always appears in third place and below the 
upper-tier of government and the 16 delegated units options (see also Figures 5.7; 5.8; 5.9; 
5.11; 5.12 and 5.13). It is important to highlight that in both urban centres the first option 
to coordinate monitoring systems, road traffic, and emergency plans, is an upper-tier of 
local government.
Table 5.2 Local authorities’ views in London and Mexico City on central government 
intervention for coordinating air quality monitoring systems, road traffic and 
emergency plans______________________________________________________________________
Air quality management issues London Mexico City
Air quality 
monitoring systems
i) Local tier of government
ii) Other specialised agency 
iii) Central government
iv) Each of 33 boroughs
i) Local tier of government
ii) Each of 16 delegaciones
iii) Central government
iv) Other specialised agency
Road traffic
i) Local tier of government
ii) Central government
iii) Each of 33 boroughs
i) Local tier of government
ii) Each of 16 delegaciones
iii) Central government
iv) Other specialised agency
Emergency plan
i) Local tier of government
ii) Central government
iii) Other specialised agency 
iv) Each of 33 boroughs
i) Local tier of government
ii) Each of 16 delegaciones
iii) Central government
iv) Other specialised agency
Source: Author’s survey 
NOTE: Preferences are ranked
The results shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 reveal a mix of local authorities’ concerns 
regarding the issue of central government intervention that is relevant to all three models 
explained in Chapter ID. There is a clear concern from local authorities to keep air quality 
management regimes in local hands. From an orthodox perspective, (either a single 
consolidated unit or a two-tier formula) one of the reasons for creating a city-wide authority
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at the metropolitan level is to avoid the responsibility of area-wide functions passing to 
central government. One of the main orthodox criticisms to the public choice approach is 
precisely that in a fragmented situation central government intervention will increase - 
although some public choice theorists would like to reduce the scope of central bureaucracy 
and arguments have been made for a more decentralised, democratic, and pluralist system 
within the process of governing urban centres. As explained in following chapters, for 
example, much of the existence of heavy central government intervention and of diverse 
agencies for managing air quality in London is derived from the current institutional 
fragmentation at the local government level. Under traditional assumptions, obtaining 
governmental efficiency would imply creating a structure of government for maintaining 
and enhancing democratic accountability at the local level and for coordinating and 
standardising air quality issues (particularly regarding monitoring systems, road traffic and 
contingency plans) vis a vis the central government. Local authorities’ preferences in 
London and Mexico City for such a metropolitan unit is linked to the critical issues or 
dilemmas outlined by the local governance approach regarding the need for an agency for 
coordination and leadership purposes. Although local authorities are also keen on including 
and encouraging the participation of new agencies (for example through self-governing 
networks) the outcome of the survey reveals that local authorities still wish to dominate in a 
governance relationship. Other specialised agencies do not seem the most appropriate units 
for coordinating air quality management issues.
5.3.2 Area-wide agency vs fragmented units
As seen in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, the third most important factor that has hindered local 
authorities from carrying out their air quality management responsibilities is the way in 
which the system of local government in both centres is structurally organised (24% in 
London and 44% in Mexico City). The results of the survey show that in London the lack 
of a local tier of government for managing air quality is subjected to much debate among 
the respondents, in other words, there is no consensus on whether this has been a 
limitation or not (London authorities responded to Question 7: ‘very important* 24%; 
‘important’ 24%; ‘less important’ 33%) (see Appendix I). By contrast, in Mexico City the 
heavily centralised functions of the DDF is less controversial for the respondents and has 
represented a significant limitation (Mexico City authorities responded to Question 7: ‘very 
important’ 44%; ‘important’ 13%; ‘less important’ 19%) (see Appendix 13). In spite of this, 
such limitations have not been a determinant issue that has impeded local authorities from 
doing their work or activities.
124
Local authorities’ responses on which should be the appropriate agency for coordinating 
diverse air quality issues point in two clear directions in each city. In the case of London, 
the first clear point is that local authorities favour the idea of an area-wide agency as more 
appropriate for coordinating air quality management between London and surrounding 
counties, monitoring systems (together with standardisation), road traffic and contingency 
plans (see Figures 5.6; 5.7; 5.8 and 5.9). Within London’s institutional setting, among the 
four given options local authorities considered that the proper agency should be an elected 
type of body, i.e. a local tier of upper government such as the former GLC or proposed 
GLA. The second point is that the less favoured agency for coordinating air quality issues 
are fragmented units, that is to say, each of the 33 boroughs in London.
Figure 5.6 Local au th o rities’ views on the most ap p ro p ria te  agency to coordinate 
efforts between London and surrounding counties on a ir quality issues_________________
Each of the 33 boroughs 
F71 Central government - specialised agency 
Local tier of government 
Q  Other specialised agency
Source: Author’s survey
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First, regarding the issue of air quality monitoring systems, before the abolition of the GLC 
there existed a coordinating head in London that assisted local authorities on measuring, 
comparing and storing information on databanks on air quality trends (see Chapters II and 
VI). Due to the existence of such a body, which was in charge of collecting all air pollution 
data, it was possible to have an overall picture of Greater London’s atmosphere. As seen in 
Figure 5.7, while most local authorities would like to have an upper tier of government to 
standardise and coordinate the results that they get when monitoring within their own 
boroughs, they believe that the second best option is a specialised agency. This is because 
local authorities tend to identify the South East Institute for Public Health SEIPH as the 
‘substitute’ of what the former GLC was doing at the coordinating level for air pollution 
databanks (see Chapter VI).
F igure 5.7 Local au th o ritie s’ views on the m ost ap p ro p ria te  agency to  coo rd ina te  and  
stan d ard ise  the a ir  quality  m onitoring system in London_________________________________
|  Each of the 33 boroughs 
□  Central government - specialised agency 
^  Local tier of government 
Other specialised agency
3.0%
Source: Author’s survey
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Second, local authorities are clearly in favour of an upper tier o f governm ent for 
coordinating road traffic issues (see Figure 5.8). Any other specialised agency is 
insufficient for this since what it is required is a head with enough powers to change 
things. The fact that the ‘each of the 33 local units’ option got a very low percentage of 
local authorities’ preferences, does not mean that they are not keen on getting involved in 
road traffic issues. On the contrary, local authorities in London have lobbied for a long time 
on issues such as testing and stopping vehicles. Although they do now have these two 
statutory powers, at the moment the survey was being carried out they lacked the powers to 
stop them (see Chapter VI).
Figure 5.8 Local au thorities’ views on the most appropriate  agency to coordinate road 
traffic in London
Each of the 33 boroughs 
□  Central government - specialised agency 
Local tier of government 
0 Other specialised agency
9.0%
24.2%
Source: Author’s survey
Finally, regarding coordination of an emergency air pollution plan, local authorities believe 
that this should be undertaken by an upper tier of government (see Figure 5.9). As with 
road traffic issues, a London-wide agency must have enough powers to change and 
implement such a plan. If a contingency programme is likely to contemplate restrictions in
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the use of cars, local authorities would certainly play a significant role on this. The 
responses by local authorities regarding an air pollution emergency plan have been given 
under the circumstances that there is not such a programme for London (see Chapter VI and 
Appendix I).
Figure 5.9 Local au tho rities’ views on the most appropria te  agency to coordinate an 
emergency a ir pollution plan in London________________________________________________
Each of the 33 boroughs 
Central government - specialised agency 
Local tier of government 
Other specialised agency
Source: Author’s survey
The answers given by local authorities in London fit more readily into the ‘hierarchical’ and 
‘network’ approaches (particularly for coordination purposes) than to the ‘market’ or public 
choice approach. Past and present experiences of London Boroughs working within a 
fragmented institutional setting seem to suggest that various political jurisdictions operating 
through contractual and/or cooperative undertakings to deliver public goods and services as 
proposed by public choice theorists do not constitute the most appropriate organisational 
arrangement for managing air quality. Rather, local authorities in London would prefer to 
work together with an upper tier of government and other participants (such as specialised 
agencies or central government units) in a more networking or partnership mode as outlined 
by a modified local governance approach. The outcome from Figures 5.6 to 5.8 reveals that 
within an interactive governing process for managing air quality (where several actors 
intervene) an area-wide authority is seen as the one organisation to dominate within the 
overall governance system. This qualifies the answers given in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
21.2%
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In Mexico City, as with the case of London, local authorities responses support first the 
idea of an area-wide agency for coordinating such issues as monitoring systems (together 
with standardisation), road traffic and contingency plans (see Figures 5.11; 5.12 and 
5.13). Within Mexico City’s institutional setting, among the four given options local 
authorities believe that a local tier of government such as former City Hall DDF should be 
the proper agency for this. The second point of relevance is that the second most 
appropriate agency for coordinating those three issues - unlike the case for London - was 
precisely the fragmented local units in Mexico City, that is to say, each of the 16 
delegaciones. The latter, together with the fact that the first most appropriate agency for 
coordinating efforts between Mexico City and surrounding municipalities was each of the 
16 delegated units (see Figure 5.10), reveals local authorities’ desire to have wider 
participation in their dealings with air pollution. It is not that Mexico City’s delegated 
authorities seek to set up a system of fragmented government but one in which they can 
jointly work with the area-wide body. All local authorities responses implicitly 
acknowledged that the former DDF would remain as the upper tier of government.
F igure  5.10 Local a u th o ritie s ' views on the m ost a p p ro p ria te  agency to  coord ina te  
efforts between Mexico City and  su rrounding  m unicipalities on a ir  quality  issues______
43.7%
|  Each of the 16 delegaciones 
□  Central government - specialised agency 
|  Local tier of government 
Other specialised agency
56.2%
Source: Author’s survey
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First, the case for air quality monitoring systems suggests that the agency for coordinating 
and standardising information on air pollution should be an upper tier of government and 
not a non-governmental area-wide agency (see Figure 5.11). Despite some criticisms that 
the media and the delegated units themselves have made on the monopolistic attitudes of 
form er DDF regarding m onitoring system inform ation (for exam ple, not enough 
distribution of information to delegaciones) local authorities still prefer the option of an 
upper tier of government. The concern of local authorities is not so much whether the DDF 
should be the body for coordination purposes, but on access to air pollution databanks and 
general information (see also Chapter VII).
Figure 5.11 Local au thorities’ views on the most appropriate  agency to coordinate and 
standard ise the a ir quality monitoring system in Mexico City__________________________
Each of the 16 delegaciones 
El Central government - specialised agency 
Local tier of government 
Other specialised agency
Source: Author’s survey
130
Second, as with the case of London, local authorities strongly believe that an upper tier of 
government (and not any other body) should be in charge of coordinating road traffic (see 
Figure 5.12). The reasons for this seem to be similar to those in the case of London: what 
is required for road traffic is a head with enough powers to change things. As the local 
authority in the delegated unit of Cuauhtemoc stated “what is required is an entity with 
general powers so as to have proposals with integral solutions” . The results also show, 
once again, how much delegated authorities would like to have wider involvement on air 
pollution issues. The local authority at Tlalpan explained that the reason why delegaciones 
should intervene in road traffic issues is “because of being more directly and closely 
involved with the problem”.
Figure 5.12 Local au th o rities’ views on the most ap p ro p ria te  agency to coordinate 
road traffic in Mexico City_____________________________________________________________
62. 5%
Each of the 16 delegaciones 
Evl Central government - specialised agency 
Local tier of government 
0 Other specialised agency
Source: Author’s survey
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Finally, results on the issue of the contingency plan suggests the need for a system of 
government with a head for coordination purposes and delegated authorities to carry out 
diverse measures of the plan (see Figure 5.13). Implementing a contingency plan requires 
an area-wide authority which would alert other bodies and coordinate and enforce several 
actions. Delegated authorities can also participate by taking quick action on informing 
people about the emergency situation in their own boundaries (e.g. hospitals, schools, 
etc.). As the local authority at Tlahuac stated on the implementation of the contingency plan: 
“it has to be the local government of DDF in conjunction with the 16 delegated units” .
Figure 5.13 Local au thorities’ views on the most app ropria te  agency to coordinate an 
emergency a ir pollution plan in Mexico City___________________________________________
Each of the 16 delegaciones 
Central government - specialised agency 
Local tier of government 
Other specialised agency
Source: Author’s survey
The answers given by local authorities in Mexico City fit more to traditional orthodox 
assumptions (in particular to the metro model) than to the public choice and local 
governance approaches. As seen from the results of Figures 5.9 to 5.13, although the 
participation of diverse stakeholders (particularly citizens) may be desired, the 
responsibility for managing air quality according to the respondents should rest upon local
18.7%
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government units. Local authorities’ desire (i.e. delegated units) to jointly participate with 
the DDF in air quality management issues is linked to the orthodox assumption of the two- 
tier formula with a ‘top-heavy’ (or ‘evenly-balanced’ for some functions) type of metro 
authority (see Chapter El). It is important to note, though, that while central government 
units and specialised agencies got the lower percentages as the most appropriate units to 
coordinate diverse air quality issues, there exist equal concern among all respondents to see 
them participating to a certain extent within the overall governance process.
5.4 Comparing air quality management systems
This section looks at the diverse ways in which local authorities in Greater London and 
Mexico City perceive and look at air pollution. The analysis concentrates on local 
authorities’ views on the scale of the problem, the need for a contingency plan, the air 
quality situation (according to national and international guidelines and bands), the existing 
access to information and on diverse aspects on public transportation systems and traffic 
management. The last part of this section concludes by commenting on the relevant links of 
all these issues (policy measures) to the three models as outlined in Chapter IE.
5.4.1 Human health, flora & fauna, and the built environment
Local authorities’ awareness of the risk or evidence that exists between exposure to any air 
pollutant and a respiratory disease or other illnesses in human beings is higher in London 
(58%) than in Mexico City (44%). However, the involvement of local authorities in 
programmes and/or research on air pollution and its effects on human health (London 33% 
and Mexico City 13%) is considerable low in both cities - particularly in the Mexican case.
In London, local authorities’ responses on the awareness of a cause-effect relationship of 
air pollution may be scientific because some of the respondents (specifically Environmental 
Health Officers) have environmental science backgrounds. However, these responses 
included a wide range of answers such as “anecdotal only”, “numerous references - too 
many to mention!”, or even “could write a book in answer to this question!”. Due to the 
length of responses, type of pollutants-consequences statements, and so on, it is not 
possible to transcribe all of them. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the two 
common characteristics given by those that perceived air pollution as a harmful issue were, 
first, that much of the awareness comes from academic related sources (e.g. medical 
journals; health articles); second, that the air pollutants identified are the typically urban 
pollutants such as NO2, smoke, CO, SO2, particulate matter, and the ‘new’ threatening 03 ,
133
PM 10, and benzene. The most common health consequences identified by London 
authorities are asthma, lung cancer, heart disease, bronchitis and asbestosis. Research that 
has been carried out by local authorities on air pollution and human health include, for 
example, the London Borough of Barnet on asthma in children and air pollution; the 
boroughs of Greenwich and Tower Hamlets (jointly with UMDS Guy’s and St. Thomas’s 
Medical and Dental School) on air pollution and respiratory health; and the City of 
Westminster (together with St. Mary’s Hospital) on individual exposure.
In the case of Mexico City, awareness of air pollution impact on human health is relatively 
low compared to the high levels of pollution that the city commonly suffers. The latter may 
have to do with the fact that local authorities have limited access to the information of DDF 
on air pollution issues, and also because most of them do not have environmental science 
backgrounds. Most importantly, though, it may have to do with the fact that they are not 
commonly involved in any programme or research carried out by DDF’s authorities (or any 
other institution) on air pollution and human health impact. The most common 
consequences that were identified by those local authorities that were aware of this cause- 
effect relationship, include asthma, skin infections, bronchitis, heart disease, lung cancer, 
diminished learning capacity due to levels of lead in blood. Local authorities from diverse 
delegated units have also identified the typically urban pollutants (e.g. lead, CO2, SO2 , 
NO2) and the 'new' threatening ones (e.g. Ozone, benzene and some hydrocarbons) as the 
main pollutants that may cause harm to human beings. According to the survey, one of the 
few examples of a delegation taking part on air pollution and human health research, is the 
delegated unit of Coyoacan, which jointly participates in a National Autonomous 
University of Mexico UNAM research-led programme on Ozone and illnesses on children.
5.4.2 Contingency plans
Whereas in London more than 70% of local authorities believe that an emergency plan is 
necessary in case air pollution levels exceed national or international standards for London, 
in Mexico City, 100% think that the emergency plan should continue to be implemented. 
Although the levels of some pollutants in London have gone beyond the permissible limits 
set out in WHO/EC standards, an emergency plan in this city does not seem to be as urgent 
as it is in the case of Mexico City, where the WHO/IMECA threshold limits have been 
regularly exceeded (see Chapter II). As seen in Figure 5.14, among the three given options 
for an emergency plan, London authorities seem to prefer an all-year alert plan; 
nevertheless, there is not a common view on when should this plan take effect. On the 
other hand, in Mexico City, local authorities seem to be much more concerned about the
implementation of the alert plan during wintertime.
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Figure 5.14 Local au tho rities’ concerns on the im plem entation of an emergency plan 
(‘m ore u rgen t’ & ‘u rgen t’) in London and Mexico City_________________________________
l?1 Greater London 
Mexico City
100
Source: Author’s survey
Interestingly, although the so-called ‘photochemical episodes’ are more likely to occur in 
the summer, respondents in both cities are more concerned about w intertim e than 
summertime pollution episodes. In the case of London, this may have to do with the 
historical fact that severe pollution episodes have mainly occurred during the winter. In the 
case of Mexico City, while air quality worsens during the winter due to meteorological 
conditions, severe pollution episodes have occurred during all periods of the year - 
especially from March to May when mild-hot weather mixes during the early mornings and 
afternoons, speed-winds are low, and there is no rain (for more details, see Chapter II).
5.4.3 Bands and guidelines
In London, local authorities do not favour the current DETR’s air quality criteria in which 
air pollution concentration is banded - i.e. ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘poor’, ‘very poor’. The 
reasons given by the 76% of London authorities who responded in this way are that the 
bands are too wide and vague, imprecise and not strict. These have been also criticised
Summertime alert plan
Wintertime alert plan
percentage (%)
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because they do not account for mixtures (synergetic levels) and do not demonstrate the 
levels of risk to human health.
In Mexico City, the air quality criteria (IMECA) in which air pollution concentration is 
banded is one of much debate among local authorities: 44% in favour and 44% against. 
Those authorities in favour pointed out that IMECA takes into consideration the realistic 
and particular characteristics Mexico City has and not the ideal ones. In fact, a local 
authority in Azcapotzalco said that the criteria is the right one for Mexico City precisely 
because in order to have such criteria “it is necessary to make an evaluation according to the 
physical characteristics of Mexico City”. Those authorities against IMECA said that the 
bands are too wide and do not take into account all types of pollutants; furthermore, they 
are presented in a way that the public do not understand them.
Figure 5.15 Local au thorities’ preferences on a ir quality bands (‘more ap p ro p ria te ’ & 
‘ap p ro p ria te ’) in London and Mexico City______________________________________________
a b e d  
a WHO Health-related guideline
b DoE Air Quality Band / SS Mexican Air Quality norms 
c EC Directive limit value 
d USEPA Standards
100-1
[xl Greater London
Mexico City
75  -
5 0 -
25 -
Source: Author’s survey
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As seen in Figure 5.15, in London and Mexico City the WHO health-related guidelines are 
preferred by local authorities over the domestic guidelines provided by the DETR and the 
Mexican government, respectively. However, in both urban centres the respondents prefer 
such domestic guidelines to the USEPA Standards. While quite important for London’s 
local authorities, the EC Directive limit values are the less appropriate guidelines to be 
followed for Mexico City.
5.4.4 Access to information
There is a strong tendency for local authorities in both cities to believe that the more 
effective channels to provide information about the air quality situation is through media - 
particularly TV and radio (see Table 5.3). These preferences may be linked to the fact that 
more people (especially vulnerable groups) have better and immediate contact with either 
TV or radio during the day and night than with any other channel of information. As seen 
in Table 5.4, the availability of information in London in this regard does not seem to be as 
good as it is in Mexico City.
T able 5.3 Local au tho rities’ views on the m ost effective channel to provide 
inform ation  abou t London and  Mexico C ity’s a ir  quality  situation
i) Media (TV, radio)
ii) Signposts on main roadside
London —> hi) Local information (local magazines, leaflets)
iv) Tube stations
v) Newspapers
i) Media (TV, radio)
ii) Signposts on main roadside 
M exico C ity — > iii) Newspapers
iv) Tube stations
v) Local information (local magazines, leaflets)
Source: Author’s survey 
NOTE: Viewpoints are ranked
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T able 5.4 Local au th o rities’ views (% ) on availability  of in form ation  regard ing  the a ir  
quality  situation in London and  Mexico City____________________________________________
LO N D O N good regular bad
Media (TV, radio) 9% 48% 30%
Newspapers 3% 42% 42%
Local information 6% 18% 58%
M EX ICO  CITY good regular bad
Media (TV, radio) 56% 19% 25%
Newspapers 50% 31% 19%
Local information 31% 25% 25%
Source: Author’s survey
The second most important channel to provide information according to London and 
Mexico City’s local authorities views is the given option of signposts on main roadside as 
this may help motorists to know about an emergency situation. Given the fact that road 
transport is the main polluter in London and Mexico city, the latter may be an appropriate 
way to alert drivers and ask them to make a more ‘rational use* of their vehicles. In Mexico 
City, signposts started to work at the beginning of the 1990s intended primarily to inform 
the population about the air quality situation. After some years, the use of them has become 
less intensive since not all of them are providing continuous information, and some are 
already broken.
5.4.5 Public transport and traffic management
According to the results of the survey, local authorities in London and Mexico City 
strongly believe that part of the solution to the problem of air pollution is the use of public 
transport. Whereas most authorities in London would like to encourage drivers to leave 
their cars at home and to shift to diverse modes of public transportation, in Mexico City 
they prefer to have better public transport without so many limitations on private cars. As 
seen in Table 5.5, the most important modes of transportation that need to be encouraged in 
London in order to contribute to a better air quality standard are: railways (73%), buses and 
underground (64%), and cycling (61%). As explained by a local authority at the London 
Borough of Camden, one of the reasons why the option of more environmentally-friendly
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cars should not be encouraged as a mode of transport is because “cleaner cars can provide a 
shorter term solution but longer term requires shift away from cars”. In addition, local 
authorities suggested ‘trams’ and ‘human powered rickshaw taxis’ as alternative modes of 
transport.
In the case of Mexico City, while local authorities believe that public transport (together 
with more environmentally-friendly cars) needs to be encouraged to improve air quality, 
not all modes of public transportation are relevant. The most important of these are: 
underground (69%), electrical buses (50%), and light railways (44%). As seen in Table 
5.5, among the six given options of public transport local authorities believe that the 
minibuses (6%) - which account for the highest percentage of journeys in Mexico City by 
mode of transport (see Chapter VII) - are the least important. Cycling and walking do not 
seem viable options supported by local authorities; as one local authority in Tlalpan said, 
“cycling and walking are not convenient in terms of distances and lack of security in the 
city”.
Table 5.5 Local au th o ritie s’ views in London and M exico City on the m ost im p o rtan t 
modes of tran sp o rta tio n  to im prove a ir  quality__________________________________________
London —>
i) Railways
ii) Buses
iii) Underground
iv) Cycling
v) Walking
vi) Environmentally-friendly cars
Mexico City --->
i) Underground
ii) Environmentally-friendly cars
iii) Electrical buses
iv) Light railways (tren ligero)
v) Buses
vi) Cycling
vii) Walking
viii) Railways
ix) Minibuses (microbuses)
Source: Author’s survey 
NOTE: Viewpoints are ranked
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As shown in Figure 5.16, it is interesting to note that in both cities local authorities believe 
that people are increasingly making use of the car (main contributor to air pollution in both 
case-studies) because of lack of public transport (London 61% and Mexico City 69%) and 
because of consumerism and comfort (London 64% and Mexico City 56%). While the 
most controversial issue in London and Mexico City was the given option of social status 
(the results of the survey did not show any tendency on whether this has been a very 
important factor or not), local authorities in both cities do not consider that widening 
existing roads and building new ones, or less exposure to bad air quality, are relevant for 
making people use their cars.
Figure 5.16 Local au thorities ' views on why people are increasingly tending to make 
use of private cars in London and Mexico City_________________________________________
Greater London
Mexico City
60
gc 402
b d fa c e
a Consumism and comfort 
b Lack of public transport 
c Social status 
d Safety reasons
e Widening existing roads and building new ones 
f Less exposure to bad air quality
Source: Author’s survey
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5.4.6 Diverse policy measures and distinct local government approaches
From research presented in this section (Figures 5.14 to 5.16 and Tables 5.3 to 5.5) it is 
important to recognise that diverse policy measures may fit more readily with one or two of 
the three approaches outlined in Chapter III than others. Thus, there are some policy 
measures which may require an area-wide approach for a more efficient (where large scale 
economies can be exploited) and coordinated (where equal distribution of services among 
all political units is necessary) governmental response. Such are the cases of the elaboration 
and implementation of contingency plans and the elaboration of a master plan for enhancing 
public transport among diverse political units across a whole metropolitan area. The 
establishment of bands and guidelines may also remain an exclusive central/local 
government function. These issues can then be associated with the traditional orthodox 
model.
Arguing from the public choice approach, attention needs to be paid not only to the costs of 
production (efficiency) but to the transactions costs of the relationships of fragmented local 
units and how these might be reduced. Cases where externalities are not likely to occur may 
fit more to a fragmented system of government as explained by the ‘market* approach. 
Some examples may include local bus services provision (in each jurisdiction) and research 
on human-health exposure to air pollutants in particular areas of a metropolitan complex 
where neither area-wide coordination nor cooperative agreements among local units may be 
required. In a few selected cases, there may be areas where the benefits of transactions 
costs greatly outweigh the additional transactions costs involved. As seen in this section, 
local authorities are working with other non-governmental agencies (such as universities, 
hospitals, private contractors) which may help local units to reduce the overall costs in the 
provision of a service. However, with a metro-level public good such as air quality, the 
application of the public choice model is likely to remain limited.
Transactions costs need to be assessed not only in relation to who produces and/or 
provides them (either a metro unit or multiple jurisdictions) but also in relation to the 
benefits derived from the relationships among diverse actors within a metropolitan area. 
There may be some policy measures where involvement of other stakeholders is required in 
the provision of certain services regardless of transactions costs; this can normatively be 
identified with the local governance approach. Some examples of this include access to and 
distribution of information (i.e. costs of the relationships of local authorities with media 
and newspapers) and delivery of diverse modes of metro-level public transport (e.g. 
underground, railways, trolleys, taxis). Here, focus needs to be put on networks and
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public/private partnerships for providing services.
5.5 Conclusion
The results of this survey are useful not only because they are representative of a 
population (i.e. local authorities in two urban centres) but because they provide a 
descriptive background for comparing the viewpoints of local authorities within each case- 
study and between the two chosen populations. While this comparable data fosters the 
exploration of diverse air quality management and local government issues as presented and 
explored in more detailed in following chapters, it serves as valuable empirical information 
to be evaluated and analyzed in the light of the three approaches as outlined in Chapter IE.
The outcome of the survey with local authorities in London and Mexico City has suggested 
two main points regarding the organisational arrangements in each system of local 
government. First, most local authorities in both urban centres would like to see less central 
government intervention for managing air quality issues. While there is a similar view on 
more devolution of power to local authorities on air pollution matters, some central 
government intervention is still accepted. Second, there are strong pressures in both urban 
centres to reorganise local government into a system of an area-wide authority at the upper 
tier and participatory local authorities at the lower one. In the case of London, local 
authorities prefer working together with an upper tier of local government as a coordinating 
head for such issues as monitoring systems, road traffic, and emergency plan than 
separately with other boroughs or any other specialised area-wide agency either from the 
central government or not. Likewise, in Mexico City, local authorities believe that the most 
appropriate agency for coordinating air quality issues is an area-wide authority (with joint 
participation of delegated units) at the local government level.
The analysis and evaluation of the results of the survey within the framework of the 
‘hierarchical’, ‘market’ and ‘network’ approaches strengthens the discussion on the 
advantages and disadvantages of each model for reorganising local government to improve 
air quality. In the case of London, while local authorities have raised concerns on the 
fragmented way in which they are currently operating, the extent to which London 
boroughs think they can solve major air pollution problems is revealed by the results in this 
survey. Local authorities believe, though, that this participation needs to be done under a 
joint working basis with other agencies. Whereas local authorities favour the idea of a two- 
tier system as the most appropriate governmental arrangement for an efficient, equalised, 
and coordinated response to air quality management, they also believe that such
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environmental problems can be jointly solved with the participation of other sectors of 
society (either through networks or partnerships). As decentralised institutions in London 
(i.e. boroughs) are not keen on adopting an exclusive orthodox style of government in the 
form of a two-tier formula, the participation of local government units needs to be 
strengthened and enhanced within the overall governing process. The latter fits more 
readily with a modification of the traditional ‘hierarchical’ model - particularly with the 
metro scheme - and the local governance approach than with the public choice theory. The 
fact that local authorities prefer to participate jointly with other area-wide authorities 
(including central government units) partly explains why a fragmented response to air 
pollution may not be the most efficient (in terms of costs and externalities) nor coordinated 
way for dealing with this particular environmental issue. Nevertheless, the public good 
dimension that the public choice model inserts into the discussion of reorganising structures 
of local government contributes to a better understanding of how the functions or 
subfunctions of an air quality management regime (i.e. costs) can be most efficiently 
allocated to local units of government.
In the case of Mexico City, the extent to which delegated units believe they can solve air 
pollution problems is also revealed by the outcome of the survey. Again, their participation 
is associated with the idea of jointly working with the existing area-wide authority - the 
GDF - which fits with traditional assumptions. It is important to note that despite the 
existence of a specialised agency working on air pollution - i.e. CAM - the answers 
continued to favour a body like the GDF for coordinating efforts with surrounding 
municipalities, monitoring systems, road traffic and the contingency plan. This in turn can 
be linked to the need for governmental units to manage air quality rather than non­
governmental ones which operate under a cooperative or voluntary basis. While the 
empirical information in the case of the delegated units hardly fits with ‘market’ or 
‘network’ approaches, it does suggest that there is increased interest in making fragmented 
units and other actors in society get involved in air pollution matters.
In the next two chapters, more detailed interviews with diverse key policy players further 
develop some of the local authorities’ viewpoints that have been presented in this chapter. 
By exploring local government organisational arrangements and air quality management 
issues in London and Mexico City, the following chapters seek to highlight relevant issues 
to the three approaches outlined in Chapter HI. A comparative analysis of the outcome of 
Chapters V, VI, and VII is made in the last chapter of this thesis.
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C H A P T E R  VI
Managing Air Quality in London
" You have your own company, your own temperature control, your own music - 
and don’t have to put up with dreadful human beings sitting alongside you".
Steven Norris (former Conservative minister 
with responsibility fo r  public transport in 
London) on praising the advantages o f 
travelling by private car.
6.1 Introduction
Over the last few years, air pollution control in London has involved a mixed system of 
government intervention. The main actors have included an elected central government and 
a system of 33 unitary local authorities; other bodies, such as borough joint committees or 
London-wide bodies, have also participated in diverse policy formulation issues. Although 
the position of central government has influenced the way in which air quality has been 
managed in London, the limited powers of London boroughs compared with central 
government have been regarded as a limitation when attempting to deal with air quality 
problems (Elsom 1996: 192). While the issue of the wider participation of local authorities 
has been addressed as a result of the latter, the need for a strategic London-wide body 
specifically dealing with, for example, air quality monitoring systems or public transport, 
has been put forward by such organisations as the extinct London Boroughs Association 
LBA or the Royal Commission for Environmental Pollution RCEP, and by the Labour 
Party (see Bell 1993: 10; Labour 1997: 34; RCEP 1994: 212-214). This chapter examines 
how the system of local government in London operates in relation to air quality 
management including the issues of monitoring systems, public transport and traffic 
management, and the application of an eventual contingency plan. In so doing, it highlights 
relevant points which reinforce diverse issues made earlier (in Chapters HI and V) about the 
three main approaches of local government. The analysis is based upon diverse semi­
structured interviews carried out with key policy actors such as central and local authorities, 
London-wide bodies, and non-govemmental organisations (see Appendix I).
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6.2 Managing air quality: central and local government participation
Central government has always played a significant role in air quality management; its 
participation has concentrated on financial, technical and personal resources that have 
supported and contributed to, for example, the elaboration and standardisation of air quality 
norms, research and educational projects, technical equipment, and implementation of 
policies whenever it has been required. As shown in Table 6.1, there are many areas in 
which different central government agencies intervene so as to prevent and control polluted 
air.i While both the central and local government have powers in the elaboration and 
implementation of air pollution control policies, it is central government’s role in both areas 
that has predominated. Under Part 1 of the 1990 Environment Protection Act EPA, major 
pollution control responsibilities have been allocated to the central agency HMIP, now the 
Environment Agency. Under the Integrated Pollution Control IPC system, this agency 
controls the more complex polluting processes seeking to prevent or minimise pollution of 
any environmental medium. By contrast, local authorities control solely atmospheric 
releases from the less polluting processes through the Local Air Pollution Control system 
LAPC. So, for example, although the number of industries in London is low compared to 
the rest of the country, there are still some industries that operate within the Greater London 
area where central government is the main author responsible for controlling pollution. By 
way of illustration, within the administrative boundaries of the London Borough of Brent, 
there exists one incinerator, one power station and the Guiness Brewery where the local 
authority has no access to inspect. The Pollution Inspector in this borough explained that if 
there is a public complaint from anyone in the borough regarding pollution from the power 
plant, the local authority can do nothing but to call the HMIP. In turn, the HMIP does not 
give feed-back about these complaints. Local authorities, thus, are confronted with the fact 
that, while their councillors have been elected and thus need to respond to public demands 
or complaints, they lack the powers to do so.
Additionally, local authorities’ powers over prescribed processes designated for local 
control need to follow process guidance notes (PGs) issued by the DoE (see Ball & Bell 
1995: 292; EA 1995; EPA 1990). Although the Local Authority Unit within this 
government department takes the initiative to investigate what kind of guidance for local 
prescribed processes control should be followed in different industrial sectors, the central
1 There exist different levels of coordination among the Government Departments regarding air pollution 
control. A detailed analysis and explanation of the diverse ways in which they liaise within each other, is 
not within the scope of this research.
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authority at the Air Quality Division at the DoE, for example, explained that there is not an 
integrated, strategic activity focusing specifically on London coming from that central 
government agency. While the 1995 Environment Act EA and the UK’s NAQS increased 
local authorities air pollution responsibilities, the Conservative government made it clear 
while in power that it had “no plans to change the principles which underpin IPC or LAPC” 
(DoE 1996: 68-69).
Table 6.1. DoE & DoT main responsibilities on air pollution control in London 
(before June 1997).____________________________________________________ _______ _______
GOV ERN M ENT D EPARTM EN T M AIN FUNCTION S
• Industrial pollution control (assessment and
enforcement)
• Guidance notes for local authorities control over
prescribed processes
• Air pollution monitoring and measurement
DEPARTMENT • Air pollution data bank (privately contracted)
of the
ENVIRONMENT • Air quality standards and guidelines
(DoE)
• National air quality strategy
Others include:
• Strategic planning guidance & land-use planning
• Liaison with London Boroughs and local
authorities associations
• Public transport (includes underground, buses,
coaches, railways)
DEPARTMENT • Road schemes (building, maintenance)
of
TRANSPORT • Traffic management (red routes, traffic control,
(DoT) signing)
Others include:
• Transport planning
• Liaison between BR & LT
Source: Various
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Heavy central government intervention in air quality management stems from four main 
factors. First, Britain has been a unitary state, and thus, local government has been 
formally subordinated to central government. The fact that local government has no 
constitutional status - i.e. can be created or abolished at will by a majority vote in the House 
of Commons (Sharpe 1995c: 111-113)- has created an enormous imbalance in power and 
self-confidence between central and local government (Gordon 1993: 14). Although the 
history of British local government shows how an unchanged constitution allows variations 
in central or local government authority, the latter no longer has the political weight and 
local independence it once had before central government intervention augmented as from 
the nineteenth century (see Foster etal 1980: 21-30; John 1990: 1-5). An example of this 
evolving process is provided by the relatively recent abolition of the GLC in 1985, which 
took place despite the opposition of the GLC and local authorities in response to the 1983 
Government’s White Paper ‘Streamlining the Cities’ (see Chapter IV).
Second, the Conservative Government’s approach to local government reorganisation 
during the 1980s and 1990s increased central government intervention (see, for example, 
John 1990: 14-16). The New Right values associated with conservatism, not liberalism, 
put forward by the Conservatives, largely influenced central-local government relationships 
(see also Chapter IV). Within this, central government emphasized the constitutional 
position of Parliamentary sovereignty over local authorities (in the case of London, the 
existing level of Parliamentary interest was very low):
“The Conservatives are enthusiastic about local government 
as long as these local authorities satisfy central criteria and 
aims”
(King 1995: 237).
Hence, as local authorities lack legislative powers - other than through making by-laws 
under Parliamentary delegated legislation (HMSO 1996: 4) - it is the UK government 
which has ultimately allocated local functions, taxation levels, standardisation of urban 
environmental services, and so on through national legislation. Additionally, although the 
Thatcher government promised in 1979 a drastic cut of quasi-govemmental organisations 
QUANGOS as part of a political and economic strategy to reduce public expenditure, this 
has not been achieved. On the contrary, these organisations started to be seen as a 
convenient way for the British government to intervene at the local level without political 
opposition from local government:
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“Quangos have provided a means of developing an 
administrative network at grass roots level without the 
uncertainty (and possible political hostility) associated with 
provision by elected local authorities. At the local level recent 
years have seen considerable central intervention via ‘fringe’ 
agencies”
(Greenwood & Wilson 1989: 218-219).
Third, London plays a very important role within the national political and social scenarios. 
Any failure in the delivery of urban environmental services in London does have a highly- 
magnified effect on informed debate and politics. Due to its dominant position as the capital 
city of the UK, where a large proportion of the country’s social problems and political 
power are concentrated, central government has to be concerned about the way London is 
governed (Travers et al 1991a: 54-55). Thus, it is in central government’s political 
interests to have tight control over city management issues in London. A weak system of 
local government with additional financial constrains in the capital facilitates this. As 
already discussed, the abolition of the GLC in 1985, had the effect of weakening the upper 
tier. At the lower tier, although the London Boroughs gained some powers, they did not 
acquire greater responsibility for controlling air pollution, and in turn, were left to intervene 
voluntarily in some areas, for instance, on monitoring air quality, a situation which lasted 
until 1996 when statutory duties were introduced in this area through the NAQS. Many of 
the boroughs urban environmental services are constrained and controlled by central 
government’s economic policies and local funding regimes, such as planning and public 
transport (see, for example, Travers et al 1991b: 5 and 1991d: 2).
Finally, it has been mentioned that central government intervention also stems from local 
authorities* lack of action due to their lack of interest in or awareness about urban 
environmental issues (see, for example, Gordon 1993: 14). It could be argued, thus, that in 
the case of the London Boroughs, if their participation has been allegedly small, this has to 
do not only because of their lack of powers and financial constraints but because of their 
lack of political will. Even so, according to the results of the semi-structured interviews 
carried out with local authorities in diverse boroughs across Greater London (see Appendix 
I), there are some London boroughs that have been actively participating in air pollution 
control programmes regardless of their functional and financial limitations (see also the 
survey results in Chapter V). Thus, the arguments put forward by some central government 
authorities that new responsibilities cannot be allocated to local authorities due to financial 
and personnel shortages or political local inaction, are weakened by the initiatives taken by
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some boroughs such as the City of Westminster and Brent in response to air pollution 
problems.
Indeed, the Westminster Initiative - launched in 1989 by the City of Westminster - is a 
good example of how London boroughs are responding to air pollution problems. This 
Initiative is an environmental partnership between the Council, residents, voluntary 
organisations and businesses working together to protect and improve the environment. 
Some of the actions in the Initiative include the ‘Exhaust Watch Scheme’ to combat vehicles 
with smoky exhaust and the adoption of the Environmental Charter which commits the 
Council to conserve energy. While this borough has one of the largest budgets across 
London, it has also secured financial assistance from businesses that sponsor different 
projects as partners of the Westminster Initiative (City of Westminster 1993: 63-64). Apart 
from this, the City of Westminster also carries out its own air quality monitoring system 
and continues to work on the 1994 Cleaner Air Campaign to further measures to combat air 
pollution from vehicles.
Another example of participation is provided by the London Borough of Brent. This 
borough, within the framework of Local Agenda 21, organised a series of seminars in 
April 1996 which depicted diverse proposals and projects from different sectors of society 
in order to discuss how the Council could respond to transport, environment, pollution and 
socio-economic aspects. The initiative for these seminars came directly from the Council 
and allowed the participation of voluntary organisations, industrial and commercial 
representatives, schools and citizens. Apart from this, a real time air quality monitoring site 
has been installed within Brent’s administrative boundaries and has been included in the 
DoE’s national network. The initiative to set up such a monitoring site, and the origins of 
the funding, came from the borough. The Pollution Inspector in this borough, who is in 
charge of monitoring air quality in the borough, explained that if it had not been because of 
their initiative in going to the DoE, the DoE would not have gone to the them. They 
contacted the DoE because the borough wants to reach national guidelines. The DoE sends 
information about air quality to the borough, and the results of the monitoring at Brent are 
on the Internet and in the Ceefax. Additionally, through its Environmental Services 
Department, the borough is working in partnership with Brent Traffic Consultancy 
responsible for managing the traffic on Brent’s busiest roads and controlling traffic and 
crowds on the roads leading to the busy Wembley Stadium complex. As part of its 
statutory powers, the Council continues to take action against smell, fumes or dust and on 
registering and inspecting local industries under LAPC.
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The outcome of the interviews carried out with central and local authorities in London 
shows some interesting results regarding central government participation. As seen in Table 
6.2, according to most central and local authorities, central government intervention on the 
elaboration and standardisation of norms and regulations is generally accepted. 
Nevertheless, there exists controversy both on whether central government should 
intervene in the enforcement of certain air pollution control policies or not - such as 
industrial emissions in London - and on the areas where this intervention should take place. 
Two interesting examples given in relation to the latter concern who should have the legal 
duty to see that air quality standards are met and who should assess air quality monitoring. 
According to Lynn Edwards, responsible for the preparation of the NAQS Consultation 
Draft at the DoE (Air Quality Management Division), ensuring that standards are met and 
assessing monitoring is closer to central government thinking, as opposed to actually 
meeting the standards or monitoring air pollutants. In practice, however, central 
government elaborates and assesses air quality standards - e.g. industrial emissions - as 
well as assessing monitoring and actually carrying out monitoring duties.
T ab le  6.2 C en tra l an d  local a u th o ritie s ’ views on the ro le  of c e n tra l a n d  local 
governm ent regard ing  a ir  pollution in London___________________________________________
C en tra l au th o ritie s’ views Local a u th o ritie s ’ views
Central government’s role: 
norms & regulations
V V
Central government’s role: 
implementation & enforcement
* *
Local government’s role: 
norms & regulations
X V
Local government’s role: 
implementation & enforcement
* V
V Intervention accepted 
x Against intervention 
^  Divided views on intervention 
Source: Author’s semi-structured questionnaires
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By contrast, local authorities have long requested a duty to assess ambient air quality areas 
and to monitor air pollutants. The interest of local authorities in getting involved in air 
quality management policies was confirmed in an interview carried out with G. Jukes, 
Director of Professional and Technical Services at the Chartered Institute of Environmental 
Health Officers CIEHO.2 According to Jukes, it is essential that local authorities are 
involved in air quality assurance and collation of data from monitoring. He argues, though, 
that a statutory duty to assess areas regarding monitoring requirements is preferable to a 
duty to actually monitor. The reason for this is because the former would provide for 
targeting financial resources better than statutory powers on monitoring. The CIEHO 
position not only conflicts with central government views on these issues, but also with 
other local authority associations, such as the Association of Metropolitan Authorities 
AMA.
Before the enactment of the 1995 EA, a number of recommendations were made on 
granting local authorities new statutory duties for air pollution control. Such duties included 
assessing ambient air quality, monitoring air pollutants, banning traffic when air pollution 
episodes occur, and other and diverse traffic management and planning responsibilities (see 
Bell 1993: 8-10; FoE 1991: 56-57; RCEP 1994: 236-237). The 1995 EA has given the 
London Boroughs some of the powers needed to tackle air pollution in London. For 
instance, local authorities in London have now clear statutory powers on assessing air 
quality within their respective areas as well as banning traffic temporarily along certain 
routes during poor air quality episodes (Ball & Bell 1995: 327; DoE 1996: 61-74; EA 
1995). Through this act, and its subsequent national air quality management strategy, the 
UK government at last has recognised “the need to give local authorities a greater role in 
managing local air quality” (Elsom 1996: 192).
Nevertheless, the new approach to air pollution control through the 1995 EA and the 1997 
NAQS failed to address two significant issues during the Conservative administration (EA 
1995; DoE 1996 and 1997). First, there was no clear central government commitment to 
financially support lower-tier authorities. In fact, the air quality strategy was criticised for 
failing to provide any resources to achieve the new London boroughs’ statutory duties. As 
Toby Harris, chairman of the Association for London Government ALG said:
2 The interests and position of CIEHO are explained later in the chapter.
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“Mr. Gummer [Environment Secretary] is passing the buck 
to local government. We are being asked to make schemes to 
clean up vehicles self-financing by fining people. They want 
teams to monitor traffic, but the police have to stop the 
vehicles, and they want paying up front for their time. It is 
not clear that any of this can work. If the Government was 
serious they would make some pump priming available to 
get the system up and running”
(The Guardian, August 22, 1996).
Second, there was no detectable sense of political will to create a London-wide authority 
for air pollution control purposes. This issue, though, has been addressed by the new 
Labour government in its recent proposals for creating an area-wide authority in London 
with air quality management responsibilities (see Chapter IV).
From the outcome of this section there are two relevant issues that need to be highlighted in 
connection with the three approaches of local government. First, the existing institutional 
fragmentation at the local level in London has fostered central government intervention on 
diverse air quality management issues, that is to say, control of certain areas and 
responsibilities have inescapably gone to central units as envisaged by orthodox 
assumptions. This situation has led to a failure in the implementation of an integrated or 
strategic approach to London-wide air pollution problems as well as leaving a gap at the 
local level regarding accountability and democracy as conventionally understood. Second, 
in spite of the enhanced central government intervention, several London boroughs have 
been actively participating in air pollution control schemes. The initiatives taken by London 
boroughs reinforce the results of the survey in Chapter V in the sense that decentralised 
authorities believe that they can help solve problems of air pollution within a currently 
fragmented situation. As seen from the examples of the City of Westminster and the 
London Borough of Brent, although local authorities believe they can solve problems to a 
certain extent, in both cases they are working in partnership with other agencies. Rather 
than exclusively working with an upper tier of government (as two-tier advocates would 
suggest), local authorities prefer working in a joint basis including not only an area-wide 
authority but other sectors of society, as envisaged and recognised by the local governance 
approach. Under public choice assumptions, some of the borough initiatives (e.g. 
conserving energy, combatting vehicles with smoky exhaust, or managing traffic 
congestion) constitute good examples of positive externalities that are created for the benefit 
of other surrounding boroughs and counties. Without a coordinated action for delivering an 
area-wide public good, these and other boroughs who are also working within their
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jurisdictions may not be able to internalise the negative externalities that are produced by the 
lack of action or cooperation from other boroughs in the same metropolitan area. The latter 
becomes more difficult to solve as the central government has failed to provide financial 
resources to the boroughs and thus equity and efficiency in the distribution of the service 
cannot be ensured.
Problems such as the lack of an integrated approach to London-wide pollution problems or 
the lack of a unit to coordinate and standardise efforts among all boroughs in London, 
reveals the need for an institutional channel or ‘bridge’ to fill the gaps created by the current 
organisational arrangements in London. While under traditional or network assumptions, a 
local unit of government could solve these conflicts - either by being directly involved or by 
steering and guiding, respectively - under the public choice model a bargained or 
cooperative arrangement among all boroughs would be sufficient. I will come back to this 
point at the end of the following section.
6.3 The role of the government of London
Discussion of the participation of the government of London regarding air pollution control 
needs to take into account two issues. First, the long-standing debate on the relevance of an 
area-wide strategic authority for London has been invigorated by current air quality 
management concerns. Second, as the nature of air pollution in London has changed over 
the last decades (i.e. road transport emissions have increased through the 1980s and 1990s) 
air quality management measures need to address public transport and traffic management 
issues (see Chapters II and IV). The results of the semi-structured interviews in London 
suggest that the way in which air pollution is currently dealt with lacks the coordination and 
strategic elements which are required for an effective government response. The lack of a 
London-wide authority has complicated the London Boroughs response to air pollution 
control when they relate to other local, area-wide or central government agencies. The latter 
reinforces the results of the general survey carried out with London Boroughs’ authorities 
(see Chapter V). The different relations that exist between boroughs and central agencies, 
and between boroughs and London-wide bodies, though, are not the only obstacle that may 
impede achieving a coordinated response to air pollution. The existing conflicts in the 
relations between the increased and diverse number of London-wide bodies and central 
authorities as well as among these area-wide bodies, add to the difficulties in achieving 
coordination and integration, standardisation and representation.
Local authorities relate to central government either directly or through other bodies (for
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example London-wide agencies) that represent local authorities’ interests. First, the 
relationships between local authorities and the central government when discussing actions 
for improving air quality in London vary from borough to borough. When there is a direct 
relationship between the borough and the central government, the level of communication 
basically depends either on the borough’s initiative or on whether there exists a friendly 
relationship between local and central authorities. For instance, the local authority in the 
London Borough of Brent, explained that the liaison between the borough and the people 
they know in the DoE has been very good. It was emphasised, though, that the contacts at 
the DoE used to work for Brent, thus facilitating such good relationships. According to the 
local authority, the problem is whether their views will influence ministers at the DoE or 
not. While the people at the DoE take their views into account, in the meetings top level 
ministers already have a hidden agenda regardless of local authorities’ opinions. Although 
the London Borough of Brent has built a friendly relationship with the DoE, they do not 
have equivalent contact with the DoT.
In the case of other boroughs, the relationship with central government is similar or even 
minimal compared to Brent. By way of illustration, Rob Gibson, Senior Technician at the 
London Borough of Hounslow, feels that there is not enough consultation with local 
authorities. In the case of this borough, the local authority has been left out of the decisions 
in relation to the widening of the A4, busy road that leads to Heathrow airport and which 
crosses the borough. The borough of Hounslow, currently working on a 3-year voluntary 
programme to pick up information about levels of CO inside cars during driving time, had - 
at the time of the interview - no committees or meetings to discuss air pollution problems. 
Their contact with the central government has been through a number of papers or ‘reports’ 
on air pollution published and sent to them by the DoE. As with the case of the London 
Borough of Brent, their relations with the DoT are extremely poor. Another example is the 
London Borough of Havering: the Divisional Environmental Health Officer at this borough 
stated that they do not have a direct relationship with the central government. For instance, 
when asked about their relations with the Government Office for London GoL (set up in 
April 1994 within the DoT in order to coordinate the policies on a regional basis of four 
government departments DoE, DoT, DTI and Employment) the local authority said that the 
role and functions of GoL were not clear enough. Although GoL has focused on 
environment issues for London - including air quality - it has had limited contact with 
boroughs. At the time of the second interview with the Havering authority, two years after 
GoL was set up, there was still no relationship between the borough and this central 
government office.
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Second, another way in which local authorities relate to the central government is through 
London-wide bodies, such as the Association of London Government ALG, or the South 
East Institute of Public Health SEIPH. Again, the relationships between the boroughs and 
most London-wide agencies vary from borough to borough. Some give their support to 
them, others do not. As these area-wide agencies work on a voluntarily basis where the 
boroughs have no legal duty to join them, some local authorities have proved to be more 
sympathetic to them than others. Without a single institutional mechanism that would 
represent the needs and interests of all 33 local authorities, diverse city-wide bodies have 
become the agencies that represent the views of the boroughs. Such is the case of the 
SEIPH, one of the most important area-wide agencies in London. This institute in 
association with the LB A and the ALA set up in February 1993 the London Air Quality 
Network LAQN to improve air quality monitoring in London. This London network 
(coordinated and initially funded by the SEIPH) assists local authorities in the operation of 
monitoring equipment and evaluation of the data as well as presenting in a London-wide or 
comprehensive way air quality information (SEIPH 1994: 2:1-2:3). The members of the 
LAQN, constituted by four Cluster Groups - each representing different boroughs - get 
together to discuss air quality issues with the DoE. Nevertheless, as a voluntary body, 
while being independent from any government agency for reliability and accessibility 
purposes regarding air quality information, it lacks the financial and political strengths 
required for influencing the decision-making process on air pollution control issues. 
Overall, the major contribution of the SEIPH to air pollution control is that it has actually 
undertaken the task to act as an air quality coordinating unit across London.
Despite its enormous contribution to London’s air quality monitoring system, the SEIPH 
does not seem to provide the best institutional mechanism to forward local authorities’ 
views to the central government. Although the SEIPH seems to represent the views of the 
majority of the boroughs, not all of them participate at the same level and some have a poor 
relationship with it.3 This situation continues even after central government has chosen the 
SEIPH as the institute to coordinate the air quality pilot scheme in London initiated in April 
1996 under the 1995 EA and the forthcoming 1997 NAQS. Without the support of all 
boroughs, it is difficult to see how the SEIPH will present a complete and comprehensive 
picture of London to the central government - let alone a single political view of the
3 During the interview with the Environment Director at the SEIPH, Mr. J. Rice, I was told that when the 
LAQN was set up, the network was supported by LBA and ALA. Nonetheless, not all boroughs supported 
the SEIPH in carrying out its tasks; according to Mr. Rice, 31 boroughs gave their support, one answered 
that it was not sure, and one simply said no.
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problem and how to tackle it.
Some examples illustrate the diversity of relations between different London boroughs and 
this important London-wide agency. To begin with, the City of Westminster has 
experienced some problems when relating to them. According to Mr. Trevor Pugh, Client 
Director Built Environment at Westminster, and in charge of the Cleaner Air Campaign at 
this borough, their relationship with the SEIPH has been “a difficult one”. In the past, the 
problem was that the SEIPH used to be run with a low budget and was too ambitious for 
the money being received. This limitation was confirmed by the SEIPH Environmental 
Health Director who emphasised that the main obstacles for carrying out its aims were the 
financial (they had to generate their own income) and personnel resources. While the 
economic and personnel situation has recently improved for the SEIPH (this body is now 
funded by the boroughs each giving £4,000 a year) the City of Westminster prefers 
working with parties that will contribute more to their own economic and political interests 
- especially when they relate to the central government - than with a body with financial and 
political weaknesses.
The London Borough of Hounslow provides another example of how a borough may not 
properly relate to the SEIPH. Since the borough has no discussion with the central 
government on road traffic, transport, and other issues, it is the SEIPH network that has 
been doing the liaison for this borough. The relations between Hounslow and the SEIPH 
do not seem to have always worked properly, though. According to the local authority it 
has happened that the SEIPH published information about air pollution and has not sent it 
to the borough. After complaining to the SEIPH about this situation, however, the local 
authority has now a better relationship with them and information is being provided.
The local authority in Havering explained that while some boroughs work with the SEIPH 
for monitoring purposes, others prefer to work with a private agency known as Stanger4 
(the successor of the former London Scientific Services LSS of the GLC), and others 
simply go to the private AEA at NETCEN. For example, on the one hand, the London 
Borough of Brent has privately contracted with Stanger Calibration Services for the 
calibration of the air quality monitoring equipment and the certification of the information 
provided; in turn, NETCEN audits Stanger. Sometimes, NETCEN itself assists the
4 When the GLC disappeared, the agency in charge of collecting air quality information was Rendell 
Science and Environment, who then became TBV Science. The latter became a private company called 
Stanger.
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borough if some monitoring problems arise. On the other hand, the London Borough of 
Barking and Dagenham works with an agency known as National Power - the electricity 
funding company who has close links with this borough and have developed an urban 
regeneration partnership. Although these two boroughs actually liaise with the SEIPH, they 
both prefer working with and being represented by other agencies than the SEIPH. 
Furthermore, in the case of Barking and Dagenham, National Power collects air quality 
data for the borough but does not give the information to the SEIPH. It seems to be that the 
reason why some boroughs prefer working with certain agencies than with others has to do 
with personalities. In the case of the SEIPH, it has to do precisely with the Environmental 
Health Director, whom some boroughs like and trust, but others do not.
Turning to the relations between London-wide bodies and other agencies, the outcome of 
the interviews suggest that there also exist conflicts between these area-wide bodies and 
central authorities as well as among them. For instance, the Chartered Institute of 
Environmental Health Officers CEEHO, a national body which represents the views of 
Professional Environmental Health Officers (mainly within local authorities), works with 
the DoE in the discussion of many environmental protection issues including the air quality 
management strategy. In the case of London, there exist a London Chief Environmental 
Health Officers Grouping working with London Boroughs, plus the London Centre of the 
institute. The CIEHO promotes sensible coordination between local authorities and central 
government through professional practice. It seeks to develop good practice, coordinate 
strategies and influence central government policy. While their relationships with the DoE 
(twice a year meetings) are good, they have no contact with the DoT, whose past relations 
have been sour and mainly on noise. When the DoE enters into conflict with the DoT, the 
CIEHO is usually on the former’s side. At the time of interviewing, they had not developed 
a relationship with GoL, either. The CIEHO’s relations with other London-wide bodies 
seem to be contentious regarding diverse air quality issues. In voice of the Director for 
Professional and Technical Services, G. Jukes, the CIEHO used to be in conflict with local 
authority associations, such as AMA, over the need for a duty to assess air quality rather 
than monitor and plan. They also disagree with the SEIPH because “it only provides one 
model on quality control, which was built up on very limited resources”, and is driven by 
the LB A and ALA agenda for a strategic planning agency for London. This mechanism, as 
explained by Mr. Jukes, facilitates getting some equipment in place, but may divert 
attention from more pragmatic approaches developing elsewhere. He believes that air 
quality data is being used as an argument for the creation of a strategic authority. 
Additionally, the CIEHO has been closely involved in the discussion of the pilot schemes 
across the UK and on the elaboration of NAQS. As the SEIPH has been chosen by the
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DoE as the organisation to coordinate the review of air quality areas in London, the CIEHO 
liaises with them. There exists one single representative named by the Chief Environmental 
Health Officers of each borough who receives information from the boroughs and then gets 
in touch with the SEIPH and the DoE to discuss diverse air quality issues (at the time of 
interviewing the representative was the Chief EHO from Haringey). Nonetheless, 
according to an Environmental Health Officer at the London Borough of Havering, not all 
the boroughs go to Haringey. Again, the reasons for this are because of the different 
preferences and political views that exist among the boroughs.
The SEIPH and LBA represent London-wide agencies whose relations are good with the 
DoE, but who have no links with the DoT. According to Steven Putnam at the Strategy and 
Coordination Unit within GoL, this central government office has worked with agencies 
such as former LBA or ALA. During the interview, Mr. Putnam mentioned that the setting 
up of GoL has encouraged a lot of people in London because now, “Londoners feel there is 
an organisation that will be battling around for London rather than ignoring it...there is a lot 
of expectation from customers that GoL will represent the views of London to the 
government”. Nevertheless, the Senior Policy Assistant at LBA said that the latter did not 
have a lot of direct contact with them on air quality issues. Instead, the LBA reports were 
usually sent to the relevant Ministry of State quite often getting a response from them.
While not having contact with GoL, the SEIPH used to relate to bodies such as LBA and 
ALA where, despite the political differences in each of them, consensus had been reached 
on issues such as the need for a more coordinated approach on air quality information and 
health. Although the SEIPH has emerged as a coordinating unit for improving air quality in 
London, though, this institute avoids contact with community groups and non­
governmental organisations. As its Environmental Health Director points out, the SEIPH 
has to be extremely selective with the groups they get in touch with and provide 
information to because they lack the resources and time to respond to everybody. In 
seeking for financial assistance, the SEIPH got in touch with London First - a business 
community organisation working in partnership with central, local government and the 
voluntary sector - to see whether the private sector would get involved, but the latter has 
been reluctant to support what they are doing.
Contrary to what some local authorities and other London-wide agencies have experienced, 
London First has been working with the DoT’s agency GoL. For example, in September 
1994, London First organised a campaign called ‘Breathe Easy’ where the DoE, GoL, 
eight local authorities, and other participants (such as Sainsbury) also collaborated. This
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campaign, launched by Secretary of State to the Environment, J. Gummer, gave people the 
opportunity to have their cars’ emissions tested; if they were inadequate, then they were 
asked to fix them. It is particularly interesting to note that, while central authorities 
participate in such events in order to improve their political image, financial resources count 
a lot for attracting central and other private agencies to get involved in environmental 
actions.
Interestingly, the outcome of the interviews about the relationships between local 
authorities and other agencies, shows that neither the boroughs, nor the London-wide 
bodies interviewed relate to the surrounding counties when addressing air pollution control. 
So, for example, the Borough Environmental Health Officer at Kingston Upon Thames 
said that there are no relationships with the surrounding county of Surrey mainly due to 
lack of financial resources. Likewise, in the case of Hounslow, although there is some 
contact with Surrey authorities, there is no discussion about air quality management issues. 
Although the London Borough of Enfield is surrounded by two counties, Essex and 
Hertfordshire, the local authority at the Group Manager, Safety & Pollution Control unit 
stated that there is no contact with none of them regarding air pollution control. Similarly, 
although the local environmental officer in the London Borough of Havering stressed the 
need for some level of coordination between Essex and his borough, the local authorities in 
Havering have no discussion with this county regarding air pollution aspects. If the local 
authority in Havering has had some discussion with surrounding local authorities about air 
quality issues is because they work together under the South East Thames Corridor. The 
local authorities in Essex provide the results of their air quality monitoring to National 
Power, which, as already seen, does not give them to the SEIPH.5
The outcome of the semi-structured interviews suggest that there is a general consensus 
among all interviewees (including central authorities) that tackling air pollution needs a 
London-wide strategic agency. This is because the existence of 33 different local units - 
without a coordinating body - with different political interests and necessities and with 
different views on environmental matters has allowed some boroughs to be more 
enthusiastic or pro-active than others. The diversity that this situation brings for Greater 
London when coping with polluted air - i.e. each borough acting on their own - necessarily 
leads to a non-coordinated approach to the problem, and therefore it creates a number of 
variables that makes the issue of combating air pollution in an integrated fashion more
5 It is important to note that the regional body SERPLAN was not mentioned at all in none of the 
interviews.
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difficult to achieve. As already seen, while some boroughs are ahead than others in terms 
of actions, others seem to be better represented by the London-wide bodies they decide to 
join. Without a single voice to represent them all, and with the complicated liaison jungle 
through voluntary London-wide bodies with lots of joint work, some boroughs do get 
more involved than others in discussing policies and putting forward their local interests. 
The overall result is an uneven response from local authorities in London.
While the results of the interviews have suggested the need for an area-wide in London, 
they have also shown that there is much debate about what type of body should this be. 
The interviewees’ preferences varied according to the political interests, functions and 
objectives of the agencies they represent, or to their own personal viewpoints. There exist 
three different kind of preferences that relate to the type of London-wide agency that is 
required for coordination and strategic purposes (see Table 6.3). First, central authorities 
and some boroughs (such as Kingston Upon Thames) believe that the coordinating body 
should be within the central government. Second, London-wide bodies (such as LBA or 
London First) and other boroughs (such as Enfield and Havering) support the idea of an 
elected, independent, and accountable authority for London. Third, other bodies (such as 
CIEHO) and some other boroughs (such as the City of Westminster) favour the idea of a 
body for London-wide, but without showing much sympathy for an elected, strategic 
authority back.
Table 6.3 Interviewees’ personal viewpoints on the best type of London-wide agency 
for air pollution control_______________________________________________________________
London-wide agency 
within central 
government
London-wide 
elected agency
London-wide 
non-elected agency
G ROU P 1
Central Government
V X X
G ROU P 2
London-wide agencies
X V V
G ROU P 3
London Boroughs
V V V
Source: Author’s semi-structured questionnaires
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It must be noted that according to those interviewees that favour the creation of an area- 
wide elected authority in London, the existence of such an agency gives more advantages 
than having a central or non-elected agency. First, the complicated liaison web that 
currently exists in London may be diminished if there is only one single head that takes 
over diverse air pollution control responsibilities. As the Environment Health Director at 
SEIPH put it “if you are dealing with a London-wide body, then you can avoid the 
difficulties of dealing with 33 different organisations”. The initiative would then come from 
the body itself and not from each borough. This interviewee explained that whether there is 
enthusiasm or lack of interest from the boroughs on air quality issues, with an elected 
authority they will have to participate. However, as an air quality management strategy 
needs to include locality support, the problem here is how to make all the boroughs 
participate and which air pollution control functions should an elected body take away from 
them. In relation to this issue, the Environmental Senior Policy Assistant at LBA, Sandra 
Bell, said that the creation of a strategic authority should not take too much power away 
from local authorities who need to work at the local level; rather, it should be “a sort of 
scale-down strategic authority that has certain powers and that is able to coordinate things 
that would not take too much away from the boroughs”.
Second, a London-wide authority could be politically strong enough to lobby for London 
boroughs’ interests. The case of the recent pilot scheme for reviewing air quality 
management areas in London in response to the NAQS, is a good example of how 
boroughs’ concerns may be heard but ignored by the central government due to the lack of 
a strong political body to channelise their demands. The Environmental Health Officer at 
Havering, Mr. P. Hayden stated that his borough will report to the SEIPH about the air 
quality assessment of their area, which in turn will report to the central government. Mr. 
Hayden wants the SEIPH to back him on the issue of the lack of knowledge that exists in 
his borough (for example, air pollutants, health effects, monitoring) when this body reports 
to the central government. A positive response to Havering local authority’s demands will 
depend very much on how the SEIPH presents the information to the British government 
and if it manages to convince central authorities of the need of more financial resources to 
cover this borough’s demands. Nevertheless, the SEIPH is not politically strong enough to 
outbalance central authorities’ views. While another level of bureaucracy (upper-tier of 
government) between a local authority and the central government may still make no 
difference, an elected London-wide body has the advantage of representing the viewpoints 
on air quality management issues of members democratically elected. As explained by the 
local authority in Havering, having democratic local support - something that the current
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London-wide bodies lack - could enhance local authorities’ interests when discussing air 
quality issues with the central government.
Finally, another advantage mentioned by some interviewees regarding the creation of an 
elected authority in London is that such a body may coordinate diverse actions between 
boroughs and surrounding counties. While the problem here lies on how to bring all parties 
together into one single forum of discussion, the outcome of the interviews has shown that 
this task has not been achieved either by the central government, or the existing London- 
wide bodies.
As explained at the beginning of this section, the current fragmented situation in which 
local authorities operate has complicated their response to air pollution when they relate to 
other governmental and non-governmental agencies. The varying relationships of London 
boroughs (for example, Brent, Hounslow and Havering) with central government units and 
other agencies or surrounding counties, that stems from the lack of a proper area-wide 
institutional bridge, has produced an unequalised and non-coordinated response to air 
quality management. The latter raises the issue concerning the need to create a proper 
institutional arrangement in order to facilitate the relationships of all agencies involved in 
managing air quality.
The ‘market’ assumption that in a fragmented situation local units may be able to agree on 
cooperative arrangements and thus solve large-scale management conflicts (as outlined by 
the public choice theory) has not properly worked as shown in the case of London. This is 
because not all the area-wide bodies that exist are voluntarily supported by London 
boroughs and some have developed better and closer relationships with diverse boroughs 
and central government units than others. On top of this, as some local authorities may 
financially contribute more than others, area-wide bodies are subjected to financial 
limitations in carrying out their functions. The costs for those boroughs that contribute 
more for delivering a public service are consequently higher than for those who are less 
willing to provide with financial resources. Such is the case of the City of Westminster that 
not only provides funding to some area-wide institutions (e.g. SEIPH) but works with its 
own environmental initiatives. This supports one main concern of orthodox advocates 
regarding fragmentation: there exists uneven response from local authorities (which in turn 
creates spillovers within a metropolitan area) because some boroughs are more enthusiastic 
or pro-active than others (see also Chapter V). In spite of the latter, and although some of 
the existing area-wide bodies have failed to provide a coordinated, efficient (in terms of 
costs) and strategic response to air pollution, the results of the interviews suggest that there
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is still some outstanding debate on whether such institutional arrangement should be an 
elected, a non-elected, or a central government agency.
It is important to note that the various agencies that exist in London for managing air quality 
and their relationships can fit with the local governance approach which recognises the 
existence of several stakeholders operating in the governing process. The dilemmas that are 
revealed in the latter are that many agencies and interlocal or intermetropolitan relationships 
can lead to blame avoidance or scapegoating (see Chapter HI). There exists a blurring of 
responsibilities which creates ambiguity and uncertainty among citizens about who is 
responsible for what. Other present dilemmas include accountability and leadership failure. 
This is because the current system of local government in London can only indirectly or 
imperfectly steer networks or partnerships as diverse agencies operate with significant 
degrees of autonomy. In any event, as local authorities are subjected to private contractors, 
providing air quality management services (e.g. monitoring data) may be unequal and 
inefficient as the costs depends on which agency the local authority relates to. Without 
leadership - let alone some form of command mode of governing - consensus building 
among many stakeholders seem difficult to achieve and constant conflicts are likely to 
continue to appear.
6.3.1 Air quality monitoring systems
After the abolition of the GLC in 1985 and until the 1995 EA, air quality monitoring in 
London had been carried out either by the GLC’s London Scientific Services LSS (which 
closed down its four sites in 1991 due to lack of funding), the DoE, or by the boroughs on 
a voluntary basis. From the early 1990s, the DoE started to expand its real time monitoring 
equipment and the London boroughs did not only continue to monitor with manual 
equipment (e.g. diffusion tubes, smoke filters, SO2 samplers) but began to buy their own 
continuous monitoring systems. During the fieldwork period in London, several visits 
were made to monitoring stations in diverse London boroughs where informal discussions 
took place with some of the technicians that were in charge of the operation of the system. 
In the cases of Brent, Camden, Havering, and Hounslow, it was the same local authority 
interviewed who showed and explained the operation of their own air quality monitoring 
stations. In addition, another visit was made to a DoE monitoring site (the EUN Phase 2 at 
University College London UCL which is now part of the DETR’s Automatic Urban 
Monitoring Network AUN) which was set up in 1993 but started monitoring just after the 
pollution episode of 1994 in June.
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The results that stem from these visits show that the air quality measurement system in 
London is not as sophisticated as it is in other cities, especially if it is compared to those 
that operate in Mexico City, Los Angeles, New York or Tokyo (see WHO/UNEP 1992: 
36). By mid-1994, there were approximately 15 local authorities continuous monitoring 
sites measuring diverse p ollu tants 6, and around 8 - some integrated from local authority 
sites e.g. at Bexley and Eltham - that corresponded to the DoE’s network. Over the last few 
years, the number of real time stations acquired by the London boroughs have increased 
and some have become part of the DoE’s air quality network. The initiative and the funding 
for acquiring these monitoring stations has come from the boroughs themselves. For 
example, a real time monitoring site was set up in April 1996 in the London Borough of 
Brent and it has already been affiliated to the DoE’s network system. By the time the 
Consultation Draft of the UK NAQS was issued - August 1996 - local authority automatic 
sites in London at Bexley, Brent, Eltham, Haringey (2 sites), North Kensington, Sutton (2 
sites) Tower Hamlets and Wandsworth had been integrated to the national network. By 
mid-June 1997, 15 of the air quality monitoring sites of the London Air Quality Network 
LAQN had been integrated to the DETR’s Automatic Urban Network AUN. At the end of 
1997, the monitoring network in London comprised around 47 local authority sites and 7 
DETR sites (see ALG 1997: 6; Bell 1993: 28; DoE 1996: 81; EA 1995; NETCEN 1995: 
21-26; SEIPH 1994: 2/1-2/8).
Over the last years, there have been three major criticisms of London’s air quality 
monitoring system management. To begin with, criticisms have focused on the lack of a 
coordinating agency both, to link the national air quality monitoring network with the local 
monitoring one, and to provide standardisation in air quality databases. First, the 
importance of linking the national with the local networks is necessary to obtain valuable 
additional information making the best use of both, national and local resources (Bell 1993: 
26-33; LRC 1993: 134-137; QUARG 1993: 3-27). It has been argued, though, that the 
British government has treated local authority monitoring “as an optional add-on rather than 
the basis for building a coherent national network” (Brown 1993: 3). While the central 
government has recognised the significance of a coordinated approach to air quality 
monitoring and of the local monitoring for a harmonised quality assured network (see 
Brown 1993: 3; DoE 1996: 81), it has not allocated additional resources to the London 
Boroughs for acquiring new equipment. The integration of local authority monitoring may
6 It is important to note that most of these real time monitoring sites principally measure only four 
pollutants: N02, 03, S02, and to a lesser extent CO. Only two sites measure PM 10 and hydrocarbons, and 
only one measures TSP.
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be a sensible and cost effective means of expanding the national network, but it could be 
perceived as “little more than an on-the-cheap and piecemeal response to evident public 
concern about UK air quality monitoring” (FoE 1994: 3). If, at the time of writing, there 
exist in Greater London more local than central real time monitoring sites, it has more to do 
with the initiative and local funding of the boroughs than the financial support from the 
central government or from any of the London-wide bodies to shoulder local authorities’ 
expenses. On top of this, most of the time, the boroughs are the ones that need to request 
affiliation to the DETR’s network; such was the case of the London Borough of Brent.
Second, since the existence of the GLC, there has been a need to establish a comprehensive 
air pollution data base for London. While such a data base was set up by the GLC’s 
London Scientific Services during the early 1980s, the GLC’s Pollution Monitoring Group 
liaised with all organisations involved in air pollution monitoring for data collection and 
standardisation purposes (GLC 1983: 35). As the GLC was abolished, air quality 
databases - before the creation of the LAQN in 1993 - were not standardised or 
comprehensive. Without an area-wide coordinating agency, most monitoring stations were 
working in isolation and data was not systematically pooled. Despite the existence of a 
monitoring scheme for a range of pollutants coordinated by Rendel Science and 
Environment (later on known as TBV Science), not all the boroughs participated and thus 
coverage was incomplete (see Bell 1993: 28-29; SEIPH 1994: 2/1). The underlying reason 
for having a coordinating agency is that monitoring on a London-wide basis provides a 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of air quality giving “a strategic overview of air quality 
across London” as well as “data for individual areas” (Bell 1993: 26). A comprehensive 
databank allows authorities to assess whether pollution control measures are stringent 
enough for the protection of human health, flora and fauna and the environment. In order to 
develop such a comprehensive approach, it is important to ensure common monitoring 
standards. This can be reached by using the same methods and frequency of 
measurements, location of sites, types of pollutants, analysis of results, quality of 
equipment and calibration, and so on (see DoE 1996: 80-83; GLC 1983: 35; SEIPH 1994: 
1/5). Thus, a comprehensive and standardised monitoring system contributes to knowledge 
about pollution sources, human health effects, the prediction of outbreaks of pollution 
episodes and dispersion of pollutants, and altogether, to more reliable and accurate 
information. Although the SEIPH - through the LAQN - has already done a comprehensive 
audit of all local authority monitoring sites, and created a database of sites, types of 
monitoring systems, pollutants measured, etc. (several reports have already been 
published) not all the boroughs, as already seen, have contributed in the same way.
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Another criticism of London’s air quality monitoring system is in relation to local 
authorities* statutory powers. The main concern for most local officers before the 1995 EA 
was enacted was the fact that London local authorities had no statutory duties upon 
monitoring nor enough financial resources for that. The local authority in Enfield explained 
that while air quality control was not a statutory duty and thus the borough did not have any 
obligation to provide information to the public, they still had to do it because of citizen’s 
complaints or because it was requested. As they had no legal duty to monitor, this was not 
a priority and consequently finance was sent to other areas; as Bell (1993: 28) pointed out, 
“cost is a major obstacle to local authority monitoring. It is a non-statutory function which 
makes it particularly vulnerable to cuts in spending.” According to the local authority in 
Havering, one of the huge advantages that the former GLC had in this respect was that they 
were interested in monitoring and had their own financial resources to buy equipment and 
set up databanks.
Now, after the 1995 EA, the London boroughs have a duty to provide an air quality 
assessment of their areas which implies a duty to monitor. As already seen, though, local 
authorities have not been allocated financial or personnel resources for this yet. In a second 
interview with the local authority in the London Borough of Havering, Mr. P. Hayden said 
that the borough is trying to start monitoring PMio, a pollutant of much concern for them. 
The new equipment, only to continuously monitor PMio, costs £27,000. Due to financial 
constraints, as Mr. Hayden explained, the boroughs cannot cover all pollutants, and thus, 
end up choosing the ones they believe are the most important to monitor. Thus, the 
monitoring results that the boroughs send to SEIPH or NETCEN, are based on a non- 
comprehensive borough’s criteria on the selection of the pollutant they monitor. According 
to Mrs. Patel at Brent, as boroughs have now a duty to monitor, they have to put more 
resources onto it, which seems positive but without an adequate central government 
financial and personnel assistance (she is the only one carrying out monitoring in the 
borough) it has become “too much” work for them.
Finally, the fourth major criticism of London’s air quality system is related to the DoE’s 
monitoring network. The DoE’s limited number of sites and their particular locations - 
mainly background as opposed to kerbside and suburban - have not been sufficient to 
provide the comprehensive data required for the Greater London area. It has been argued 
that background sites may regularly miss higher pollution levels in areas of heavy traffic 
and risks misleading citizens about the real levels of pollution (Bell 1993: 26-33; Dobson 
1995?: 4; FoE 1994: 3; SEIPH 1994: 1/3).
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These criticisms have certainly showed the need for having an air pollution-wide agency 
where the London boroughs can participate and contribute to the air quality monitoring 
system. Again, the question is whether this agency should be within the central 
government, within an elected local authority, or simply be a non-elected one. In an 
interesting conversation with Mr. Halford at Enfield, he properly pointed out that if “we 
have subscribed and agreed to work with SEIPH...[is]...because is the only agency that 
wants to analyse and evaluate the problem London-wide, regardless of their motifs. So, if 
they are offering to do that work, then we join them”. It might well be the case that other 
boroughs have done the same because of a lack of any other coordinating unit. As 
importance and awareness of a comprehensive strategy for air quality monitoring has 
grown among local authorities, the creation of a London-wide authority ensuring 
standardisation of information and financial and personnel support would encourage 
London boroughs to join in and work all together.
The case for monitoring air quality in London as presented here raises the question of 
whether providing public goods under a fragmented situation (i.e. market approach) may 
fail to exploit large economies of scale. Because London boroughs acquire monitoring 
equipment depending on their financial situation and on their political interests or priorities, 
the information provided is incomplete and not systematically pooled; that is to say, it fails 
to give a metropolitan-wide view of the problem. This situation reinforces the results 
obtained from the survey in Chapter V, where even with statutory duties to monitor money 
can be sent to other areas (see example of Enfield) producing an unequalised provision of 
the service, which in turn may create externalities across the metropolitan complex. At 
present, boroughs are monitoring those pollutants they believe are more dangerous and 
with diverse types of equipment which provides inefficient and unequalised air quality 
information for the whole metropolitan area.
6.3.2 Transportation and traffic management
As already explained, road traffic is the main source of air pollution in London accounting 
for virtually all the emissions of energy-related hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, black 
smoke and the majority of emissions of nitrogen oxides. It is also the major source of lead 
and other particulates as well as an important contributor to sulphur dioxide. Although 
ozone is a secondary pollutant, the pollutants that synergistically contribute to its formation 
- NOx and hydrocarbons - mainly come from road traffic as well (see Chapter II).
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Whereas road vehicles are considered to be the major source of pollution in London, not all 
types of vehicles pollute in the same percentage. As seen in Table 6.4, private cars are top 
on the list of polluters by energy use in London; this table gives an estimate of how much 
different types of road vehicles may contribute to air pollution.
Table 6.4 Energy use in London by road vehicles
Road vehicles Energy use (% )
Automobiles (private cars) 56.4
Light goods vehicles 17.8
Medium goods vehicles 11.2
Heavy goods vehicles 8.4
Buses 4.1
Taxis 1.4
Motorcycles 0.7
Source: LRC (1993)
While private vehicles have become the main source of most pollutants of concern in 
today’s London atmosphere, they amount for less than half of the total journeys in London 
as in mode of transportation (see Table 6.5).
Table 6.5 Journeys in London by mode of tran sp o rt
M ode D istribu tion  of jou rneys (% )
Cars 37
Buses 12
Underground 5.5
Railways 3
Other 4
Walking 38.5
Source: LRC (1993)
The outcome of the semi-structured interviews carried out in London, show that the main 
air pollution source of concern for local authorities is road vehicles (see also Chapter V). 
This concern arises mainly from the number of public complaints that the London boroughs 
receive on, for example, smoky cars. For instance, the local authority in the London 
Borough of Enfield explained that during the period from 1994 to the beginning of 1995 
(c.a. 18 months) this borough got over 100 calls alone complaining about smoky cars. 
Similarly, while in Havering most complaints come from vehicle emissions because of the 
M25, in Kingston upon Thames, the local authority pointed out that air pollution accounts
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for 50 to 100 complaints a year basically from road vehicle emissions.
In the case of the borough of Enfield, though, the local authority stated that there have also 
been air quality complaints on high levels of pollution that are not precisely originated in the 
borough itself. The London Borough of Enfield tends to have problems with polluted air 
that is brought by the winds from the centre of London into its geographical boundaries. 
The centre of London is where most concentrations of pollutants are higher than in other 
parts - especially for SO2, black smoke, CO, NOx, VOCs - presumably because this area 
has a major traffic flow (see LRC 1993: 129-132). In other boroughs, such as Havering, 
the south westerly winds during the summer time take all the pollution that originated from 
the M25 away from the borough. As a result of this, Havering authorities have found that 
levels of ozone are higher outside the borough, approximately 40 miles away into the 
countryside.
Given their importance for an adequate air quality management strategy, public transport 
and traffic management issues have recently become the most significant reasons for 
reorganising local government structures in London. This is not to say that in the past these 
issues were not taken into account when discussing London’s government organisation. 
By way of illustration, since the Herbert Commission was established in the late 1950s, it 
was clearly stated that traffic management issues should belong to the upper-tier of 
government in order to avoid central government to assume dictatorial powers in this regard 
(RCLG 1960: 203). Later on, in 1984 when the GLC responded to the Governments’ 
White Paper ‘Streamlining the Cities’ (DoE 1983), traffic management and planning were 
included as strong cases for the need of a London-wide authority for air pollution control. 
In this response it was stressed the importance of an area-wide authority for London-wide 
prevention activities:
“The Council’s role is to maintain an overview of London’s 
air quality, and as strategic planning authority it must watch 
the existing levels of air pollution. This role is particularly 
important because of London’s size and the scale and 
distribution of polluting sources, many of which are not 
amenable to local borough council control. Examples of this 
include traffic emissions... As highway authority, the 
Council has always paid great attention to minimizing the 
effects of air pollution and other impact of new road schemes 
and traffic management measures”
(GLC 1984: (31) 2).
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Over the last few years, there have also been continuous calls by different organisations to 
create an area-wide body for public transportation management in order to have strategic 
and coordinated policies across London (see Sharpe 1995c: 124-125). In March 1990, for 
instance, the Chartered Institute of Transport proposed a transport authority with powers 
over the finance and control of London Transport LT, British Railways BR, suburban 
services, and trunk and local roads (Ridley & Travers 1991: 175). Another example is the 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution RCEP (1994: 213) which emphasized in its 
Eighteenth Report the need of a body to take a strategic overview of transport problems and 
solutions and to have them implemented by the providers of transport, whether public or 
private. Although the Conservative government did actually recognise the need for a 
coordinated and integrated transport policy, it ruled out the possibility of creating a strategic 
transport authority stating it to be both “undesirable in principle and unworkable in 
practice” (DoT 1996: 126). While the British government at that time showed some concern 
about the impacts of transport on air quality in London, it failed to include in its integrated 
transport strategy the creation of a local area-wide body for such aims stressing that all 
transport responsibilities should lie on the government itself, London Transport, and the 
London Boroughs (see DoE 1994: 49-54 and 1995: 23-28; DoT 1996: 1-5; 126-127). 
More recently, the Labour Government’s proposals for reorganising the system of local 
government in London have included the creation of a strategic authority - a Greater 
London Authority GLA - who will take over diverse transport and traffic management 
responsibilities (see DETR 1997b and 1998).
Although these two areas - transportation systems and traffic management issues - are in 
many ways interlinked for controlling air pollution, there exist a variety of views on 
developing policy strategies. On the one hand, the results of the semi-structured 
questionnaires show that most of the interviewees coincide in the need for a more 
coordinated system among London boroughs for transport and traffic management policies. 
On the other hand, the debatable issues focus on the type of coordinating agency, on the 
issue of devolution of power to local authorities, and on the reasons why people are 
increasingly making use of vehicles and thus on the policies that should be developed to 
encourage them to change to public transport (see Tables 6.6 and 6.7). From an 
institutional point of view the controversial issue lies primarily, once again, on whether a 
coordinated and strategic approach should come from an area-wide central agency, a local 
elected body, or a non-elected one.
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Table 6.6 Interviewees* consensus on public transport and traffic management issues 
for air pollution control______________________________________________________________
Main issue of concern • Motor vehicle emissions
Public transport 
&
traffic management
• An integrated strategy
• Betterment of public transport
• More cycling routes
• Better pedestrianisation
• Priority to public transport than to car road
policies schemes
• Reduce traffic congestion
• No Draconian measures under current air quality 
situation
Local government 
system
• Coordination among boroughs is necessary
Education & social • Change people’s attitudes: shift from cars to
policies public transport
Source: Author’s semi-structured questionnaires
With the new powers they have recently acquired on traffic management issues, London 
local authorities still face two main problems. First, the central government has not 
allocated financial resources to them; second, there is no coordinating agency for when 
local authorities decide to implement and enforce those local powers. With the existing poor 
relationship between the boroughs and the DoT is difficult to envisage that a coordinated 
and integrated approach to air pollution when implementing traffic management policies can 
take place.
171
T able 6.7 In terv iew ees’ d isag reem en t on public  t ra n s p o r t  an d  tra ffic  m anagem ent
issues fo r a ir  pollution control
Agency options:
I. Public tran sp o rt
& • central government agency
traffic  m anagem ent
• elected upper-tier of government
coord ina ting  un it
• specialised non-elected agency
Alternative statutory powers:
• air quality monitoring (obtained through 1995
EA)
• assessment of air quality areas (obtained through
1995 EA)
II. A llocation of functions
• testing vehicles’ emissions (obtained through
(devolution of pow er 1995 EA)
to
local au thorities) • stopping (one-by-one) vehicles
• banning vehicles (obtained through 1995 EA only
temporarily ban and along certain routes during
poor air quality)
• major roads
• IPC industrial emissions control
Diverse reasons:
• lack of public transport
• safety reasons
III. Use of private cars • consumism, comfort, private space
•freedom
• selfishness and egoism
• social status
Source: Author’s semi-structured questionnaires
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The Divisional Environmental Health Officer at Havering, Mr. P. Hayden explained some 
of the problems they face after the enactment of the 1995 EA. While for the first time the 
NAQS allows Havering authorities to review and assess major roads - in particular the M25 
that crosses the borough - through a duty on assessing air quality management areas, there 
is no way they could possibly control this motorway without a coordinating body if high 
levels of air pollution occur. If they were to implement their duties separately, for example, 
temporarily banning cars without getting in touch with all the other London boroughs and 
surrounding authorities where the M25 crosses, a traffic chaos would be created. The low 
level of communication that exists between the DoT, DoE and the boroughs certainly adds 
up to a non-coordinated response to control traffic flow. Although the central government 
has insisted that it consults London local authorities, the DoT does not seem to be included 
as part of this. For instance, during the second interview with local authority P. Hayden at 
Havering in November 1996, the DoT had not contacted the London Borough of Havering 
for developing the transport plans and programmes TPPs in order to establish “a common 
approach to reducing pollution and improving the environment across the capital” yet (DoE 
1995: 25).
The fact that it is not appropriate or convenient to close roads without consulting other 
authorities that might be affected by such decision, was addressed by the local authorities in 
the boroughs of Brent, Camden, City of Westminster, Enfield and Havering. The 
underlying reason for this is the same: closing one road within the boundaries of a borough 
would divert traffic to other adjacent boroughs creating traffic jams and thus leading to 
increasing levels of air pollution.
Public transport and traffic management issues constitute examples that are relevant to the 
public choice approach because of the externalities that can be created by these subfunctions 
with broad catchment areas. The case of the London Borough of Enfield, for example, 
where air quality complaints are about levels of pollution that have not originated within the 
borough’s boundaries, shows the existence of negative externalities produced by other 
boroughs within the same metropolitan area. Under ‘market’ assumptions the issue of 
concern, in the example of Enfield, is whether the boroughs where pollution is originated 
(i.e. road transport emissions in central London) can actually internalise the effects that are 
imposed onto Enfield. Another example of spillovers under a fragmented system are the 
concerns raised by the boroughs of Brent, Camden, City of Westminster, Enfield and 
Havering on the issue of closing roads (as well as banning or stopping cars when air 
pollution episodes occur) without consulting other local authorities that might be affected 
by that measure. The externalities created in these cases may be associated with increasing
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levels of air pollution as closing roads in one borough diverts traffic to adjacent boroughs 
eventually creating traffic jams. While the interviewees emphasised the need for a strategic 
and coordinated approach to public transport and traffic management, they also raised 
concerns on the need of making citizens participate in air quality management issues (e.g. 
to encourage modal shift from private cars to public transport). Under local governance 
assumptions such participation could be achieved through diverse organisations 
(community groups, non-governmental organisations or networks) which could encourage 
drivers to make less use of their cars. As yet there is limited exploitation of these 
opportunities.
6.3.3 Emergency plan
One of the first alert systems schemes in the world was devised for London after the 1952 
smog pollution episode occurred; this scheme, an emergency hospital alert plan, however, 
was never brought into operation (Elsom 1996: 91). At the time of writing, the British 
government has not designed yet an alert system for London to address warning and 
emergency situations when air pollution levels rise and breach the DoE’s air quality limit 
threshold gu id e lin es . 7 The U K  warnings on high levels of air pollution in London do not 
include any legally-binding measures; it only requests voluntary cooperation from local 
authorities, drivers, etc (see Elsom 1996: 99; FoE 1994; Weir 1993: 13). While local 
authorities in London have now statutory powers to restrict use of roads during air 
pollution episodes (e.g. ban cars), they need first to go through a consultation process for 
this and prepare contingency plans (DoE 1995: 19 and 1996: 54; EA 1995).
During the fieldwork carried out in London, some interviewees explained that under the 
current air quality situation an emergency plan is not required. For example, J. Rice at 
SEIPH stated during the interview that the levels of pollution in London are not going into 
an emergency planning situation: until November 1994 the last pollution episode of concern 
occurred in December 1991 when NOx went right up and breached the air quality norms. 
On the other hand, S. Bell at LBA said that at an emergency level, action needs to be taken 
more on a long term background than on a short one. According to this interviewee, there 
should be at least some kind of emergency banding to best inform people about the
7 This section does not consider emergency plans in the case of industrial accidents. The focus of debate is 
on pollution outbreaks stemmed from road vehicles. For some information on unexpected events of 
hazardous pollutants see the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act (Planning 1990).
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situation and perhaps encourage them not to drive into work. The central government 
authorities interviewed also showed more concern on the existence of the right air quality 
bands than on an immediate response to air pollution through an emergency plan in 
London.
An emergency situation is certainly subjected to the type of air quality band system that 
exist so as to measure whether the limits are being breached or not. The way into which air 
pollution concentration is banded in London raises some questions on whether there have 
not been, in effect, pollution episodes. For example, if an air quality band is ‘too tolerant’, 
then it is less likely that pollution episodes, i.e. an emergency situation, may occur. As the 
results of the general survey showed (see Chapter V), the DoE’s air quality band has 
precisely been criticised for being too tolerant. It has also been argued that because the 
monitoring network is unable to provide appropriate local information, and the air quality 
information broadcast is often unclear about predicting an episode, it is not possible to 
create a preventative plan (Weir 1993: 12), let alone have reliable information on the real 
levels of pollution. As already seen in this and other chapters, the number and location of 
the air quality monitoring sites also contributes to the latter.
If local authorities were to elaborate contingency plans on their own, these plans will lack 
an integrated and area-wide perspective that is required for London. Whatever the type of 
measures contained in such emergency plans, a head is required to have an overview of 
pollution episodes in London as well as to coordinate all boroughs in the implementation of 
the 33 diverse plans. This coordination is necessary especially if local authorities decide to 
control cars and close some roads. In addition, as much as media is extremely important in 
the quick dissemination of the outbreak of a pollution episode, a coordinating body would 
certainly contribute to spread all the information to local authorities, schools, police, 
hospitals, and so on.
In order to know the type of response London boroughs have when an air pollution 
episode occurs, the semi-structured questionnaires sought to depict local authorities’ 
experiences regarding the 1994 summer pollution episode in L on d o n .8 The answers of five 
different geographically located boroughs at the centre, north, east, west and south of
8 There is some debate on whether the 1994 ‘pollution’ episode that took place during the summer of that 
year - July 15 - was really a pollution episode or a simple environmental phenomenon, that is to say, a 
thunderstorm. However, the outcome of the local authorities’ views and the data collected during the 
fieldwork in London, suggest that it was, indeed, a summer pollution episode (see also, Elsom 1996: 99).
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Greater London - Camden, Enfield, Havering, Hounslow, Kingston upon Thames - were 
quite similar: they did nothing about it. The reasons that local authorities gave in relation to 
this are as follows:
• CAMDEN. They did nothing because local authorities do not have the capacity to deal 
with that; they had first to get in touch with health authorities to see if there was any 
increase of asthma or lung illnesses reports. After the pollution occurred they issued a press 
statement.
• ENFIELD. The reason was that as they are not able to generate their own data, they did 
not know that the pollution episode would occur. They only received a fax with 
information about air quality from SEIPH.
• HAVERING. It was explained that the authorities “did not know what was occurring”. 
The borough first knew about the episode from medical people, who rang them and told 
them about an unusual number of people going to hospital: all of a sudden hospitals were 
full of asmathics. The problem was that there was no information circulating; no one told 
them about that and as a result, the local authority did nothing.
• HOUNSLOW. Although they now work with the SEIPH, the borough did not have at 
that time the mechanisms to publish data, and therefore to give the information and alert 
public. Emphasis was made on the need to establish the way in which messages reach 
people. In addition, the local authority complained that media seems to report only when 
poor air quality conditions emerge.
• KINGSTON UPON THAMES. The answer was “because we didn’t know that an 
episode was happening”. The reason for the latter is because they did not have continuous 
monitoring systems to quickly identify high levels of pollution. Not even hospitals 
contacted them when the pollution episode took place.
As clearly seen with these examples, Greater London lacks a body to coordinate and send 
information to local authorities, media, and public - especially vulnerable groups such as 
asmathics, elderly, children - of an eventual air pollution episode occurrence. According to 
the local authority in the London Borough of Hounslow, in order to give an alert about 
high levels of pollution is important to follow a ‘cascade system*, i.e. a system where there 
is a head No. 1 who rings No. 2 who comprises different channels; then each of these ring 
their own next channels, and these to the rest, and so on. Information may be sent through
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faxes, via INTERNET, via e-mail, etc. After all, according to this local authority, what 
people want to know is when air quality is poor and not when is good.
Although the London boroughs have been constrained to participate on emergency 
situations, some of them have already taken the initiative to do something about this 
particular issue. By way of illustration, the City of Westminster, has included in its 
‘Westminster Initiative’ a system to predict weather conditions and see whether poor air 
quality will appear or not. When poor air quality is predicted, they send faxes to schools, 
GPs, pharmacies, in order to warn them in advance. This experiment started only in July 
1995 so the effectiveness of the results cannot be thoroughly assessed yet. Likewise, the 
London Borough of Brent has already set up a system in which, when a pollution episode 
occurs, they send a fax to schools and clinics warning them about the situation. In this 
Borough, when the warning has been given, schools interrupt and postpone children’s 
exercise or physical activities.
The relevant point in this section, in connection with the three approaches outlined in 
Chapter ID, is that the implementation of an emergency plan when pollution episodes occur 
requires much coordination and consensus among all participants involved. Whatever the 
organisational arrangement (hierarchical, market, or network) the unit in charge needs to 
serve as a forum for deliberation on the type of measures to be implemented and as a centre 
to coordinate and disseminate information of the outbreak of a pollution episode. What it is 
clear from the experiences of the London boroughs during the 1994 summer pollution was 
the lack of a body to inform them about its occurrence. Under market assumptions the issue 
of concern is whether all boroughs (and other participants) would actually reach consensus 
and equally cooperate in the implementation of the emergency plan. Under governance 
assumption the question is one of the blurring of responsibilities; that is to say, who will be 
responsible in case the alert plan was not launched on time or if the agreed measures during 
the decision-making process do not properly operate.
6.4 Conclusion
The outcome of the semi-structured interviews carried out in London suggest that there is 
wide consensus among all the interviewees on the need for a coordinating and strategic 
body for managing air quality issues, particularly for monitoring systems, transport and 
traffic management, and the eventual creation and implementation of a contingency plan. 
However, there exist different views on whether this body should be a central government 
unit, a local elected body, or a non-elected one. It is clear, though, that air quality
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management concerns have invigorated the discussion for reorganising the system of local 
government in London and that such reorganisation must include the creation of a kind of 
strategic area-wide authority. The lack of a city-wide authority in London has implied 
heavy intervention by central government units and the emergence of a number of area- 
wide bodies which have participated on diverse air quality management issues. On the one 
hand, while central government participation seems necessary (specially regarding 
economic and technical aspects), it has failed to adopt an integrated approach to air 
pollution and to create a central agency to coordinate London boroughs and other area-wide 
bodies in their dealings with air pollution. On the other hand, London-wide agencies have 
not been the institutional forum (where all parties can participate) for discussing air quality 
management issues nor become the politically legitimate bodies to put forward local 
authorities’ concerns to central government.
From the outcome of the semi-structured interviews it is also possible to conclude that 
managing air quality in London under a fragmented system of government has not properly 
achieved, as traditional advocates would argue, the greatest efficiency in production nor the 
greatest equity in distribution. The evaluation of the empirical information under public 
choice assumptions suggest the substantial amount of externalities that are likely to appear 
in a metropolitan complex with a jurisdictional fragmentation of local units regarding goods 
or services with broad catchment areas. While the participation of diverse sectors of society 
(as defined by the local governance approach) is frequently considered desirable, the 
various agencies that operate and their consequent relationships for managing air quality 
have resulted in complex governmental response to air pollution, problematic from 
coordination, efficiency and standardisation viewpoints.
The next chapter provides an insight of how a different system of local government 
operates in relation to air quality management. By following the same methodological 
process carried out for London, the case of Mexico City reviews many of the issues that 
have been addressed in this chapter. The final results of both case-studies is presented in 
the last part of this thesis.
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C H A P T E R  VII
Managing Air Quality in Mexico City
“And when we saw so many cities and villages built in the water and other great 
towns on dry land and that straight and level causeway going towards 
[Tenochtitlan], we were amazed and said it was like the enchantments they tell o f 
in the legend o f Amadis, on account o f the great towers and [templesJ and 
buildings rising from  the water, and all built o f masonry, and some o f our 
soldiers asked whether the things that we saw were not a dream... ”.
Bernal Diaz del Castillo - 1519? (soldier and 
chronicler o f the discovery and conquest o f
Mexico City).
7.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, government response for controlling air pollution in the MZMC has 
involved a mixed system of tiers of government whereby the main policy formulation and 
implementation actors have been an elected central government, an elected federated state 
(the surrounding State of Mexico EdoMex) and a non-elected government agency of 
Mexico City: the DDF. As in the case of London, the participation of central government in 
managing air quality in Mexico City has concentrated on financial, technical and personal 
resources. Such intervention has supported and contributed to, for example, the elaboration 
and standardisation of air quality norms, research and educational projects, technical 
equipment, and implementation of policies whenever it has been required. Although by the 
late 1980s the Federal Constitution established a decentralised system for environmental 
management purposes incorporating the participation of local and municipal authorities 
regarding air pollution control, heavy central government intervention has continued. While 
the participation of Mexico City’s local authorities for controlling air pollution has 
increased, air quality management concerns have not been included in the discussion for 
reorganising the structures of local government in Mexico City. Based upon diverse semi­
structured interviews carried out with diverse policy actors (e.g. central and local 
authorities, NGOs), this chapter examines how the system of local government in Mexico 
City operates in relation to air quality management. As in the previous chapter, it also seeks
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to highlight relevant points in connection with the three approaches outlined in Chapter IH 
and to reinforce some of the results analysed in Chapter V. The analysis of the empirical 
material includes the issues of monitoring systems, transportation and traffic management, 
and the application of an eventual contingency plan (see Appendix II).
7.2 Managing air quality: central and local government participation
From the 1930s up to 1988, air pollution matters had been exclusively a function of the 
federal government. While the 1987 Constitutional ammendment of article 73 XXIX-G and 
the 1988 Environmental Law LGEEPA (Ley General del Equilibrio Ecoldgico y Proteccion 
al Ambiente) allowed the government of Mexico City to get legally involved in the 
prevention and control of air pollution, central government has continued to play a 
significant role in air quality management (see Campos Ruiz et al 1993: 60; Collins & Scott 
1993: 119; Ward 1990: 63-91). The heavily centralised intervention of the federal 
government, though, has been regarded as one of the main factors which have impeded an 
adequate response to air pollution in Mexico City:
“Although most of the environmental problems in the Basin 
of Mexico have reached critical proportions in the late 
twentieth century, industrial development is not solely to 
blame. Urban primacy and political centralism have been a 
tradition in Mexican society since the Aztec empire. The 
basin of Mexico...has used its preeminent administrative and 
political position to obtain advantages over other areas of the 
nation”
(Ezcurra 1990: 586).
As shown in Table 7.1, there are many areas in which different federal agencies have 
intervened so as to prevent and control air pollution in Mexico City. For instance, the 
central government agency for environmental issues - SEMARNAP - has powers for 
regulating all fixed sources which produce pollution in the DF (with the exception of 
service establishments) as well as on the organisation and management of national parks 
and ecological reserves in Mexico City (see LGEEPA 1988). While both federal and local 
authorities legislate on the issue of air quality management, it is central government’s role 
in this area that has predominated. By way of illustration, whereas the 1988 LGEEPA says 
that the DDF has powers on any type of moving sources within its territory (and on fixed 
sources which are service establishments) the federal agency SEMARNAP is in charge of 
issuing the norms for the maximum levels of emissions of such moving sources and for the 
norms on the quality of fuels as well as on the elaboration of the contingency plan. The 
local environmental act for the Federal District (the Ley Ambiental del Distrito Federal
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enacted by the ALDF in 1996) regulates all moving sources within Mexico City following 
federal guidelines in this regard (see LADF 1996).
Table 7.1 Functions of different federal bodies on air pollution matters in the MZMC
Federal agencies and members of the CMPCCAVM Principal functions
SEMARNAP 
(Secretariat for the Environment)
• Industrial inspection and control (fixed sources)
• Elaboration of environmental norms
Ssa
(Secretariat of Health)
• Epidemiological supervision and health impact 
evaluation
• Citizen’s orientation
SEP
(Secretariat of Education)
• School regulation during contingencies
• Environmental education programmes
SCT
(Secretariat of Communications & Transport)
• Transport emissions control (other than MZMC 
vehicles)
SECOFI
(Secretariat of Commerce & Industry)
• Change-over to gas programme
• Norms issuance on gas use and distribution
SE
(Secretariat for Energy)
• Energy saving programme
SHCP 
(Secretariat of Finance)
• External finance
• Fiscal measures
• Price policies on fuels
PEMEX 
(State-owned oil industry)
• Fuels quality improvement
• Research project: Los Alamos/IMP
CFE
(State-owned electricity industry)
• Emissions control in thermoelectric plants
Source: CMPCCAVM (1994a); LGEEPA (1988)
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While the legal system determines the participation of central and local authorities, due to 
the imprecise distribution of functions among the federal and local government, the current 
environmental legislation has created enormous confusion about the elaboration and 
implementation and enforcement of air pollution regulations in the MZMC. While the 
Federal Constitution clearly states in article 48 that any issue related to the atmosphere is a 
federal function, it also allows local authorities to intervene on diverse air quality issues. 
The coordination agreements that are set out in the environmental legislation allow local 
authorities to get involved only at the administrative or enforcement level and regarding 
certain areas. Thus, formally speaking, the local legislature in Mexico City - the ALDF - 
does not have constitutional powers to enact legislation on air pollution issues except those 
that are related to the implementation and enforcement of air quality norms with the 
exception of fixed sources (Branes 1994: 123-126; Cancino Aguilar 1994: 115-136; 
Constitution 1997; EGDF 1994; Gonzalez Marquez & Cancino Aguilar 1994: 32-42 and 
63-65; LGEEPA 1988). While not clearly established, it is therefore important to 
distinguish between the regulatory and the administrative functions (implementation and 
enforcement) in relation to air pollution aspects. Although the Mexican legislation gives 
exclusive powers to the federal government regarding air quality norms, in practice, federal 
authorities are continuously working on their elaboration and discussion in coordination 
with local authorities of Mexico City and the surrounding federated state EdoMex through 
informal meetings.
The views of most federal and local authorities also stress the issues of confusion and 
overlapping of functions that derive from the current Mexican environmental legislation on 
air pollution. For example, the Director for Environmental Policies and Norms at DDF, 
explained that in the case of fixed sources in the MZMC different authorities intervene for 
the application of different environmental regulations for the same industry. If it is about air 
emissions, the federal authorities intervene, but if it is about polluting water, then the local 
ones are in charge. Even more, generation of dangerous waste is a federal issue, but 
generation of non-dangerous waste is local - and municipal if the case involves drainage in 
one of the municipalities of the MZMC. All this creates confusion for industry in the 
application of environmental regulation resulting in two or three simultaneous 
administrative procedures for licences, sanctions, payment of fines, and so on. The 
economic costs and delays that stem from this system are substantial. According to this 
local authority, the federal government should specify the norms, and the local authorities 
should implement and enforce them. Only when the process of implementation demands 
federal assistance, should both local and central authorities participate.
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As shown in Table 7.2, the argument that the federal government should intervene on the 
elaboration of the norms - such as environmental standards, main environmental policy, 
regulations on air pollution related issues such as health and vehicle emissions norms, and 
so on - is shared by both federal and local authorities. However, according to the answers 
of the interviewees, the latter does not imply that the federal government exclusively should 
have powers for that. On the contrary, federal and local authorities views are that the central 
government should work together with the DDF and the EdoMex authorities on the 
elaboration and discussion of policies and norms for the MZMC; thus, some legal changes 
are required at the constitutional and legislation levels. The Director for Environmental 
Policies and Norms at DDF pointed out that the importance for keeping the elaboration of 
environmental norms as a federal function is due to the need for uniformity and 
standardisation “because if it were local, there could be incoherence of norms in each of the 
federated states”. Nonetheless, the local authority argued that in the case of critical areas, 
such as the MZMC, there should be joint work between federal and local authorities. This 
is because in order to reach air quality norms in Mexico City (where there exist particular 
geographical characteristics and industrial location) specific and individual emission norms 
must be stricter than in other areas like Veracruz (a coast city) where wind ‘cleans-up’ the 
atmosphere (see Chapter II).
T able  7.2 C en tra l an d  local au th o ritie s ’ views on the  ro le  of c en tra l a n d  local 
governm ent regard ing  a ir  pollution in Mexico City
C en tra l au th o ritie s’ views Local au th o ritie s ’ views
Central government’s role: 
norms & regulations
V
Central government’s role: 
implementation & enforcement
* X
Local government’s role: 
norms & regulations
V V
Local government’s role: 
implementation & enforcement
V V
x Against intervention
*  Divided views on intervention
Source: Author’s semi-structured questionnaires
183
In relation to the administrative level, whereas federal authorities disagree on whether the 
central government should participate or not in the implementation and enforcement of air 
pollution norms, local authorities seem to prefer having exclusive powers for the latter than 
to jointly work with the federal government, unless the own local authorities require some 
kind of federal support (see Table 7.2). The interviews carried out with different federal 
and local authorities illustrate both sides of the argument in relation to whether the federal 
government should intervene in the implementation and enforcement of air pollution 
emissions for fixed sources (i.e. industrial emissions) in the MZMC. First, central 
authorities views on fixed sources are divided. On the one hand, Mr. David Guidi, head of 
the Office for Normative Inspection (Subprocuraduria de Verification Normativa) at the 
Attorney General for Environmental Protection PROFEPA (Procuradurfa Federal de 
Protection al Ambiente - the federal agency for implementing and enforcing policies for 
fixed sources in MZMC) said that from a legal point of view federal intervention in MZMC 
is ‘adequate enough’ because the problem of polluted air embraces a huge variety of 
emission sources. Such emission sources include not only those where the DDF is in 
charge of, such as moving and non-industrial fixed sources, but also industrial fixed 
sources which require federal participation because of the complexities of regulation. On 
the other hand, Attorney General at PROFEPA, Antonio Azuela, pointed out that the 
industrial emissions control special formula for the MZMC derived from the LGEEPA - 
whereby the PROFEPA is in charge of inspection and enforcement of regulations of all 
industries - should not continue. According to this federal authority, there is no reason why 
the MZMC should have a special regulatory system compared to the rest of the federated 
entities, where local authorities participate on industrial emissions control when they are 
generated by local sources or in zones of local jurisdiction: “the intervention of the federal 
government...[in the MZMC]...in areas that could be very well covered by local authorities 
represents a centralist hallmark”. Additionally, the head at PROFEPA, Mr. Azuela, was not 
keen on the idea of getting the Federation involved when polluted air covers two or more 
federated entities, as in the case of the MZMC. The latter implies undermining the capacity 
of the federated states to arrange their own environmental conflicts.
Second, the viewpoints of local authorities in Mexico City seem to support Mr. Azuela’s 
opinion in the sense of getting powers for inspecting industrial emissions, which include 
emissions to all media. For instance, Mr. Rodolfo Lacy Tamayo current Director General 
for Environmental Issues at DDF (Direction General de Ecologia), explained that there is 
“no logical reason why the federal government has exclusive powers for controlling
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industrial emissions to the atmosphere...this is an absurd”. According to this local 
authority, the underlying reason for this, is due to the economic importance and vested 
interests that the industry located in the Valley of Mexico represents at the national level and 
thus the pressures on the Federation to keep control over it. This situation has hindered the 
DDF from properly carrying out those functions which the DDF is legally responsible for. 
For example, although the DDF inspects industrial waste disposal, the pollution inventories 
each industry prepares (which include air, water, and so on) is usually given to the federal 
government and not to DDF’s authorities. Local authorities then have to ask of the same 
industry, another emissions inventory but only regarding waste disposal, which is an 
unnecessary duplicated task for governmental officials and the industry. While the DDF has 
already requested more powers on inspection matters - something that PROFEPA has 
partially agreed on - Mr. Lacy Tamayo confessed that in some ways, it is convenient for 
them not to have so many statutory powers on inspection issues because of the lack of 
personal and financial resources. However, he emphasized that the government of Mexico 
City should have these powers: institutional capacity for responding to new duties should 
not be a problem.
Overall, the interviewees’ opinions on federal and local government intervention and the 
existence of coordination agreements for environmental purposes - either by law or through 
regular informal meetings - confirms that there exists a common government view for 
adopting an integrated approach for tackling air pollution in Mexico City. The latter requires 
central and local government participation, as well as the need to continue a process of 
devolution of power to Mexico City’s local authorities which started in the late 1980s. 
During the mid-1990s, this process has included more powers for the government of 
Mexico City at the regulatory and administrative levels. Indeed, as from 1994, the ALDF 
can enact legislation on air quality issues such as public transportation and traffic 
management (Constitution 1997; DDF 1993; EGDF 1994; Gamboa de Buen 1994: 158- 
159).
None the less, federal government intervention on air pollution issues at the policy 
formulation and regulation levels is likely to continue for the rest of the century. The new 
1996 air quality programme for the MZMC that enhances and updates the 1990 PICCA is a 
good example of continuous central intervention. According to Mr. Femandez-Bremauntz, 
Director General at SEMARNAP and in charge of the elaboration of the new air quality 
programme, the idea of such a new programme came from the federal government. 
Presumably, the principles of the new air quality management strategy were being 
discussed with other local authorities - particularly with DDF and EdoMex - at the time of
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interviewing. However, the discussion and progress of the new air quality plan, has failed 
to include, or at least inform, other members of the CMPCCAVM of the issues at debate. 
Although central government authorities announced the existence of this programme 
through the media during 1995, by the time the interviews were carried out with some of 
CMPCCAVM members in July 1995 - for example, with academic Bravo Alvarez and 
environmentalist Barba Pirez - the CMPCCAVM had not had its first meeting yet since the 
beginning of 1995.
The results of the semi-structured interviews in this section reveal that heavy central 
government intervention and recent increased participation of local authorities has hindered 
other actors of society from participating in air quality management issues as recognised by 
the local governance approach. The existence of blurring of responsibilities derives not 
from the various agencies - networks or partnerships - for managing air quality (as 
explained by the network approach) but from imprecise legislation (i.e. functional 
allocation) which can be seen in the division of responsibilities between central and local 
units.
7.3 The role of the government of Mexico City
As seen in Chapter IV, the organisational changes that are taking place in the system of 
local government in Mexico City - i.e. direct election of a Mayor at the upper level in 1997 
and of local mayors at the lower level in the year 2000 - stem primarily from democratic 
and representative demands rather than from city management concerns. The current debate 
on local government organisation in this urban centre raises two major issues within 
Mexico City’s urban environmental management in relation to air pollution. First, since 
democracy and representation are upfront in the political reform debate, it is important to 
query whether these two issues would make a positive impact on managing air quality. 
Whether democratisation may improve the functionality of this or any other city, and thus 
be reflected on urban environmental improvement, is a hotly debated issue with no definite 
or universal answer (see, for example, de Geus 1996: 194-197; Diaz Diaz & Perlo Cohen 
1994: 55-57; Doherty & de Geus 1996: 7-14; Ward 1990: 73-91). Scholar discourse and 
reality could be far away from each other, but at least, as Davey pointed out “in theory the 
extent to which urban governments are accountable to the local electorate should have a 
major impact on their effectiveness” (Davey 1996: 65). Second, democratic and 
accountability concerns have shifted attention from reviewing the advantages that the 
current system of government has for controlling air pollution. Some of these advantages 
relate to, for instance, the importance of DDF participation as a strategic body for
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coordination and standardisation purposes, as well as for liaising with other federal, local 
or non-governmental agencies as a single, city-wide authority. The positive aspects that 
could be identified from the way Mexico City has been governed and that should be taken 
into account when reforming local government, though, should not become an excuse for 
preventing the democratisation and accountability process in Mexico City at the upper and 
lower tiers of government.
The results of the interviews in Mexico City with diverse local authorities within the DDF 
suggest that the relationships of Mexico City’s upper tier authorities with other agencies in 
terms of coordination have not been a major limitation for tackling air pollution (see 
Appendix II). According to local authorities’ viewpoints, there seems to be a low degree of 
tension between federal agencies and Mexico City’s government as well as between the 
latter and the 16 delegated units. The latter does not imply that there have not been some 
conflicts between central and local authorities when discussing the elaboration and 
application of air pollution regulations. Some of these conflicts, though, have occurred due 
to overlapping of functions derived from an imprecise legislation.
Although different views and interests from central government departments and the DDF 
arise when discussing actions for improving air quality in the MZMC, their relationships 
have been described as ‘good’ and ‘friendly’ by the local authorities themselves (see Table 
7.3). There exist two main reasons that may explain why Mexico City’s government 
relationships with the central government are not often conflictive. First, whereas the 
creation of a Metropolitan Commission for Environmental Pollution for the MZMC (the 
CMPCCAVM) seems to have largely contributed in bringing all diverse governmental 
authorities (including the EdoMex) into one single forum of discussion where some degree 
of consensus has been reached, such a consensus has been centrally-led most of the times. 
According to Sergio Sanchez Martinez, Director General for Environmental Projects at 
DDF and member of the CMPCCAVM, the main function of the Metropolitan Commission 
has been precisely to act as the coordinating mechanism among all federal and local 
government agencies in order to jointly formulate integrated actions against air pollution 
and implement them by involving all governmental sectors according to their own 
responsibilities. Not all local authorities, though, believe that this metropolitan body has 
been efficient or effective enough, since central government precisely imposes its views. 
For example, Eduardo Palazuelos, Head of the Secretariat for the Environment at DDF and 
also a member of the CMPCCAVM, explained that the current commission does not 
properly work “because it is not an independent and autonomous body...it needs to have its 
own budget”. Second, the allegedly lack of tension among federal and local authorities
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relationships, has to do with party political issues and the lack of autonomous authorities in 
Mexico City as well. Although a Mayor’s Office could become powerful on its own and 
relatively autonomous from the federal government, until 1997 the mayor had been 
appointed by the President of Mexico, and thus followed most of the presidential 
instructions (see, for example, Ward 1990 and 1998). Furthermore, the last three non­
elected mayors involved in the implementation of the 1990 PICCA programme - i.e. 
Camacho 1988-93, Aguilera 1994, and Espinoza 1994-97 - belonged all to the same 
political party of the President: the PRI. As explained in Chapter II and IV, the initiative to 
adopt an air quality management strategy during the Salinas administration, did not come 
from an autonomous Mayor whose main concerns were oriented to polluted air, but from 
the President who regarded environmental contamination as one of the priorities in his 
political agenda.
In the case of the relationships between the DDF (upper tier) and its 16 politically and 
territorially fragmented delegated units, the fact that the latter are non-autonomous entities 
whose functions derive from the Mayor’s Office, they often follow what the Mayor tells 
them to do. According to Mr. Lacy Tamayo at the DDF, as all heads of the delegated units 
are appointees of the Mayor and belong to the same political party as the Mayor, there is no 
real opposition or discussion on most of the issues. There actually exists more discussion 
on air quality issues between Mexico City local authorities and the surrounding municipal 
authorities (as well as with other non-governmental organisations) than with the central 
government or delegated units. For instance, although the 17 conurbated municipalities to 
Mexico City are truly elected and autonomous authorities in the EdoMex, the first Mayor of 
the Federal District during the Salinas administration had to get the cooperation and 
compliance from all of them in the application of the 1990 PICCA air pollution measures.
Regarding the relationships of Mexico City, local authorities with other bodies, most 
interviewees at the DDF described these as ‘good’ depending on the type of the 
organisation. For example, when mentioning NGOs, Mr. Sanchez Martinez at DDF said 
that it is not possible to frame in one single group all environmental organisations that 
participate at the CMPCCAVM because each has its own views on air pollution aspects. 
These views correspond either to the interests of the specific communities they represent 
(such as Union de Grupos Ambientalistas who represent many ecological groups) or to 
international guidelines (such as Greenpeace). This local authority emphasized that 
although unconditional support from environmental groups to governmental action is not 
expected, some of them only criticize governmental activity without proposing viable 
options. Albeit he recognised that some environmental groups make positive criticisms and
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suggest specific proposals, “their degree of influence is variable depending on the level of 
knowledge they have and the will they show to participate in or outside the Metropolitan 
Commission...because the environment has become a citizen’s priority, some groups use it 
as a political platform”.
Table 7.3 Local authorities* views (DDF) on type of Mexico City’s government 
relationships with other agencies regarding air pollution issues________________________
Agencies Viewpoints of upper tier authorities
With the federal government
• Relationships described as ‘good’ and ‘friendly’
• Although different views arise among 
governmental bodies, consensus has been achieved
• No major coordination problems
• Conflicts arise due to overlapping functions from 
legislation
With delegated units (lower tier)
• Relationships described as ‘good’ and of ‘much 
cooperation’
• No major coordination problems
• Positive and helpful participation of delegated 
units for carrying out DDF’s functions
• Delegated units should assist DDF in areas that 
are ‘too local’
With EdoMex authorities 
(including state authorities & conurbated 
municipalities)
• Relationships described as ‘good’ with no major 
coordination problems
• Occasional conflicts arise due to independent 
hallmarks of municipalities
• Although there exist different views, consensus 
has been achieved
With non-governmental organisations
• Participation is welcomed, but degree of influence 
depends on level of knowledge and type of 
proposals
Source: Author’s semi-structured questionnaires
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The fact that Mexico City’s government involvement on air pollution issues has increased, 
does not mean that all interested parties have also participated on the policy-making 
process. This situation is not only due to the lack of an upper and lower democratic tiers of 
government, but to a weak legislative body in the past and a non-democratically created 
metropolitan commission CMPCCAVM for the MZMC which have barely represented the 
interests of Mexico City’s inhabitants. Some examples can illustrate this. First, as already 
said, Mexico City’s local authorities that have participated on policy formulation regarding 
air quality issues have not represented the interests of Mexico City inhabitants since they 
were not elected. Second, at the time the legislative body for Mexico City ARDF was 
created (1988), the 1980s’ air pollution policies had already been discussed: the ARDF 
participation on a posteriori regulations such as the 1990 PICCA, was formally minimal 
due to its fairly limited powers on environmental issues. As already seen, the new 
legislative body ALDF can now regulate and enact environmental legislation for the Federal 
District but with no clear specification on its air pollution powers. Finally, although official 
publications (for example, the 1990 PICCA and the 1996 air quality programme) have 
mentioned that the strategy for dealing with air pollution has included the participation of 
national and international specialists as well as environmental groups and citizens, the 
outcome of the interviews with environmental groups and academics in Mexico City tells a 
different story (see CMPCCAVM 1994a: I/17-I/19; DDF 1996; SEDESOL 1993 and 1994; 
STI 1990: 2).
Most of the non-governmental interviewees said that their participation, when permitted, 
did not influence the decision-making policy process. For instance, the Head of the Office 
for Environmental Pollution at UNAM and member of the CMPCCAVM, said that during 
the Salinas administration, the state-owned oil industry PEMEX and the federal health 
authorities (i.e. the former SSA) did not only hide all available information on air pollution 
and related matters - such as health - but denied the existence of damaging consequences as 
a result of the air quality situation in Mexico City. This interviewee emphasized that “it is 
very difficult for politicians to accept that there exist damaging effects because of air 
pollution: they do not like being told off...although the CMPCCAVM listens to us, most of 
the times do not follow our recommendations”. Likewise, an interviewee at the National 
Institute for Public Health INSP (Instituto Nacional de Salud Publica) said that the then 
Secretariat of Health SSA during the Salinas administration was reluctant to take into 
account INSP research findings on human health. The new Secretariat for Health Ssa under 
Zedillo’s administration, though, seems to be more open and receptive to the work they 
have lately produced.
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Other examples concern environmental groups. For instance, the head of the Atmospheric 
and Energy Campaign of Greenpeace Mexico, mentioned that although there is more access 
to Ssa and INE with the Zedillo administration, the DDF is still ‘closed’ to any outside 
environmental policy recommendation, specially regarding transportation issues. Another 
example is constituted by the President of the environmental group Union de Grupos 
Am bientalistas and member of the CMPCCAVM, who also mentioned that their 
environmental suggestions were ignored, and, when taken into account, the main idea was 
distorted. For example, while this organisation launched the voluntary programme ‘A Day 
Without a Car’ in the mid-1980s, the programme was implemented by the federal and local 
governments after few years twisting its original purposes. While such programme was 
intended to be implemented under a voluntarily basis, the federal and local authorities made 
it obligatory. In addition, the President of this environmental group said that the policies to 
be discussed at the CMPCCAVM are usually previously agreed among governmental 
authorities. This interviewee insisted that “from a citizen’s participation point of view 
regarding air pollution issues, there has not been a lot of progress”.
From the outcome of this section there are issues that fit better with the ‘hierarchical’ than 
with ‘market’ or ‘network’ approaches. First, the interviews reveal existing concerns on 
augmenting delegated units’ participation on air quality issues under a joint working basis 
with the area-wide authority - the GDF. While the latter reinforces the results of the survey 
in Chapter V, it also resembles the idea of creating a ‘top-heavy’ two-tier formula of 
government (as explained by the orthodox model) as some interviewees believe delegated 
units should assist the GDF in areas that are ‘too local’. The empirical information, though, 
does not seem to suggest with clarity which areas may be regarded as metropolitan and 
which as local. This situation is a classical example of what the orthodox and public choice 
approaches have identified as the functional allocation problem in metro schemes.
Second, Mexico City’s government response to air pollution does not seem to show major 
problems as identified by the orthodox model regarding coordination and standardisation, 
financial equalisation, and equal distribution of diverse functions or subfunctions within the 
air quality management strategy. Nor has it shown major problems under public choice 
assumptions in connection with costs of production (efficiency), transaction costs 
(governmental relationships), or externalities. This can be partly explained because the 
relationships between GDF authorities and both central government and delegated units 
have not been too conflictual and consensus has been achieved without major opposition, 
although this does follow from the fact that central authorities have imposed their views on 
non-elected and centrally-appointed DDF authorities and the lack of autonomous and
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elected lower-tier authorities. At the metropolitan level (i.e. within the MZMC), though, 
this situation has in turn revealed some problems of consensus building and restricted 
participation of other agencies and actors within society. This concern at the metro level 
raises the question of whether cooperation from the surrounding authorities of the EdoMex 
can be more easily obtained through an area-wide authority that may cover the whole 
metropolitan complex (as envisaged by orthodox views) or through other agencies which 
could serve as coordinating and consensus building bodies networking with several 
participants (as envisaged by local governance views) (see also Table 7.3).
Third, the way in which air quality management policies are elaborated for the whole 
MZMC (i.e. through cooperative arrangements between DDF and EdoMex authorities) 
raises the question of whether the transactional costs between Mexico City authorities and 
surrounding municipalities might be reduced with the existence of a metro authority for the 
whole metropolitan complex. As the current GDF has no control or power over 
independent and elected surrounding municipalities, the avoidance of externalities (positive 
or negative) depends on concerted actions between these local authorities. While the 
CMPCCAVM has served as an institutional channel or forum for discussion this 
specialised agency is not autonomous enough (i.e. it is financially weak). The existence of 
such an agency fits with the orthodox views of confronting political fragmentation through 
cooperation among local governments (in this case GDF and EdoMex) with no structural 
changes in government. Under local governance assumptions the CMPCCAVM has created 
some uncertainty and ambiguity over the way it operates and who is responsible for what. 
At the same time, it has failed to ensure that other participants (non-governmental 
organisations or community groups) have contributed to the decision-making process. This 
situation, together with the predominant participation of central and local government units 
in Mexico City, reveals that the existing organisational arrangements do not properly fit 
with the assumptions of the ‘network’ approach which recognises the involvement of other 
networks or community groups.
7.3.1 Air quality monitoring systems
Monitoring air quality in Mexico City has been, for long, a federal function. It was not until 
1992 that the former environmental secretariat SEDESOL gave to DDF’s authorities the 
responsibility of all monitoring systems in the MZMC. Since 1986 the whole monitoring 
system - i.e. the Automatic Air Quality Monitoring Network RAMA (Red Automatica de 
Monitoreo Atmosferico) has been improved to such an extent that it is now regarded as one 
of the best air quality measurement systems in the world compared to those in Los Angeles,
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New York or Tokyo (DDF 1994; WHO/UNEP 1992: 36). The air quality monitoring 
system in MZMC currently consists of 32 real time or automatic and of 19 manual 
monitoring stations measuring different pollutants. This monitoring systems are located 
across the MZMC - the Federal District contains 21 real time and the conurbated areas of 
the State of Mexico 11 of them. The MZMC is divided up into five main areas that 
continuously report the situation of the air quality in the whole metropolitan zone 
(CMPCCAVM 1994a II/50-II/54 and 1994c: 34-39; SEDESOL 1993: 156; STI 1990: 29- 
39). During the fieldwork period in Mexico City, several visits were made to monitoring 
stations in diverse delegated units across the MZMC where discussion took place with 
some of the technicians that are in charge of the operation of the RAMA system. Other 
visits to monitoring stations were also made to autonomous organisations such as UNAM 
and IMP (see Appendix II). The results that stemmed from the latter showed that the 
monitoring system is fairly sophisticated - especially if it is compared to that in London. 
The effectiveness and efficiency of the system for measuring pollutants and providing 
continuous information on air quality standards proved to be adequate enough in terms of 
coordination, uniformity and standardisation.
The success of the monitoring network in Mexico City has to do not only with 
technological issues, but to the fact that there has been only one organisation (either federal 
SEDUE, SEDESOL, SEMARNAP or local DDF) that has been in charge of managing and 
operating the whole system. First, according to local authority Rivera Nava, in charge of 
the automatic real time monitoring system at DDF, the type of equipment and the whole 
system is one of the best at the international level due to its continuous calibration and 
standardised method of measurement. The calibration of the equipment is certified by three 
international agencies, USEPA (United States Environmental Protection Agency) every six 
months, the German agency GTZ every three months, and by JICA (Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency) every two months. All pollutants within the automatic network are 
monitored by consistent methods, for example, ozone is measured by U.V. Photometry. 
Second, the management of the monitoring network by one single authority has proved to 
be efficient because standardised information of the MZMC-wide air quality situation can 
be obtained by the same authority at once and at every hour for most pollutants. All the 
information sent by the 32 monitoring stations across the MZMC is analysed through a 
complex but uniform computer system at DDF which provides accurate measurements of 
pollutants that are, in turn, sent by fax or computer through e-mail to the federal and local 
authorities that are in charge of implementing the contingency plan at DDF if high levels of 
pollution are reported, i.e. if the permissible levels of the Mexican value index IMECA are 
exceeded.
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The interviews with federal and local authorities and non-governmental organisations show 
no major criticisms of the way in which the air quality monitoring system has operated or 
of the fact that it is not managed any longer by the federal government or the delegated 
authorities. On the contrary, as local authority at DDF Sanchez Martinez emphasized, “as it 
is true that some tasks need to be done by the delegaciones, such as getting local 
communities more involved on air pollution issues, it is impossible to decentralised the 
automatic air quality network, simply because this would imply that every delegated unit 
would have to take care of every single monitoring station within its 
jurisdiction...something that is not acceptable”.
There are two aspects, however, that need to be addressed so as to keep the whole system 
properly working and to make it more accessible to the public: both involve relevant issues 
to Mexico City’s local government reorganisation. The first has to do with the transfer of 
the monitoring responsibilities from SEDESOL to DDF in 1992. Such a transfer had a 
negative impact on the training programme given by USEPA to Mexican technicians in 
relation to the use and maintenance of air quality equipment. Mr. Francisco J. Rivera Nava 
at DDF, who experienced the transfer, pointed out that as soon as the air quality monitoring 
functions became a local responsibility, USEPA cut down its financial assistance for these 
purposes. This local authority commented that currently there are not many specialists that 
are trained for using and maintaining this equipment; there are only eight people currently 
working at the RAMA Office and, according to him, the number should be increased. This 
interviewee said that if further devolution of power to local government was going to take 
place it should be accompanied by financial and technical assistance to avoid lack of 
continuity in the implementation of certain policies or programmes. In this case, the federal 
government should have ensured the continuation of this training programme.
A second aspect that requires some serious consideration is that of public accessibility to 
the information provided by the RAMA Office. According to the outcome of the interviews 
with local authorities at DDF, there seems to be no distribution of the air pollutants 
monitoring results to the delegated units in Mexico City. This particular situation - 
confirmed by the local authorities at the delegated units - prevents local communities in 
Mexico City from getting details of the air quality situation for the MZMC. Although the 
access to the RAMA Office for the results of the air quality situation is not ‘blocked’ to 
anyone who requests it - as personally experienced - a single office at the upper level of 
government for distributing them does not seem to be close and accessible enough for a 
population of more than eight million people in Mexico City, let alone for the whole
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MZMC. If one of the criteria for an adequate air quality system is that information should 
be continuous and accessible so as to alert the population of a pollution episode, then the 
intervention of the delegated units for information purposes could be extremely helpful. 
While media plays a major role in this, especially when a contingency plan needs to be 
implemented, there are vulnerable groups such as asmathics, the elderly, people with 
cardiovascular or respiratory problems, which regardless of a contingency situation, need 
to have information on pollution levels.
As confirmed by local authorities at the RAMA Office, although the costs for installing 
monitoring equipment is extremely high, the access to the information on the air quality 
situation is not, and could be easily reached by computer. The requirements for getting that 
information include the acquisition of a compatible PC computer (386 processor; 40 mb in 
the hard disk; 2mb in the memory) a modem, and a telephone line to call the DDF, which 
altogether are not expensive and are easy to get on the market. Once installed, the RAMA 
Office provide technical assistance for the operation of the system (see DDF 1994). The 
installment of 16 computers, each in one of the 16 delegated units, would certainly not 
represent an unthinkable expense for local budgeting, but would assist the DDF on its task 
of informing the population, especially the vulnerable groups whose interest is bigger than 
to the rest of the population. Media, as it happens in London, seems to report episodes only 
when the levels of pollution are extremely high (see also the survey results in Chapter V).
The public good dimension that the public choice model inserts into the discussion for 
reorganising structures of local government helps to fully understand, paradoxically, the 
advantages of an area-wide authority for managing air quality monitoring systems. The 
results in this section show that the system managed by one single authority has proved to 
be coordinated, efficient, and equally distributed. Transactions costs of the relationships of 
different participants involved in air quality management are reduced because information 
on the whole MZMC air quality situation can be obtained only from one authority. 
Additionally, air quality information is distributed equally (covers the whole metropolitan 
complex with standardised information) and efficiently (with reduced disseminating costs) 
by fax or computer (e.g. e-mail). It is important to note that the metropolitan coverage of 
the monitoring system was made possible through the financial equalisation that central 
government provided until 1992. This situation raises the question of whether the 
enhancement and maintenance of the whole monitoring system will only take place within 
Mexico City’s boundaries as the GDF does not have authority over surrounding 
municipalities. It is then worth considering the need for an area-wide organisation (larger 
than the GDF) to ensure that the system will continue operating as it has.
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7.3.2 Transportation and traffic management
As seen in Chapter II, among all the sources of air pollution in Mexico City, those that 
relate to oil fuel consumption are the most significant in terms of weight and toxicity. While 
industry remains as the prime polluter for such pollutants as SO2, road transport is the main 
polluter for other pollutants such as CO, NOx, and HC. Again, while private cars are the 
main source of pollution, they account for only 21.4% of the journeys in the Metropolitan 
Zone of Mexico City MZMC by mode of transport. All other journeys are distributed 
among other means of public transport such as buses, underground, trolleys and light 
trains (see Table 7.4).
Table 7.4 Journeys in Mexico City by mode of tran sp o rt
M ode D istribu tion  o f jou rneys (% )
Cars 21.4
Buses 3.8
Underground 3.2
Microbuses 42.0
Taxi 3.8
Other (light trains, trolleys, motorbikes) 5.8
NOTE: Overall percentage (100%) is not available 
Source: DDF (1995)
Since moving sources are regarded as the main cause of the problem most government 
strategies and non-governmental proposals have been oriented to prevent and control road 
transport emissions (see, for example, Bravo Alvarez 1993: 7; Calvillo 1993: 3-6 and 
1995; CMPCCAVM 1994a: II/12-II/27 and 1994c: 26-27, 65-69; DDF 1995: Greenpeace 
1993: 20-23; Quadri 1993: 10; SEDESOL 1993: 158-164 and 1994: 223-232; STI 1990: 
31). The government response to this problem has demanded considerable transport 
planning and traffic management restrictions in a city where for many years the use of the 
private vehicle has been favoured. An insufficient and corrupt public transportation system 
plus the new environmental demands of the 1990s has led the government of Mexico City 
to produce two major and integrated plans for the city (one in conjunction with federal 
authorities) to re-arrange and considerably increase the use of public transport but not 
without continuing to favour private vehicles. These two plans are the 1995 public 
transport and traffic management programme (Programa Integral de Transporte y Vialidad 
1995-2000), and the 1996 air quality programme for the Valley of Mexico jointly produced 
with federal agencies (Programa para Mejorar la Calidad del Aire en el Valle de Mexico
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1995-2000) (see DDF 1995 and 1996).
Diverse interviews with federal and local authorities in Mexico City showed the importance 
of the control of public transportation systems and diverse traffic management issues by an 
upper tier of government (such as the DDF). The latter sheds light on the issues of 
institutional coordination among different authorities for the whole MZMC, including 
municipalities and delegated units. The issue of social participation on transport policy 
formulation, though, was severely criticised by environmental groups which emphasized 
that their proposals have simply been ignored by the government.
The viewpoints of local authorities on transportation systems and traffic management issues 
are that these have to be controlled at a metropolitan level, and if they are not, at least at a 
Mexico City government level. First, the Director General for Environmental Projects at 
DDF, Mr. Sanchez Martinez, said that the reason why a metropolitan approach is required 
for road transport, is because it is very important to have “a detailed analysis of the impact 
that an action at a local level [lower tier] could have over its surrounding areas. For 
example, a head of a delegated unit might like to divert traffic from a conflictive junction 
within its politico-administrative boundaries, but because this may produce collateral effects 
creating additional traffic problems in the surroundings, a strategic authority such as DDF 
should intervene to solve the problem”.
Second, when addressing the issue of coordination among several units, the interviews 
show that there seems to be no major coordinating problems between the authorities at the 
DDF and the authorities at the delegated units which help to implement all traffic 
management policies. As explained before though, this has very much to do with the fact 
that all delegated authorities are subordinated and report to the Mayor. However, the 
relationships between DDF authorities and the other local authorities of the surrounding 
municipalities have produced some conflicts when enforcing policy issues regarding 
transportation and traffic management regulations. For example, Lacy Tamayo local 
authority at the DDF and member of the CMPCCAVM, explained that disobedience from 
lower tier authorities is less common within the Federal District boundaries than with some 
authorities at the municipal level in the MZMC. Mr. Lacy Tamayo said that “Municipal 
Presidents, as opposed to Delegados, are elected and thus sometimes like to show their 
independent status by not following or implementing some policies that are for the whole 
metropolis and not only for the municipality - this happens even if they are from the same 
political party of the Governor [of the federated state EdoMex]”. By way of illustration, 
when the programme ‘A Day Without a Car* was launched for the whole MZMC, the
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Municipal President of Cuautitlan Izcalli in the federated state EdoMex told the inhabitants 
within its territorial jurisdiction that the programme would not be enforced in that 
municipality.! Despite the fact that the predominant winds go precisely from the north to 
the centre of Mexico City transporting air pollutants emitted there, the reason given by that 
local authority was because the municipality was too far away from the affected or polluted 
area (see Map 4.2). According to Lacy Tamayo, this decision was clearly oriented to 
politico-electoral purposes as well as due to a lack of knowledge and strategic view of the 
problem. The decision taken by the Municipal President, though, was overturned and the 
programme started operating fully in the surrounding municipality of Cuautitlan Izcalli.
Third, although some federal and local authorities explained that future elected lower tier 
authorities in Mexico City may prolong policy discussion o r hinder the enforcement of 
policies because of politico-electoral reasons, the results of the fieldwork show that the 
1990 PICCA programme has been enforced across the whole MZMC. This situation, 
which has included the participation of elected municipalities of the surrounding federated 
state EdoMex, proves that democracy and increased autonomy of lower tier authorities (i.e. 
delegated units) may not be obstacles for implementing transportation and traffic 
management policies in a coordinated way. As local authority at DDF, G. Arrieta Lerdo de 
Tejada pointed out,
“...ideally, democracy will necessarily lead to a more 
efficient public administration...democracy will always 
guarantee a better government, and a better response of civil 
servants because if their response is not the adequate one, 
then voters could elect someone else. Thus, officers feel 
more committed to citizens in the delivery of services, 
implementation of actions, and so on”.
Nevertheless, Mr. Arrieta emphasized that by democratising Mexico City, some problems 
are likely to emerge given the politico-economic situation in the country in the short term, 
but not necessarily in the medium or longer terms. If democracy and accountability do not 
seem to prevent coordinated and effective action but to foster it, then concerted actions 
among all DDF and delegated units’ authorities become extremely important in order to
1 The legally-binding ‘A Day Without a Car’ programme Programa Hoy no Circula, consists of banning 
vehicles one working day a week according to the displayed colour of each vehicle’s licence. This 
programme, which initiated in November 1989, has been recently modified by the new 1996 air quality plan 
(see DDF 1996). The new measures allow newer cars (which have been produced since the year 1993) to be 
exempted from the banning regulations only if they approve the vehicle’s emissions test.
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achieve consensus and support from other federal or local elected authorities.
Most criticisms of public transport and traffic management policies by non-governmental 
organisations are either because the programmes themselves have lacked an integral vision 
for transport planning and traffic management, because corruption of local authorities has 
impeded the enforcement of many of them, or simply because society has not observed 
legal measures. Such is the case for the ‘A Day Without a Car* programme where motorists 
preferred bribing police officers than respecting environmental regulations. On the one 
hand, while statutory powers given to police forces were necessary in order to stop cars for 
being on the road on a prohibited working day or for ostensibly polluting, their traffic 
management responsibilities have not only taken time away from carrying out other security 
and criminal functions but have not been properly implemented. On the other hand, the fact 
that Mexico City’s inhabitants have bought a second-hand car since the implementation of 
the ‘A Day Without a Car’ plan, participated on a ‘bribing police’ attitude, as well as paid 
for emission control test licences without having a proper vehicles’ test, indicate the 
preference society also has for alleviating air pollution in the MZMC. Civil disobedience, as 
explained by federal and local authorities (including NGOs), stems from a mixed and 
complex set of issues. These involve economic and politico-electorate issues (e.g. public 
resistance to comply with governmental mandates), the way in which private vehicles have 
impacted on Mexican society, the lack of environmental awareness, and the need for an 
adequate and sufficient public transportation system. The latter corresponds with the results 
of the general survey carried out with local authorities in Mexico City (see Chapter V).
The continuous critique that environmental groups make of governmental actions for 
transportation systems and traffic management, is derived from the way the government 
has responded to their demands and proposals. Ms Barba Pirez, an environmentalist 
campaigner, explained that the enlargement of the motorways within and around Mexico 
City’s boundaries seemed to be linked to the embedded political and economic interests of 
present and past government authorities (central and local) which have shown no concern 
on environmental or local community issues. Presumably, since the building operators are 
owned by ex-officers of the last and former administrations, a small group of ex- and 
current authorities would financially benefit from these huge public works at the expense of 
Mexico City’s air quality situation.
The cases of public transport and traffic management issues in Mexico City constitute good 
examples that are relevant to the hierarchical and public choice approaches. This is because 
the various governmental agreements that exist within Mexico City and the MZMC are
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oriented to avoid externalities within the whole metropolitan area. The amount of 
coordination and consensus building of all authorities involved in diverse traffic 
management issues - for example banning cars one day a week - is also revealed in this 
section. It is of significant importance to highlight that the same concerns raised by local 
authorities in London about closing roads without consulting other local authorities and 
about the need to have a metropolitan approach in these matters in order to avoid spillovers, 
was also raised by the local authorities at the DDF. The conflicts that have arisen between 
DDF’s authorities and surrounding municipalities in the implementation of some traffic 
management issues again raises the issue of considering the need for a larger area-wide 
authority to deal with these matters within the whole metropolitan complex.
7.3.2 Emergency plan
The application of the contingency plan in Mexico City (Plan de Contingencias 
Ambientales) when critical episodes of air pollution occur, proves how relevant the 
existence of an upper tier of government can be for coordination purposes. Whether the 
plan has proved to accomplish its main objectives and thus contribute for better air quality 
standards in the MZMC seems to be a more debatable issue. The way in which official 
publications describe how the emergency plan is implemented leads one to believe that the 
governmental response in case of an episode is quick and well coordinated among public 
and private bodies. The application of the plan is initiated when the CMPCCAVM gets the 
information from the RAMA Office that the permissible levels of the index value IMECA 
have been reached. Once the CMPCCAVM decides to implement it according to pollution 
levels and meteorological conditions, the emergency alert is distributed in a ‘cascade’ 
system to all federal and local authorities in the DDF and the federated state EdoMex to 
comply with the regulations. Originally, the plan was divided up into three phases. Phase 1 
(called at 250 IMECA points) required a 30-40% cut in industrial emissions, a 50% 
reduction in the use of government vehicles, the halting of street repairs, and drivers were 
requested not to use their cars. Phase 2 (called at 350 IMECA points) required 50-75% cut 
of industrial emissions, schools were closed, and the ‘A Day without a Car’ programme 
was extended to two days a week. Phase 3 (called at 450 IMECA points) required basically 
all industry to stop their activities and the banning of the operation of any source of 
pollution. In practice though, these measures have been interchangeably implemented 
during Phases 1 and 2 (Phase 3 has never been activated) and have not always been 
enforced - especially regarding industry. At the time of writing, there are government 
discussions on whether calling at an emergency situation (Phase 1) should be lowered 
down to 200 IMECA points (see Barrera Echeverri et al 1993: 42-46; CMPCCAVM 1992:
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16-20 and 1995a: 85-86; DDF 1996: 232-237; Elsom 1996: 203; SEDESOL 1993: 166- 
167; 219-222).
In order to find out if the governmental description was accurate the interviews sought the 
authorities’ views on the functionality of the plan. The findings of the fieldwork in Mexico 
City confirmed that the level of coordination within federal and local authorities and the 
speed at which information is distributed across the MZMC when a contingency exists, are 
fairly high. Indeed, the interviewees at the RAMA Office at DDF said that the continuous 
information that the RAMA monitoring network provides is sent to the local authorities 
directly responsible for the implementation of the contingency plan. The time for informing 
authorities of the existence of a contingency and thus for the application of the emergency 
plan is between half an hour to one hour. The analysis of a possible emergency situation is 
made by central and local authorities between twelve and two o’clock in the afternoon; a 
period of two hours is what these authorities take for identifying a possible contingency 
occurrence.
Diverse federal authorities corroborated the speed at which information is distributed to 
them so as to implement the contingency plan according to their responsibilities. Mr. David 
Guidi at PROFEPA, for example, explained that the Secretary General at CMPCCAVM 
(headed by DDF local authority Eduardo Palazuelos at the time of interviewing) let them 
know about a contingency situation usually at two o’clock. In turn, PROFEPA notifies its 
inspectors (who carry portable radios) about the contingency and ask them to leave any 
other activities but those related to verifying that the industry is complying with a reduction 
in their productive processes depending on the phase of the plan. Those industries that 
signed an agreement for cooperating with the implementation of the emergency plan are 
usually notified by the CMPCCAVM or by PROFEPA by e-mail, fax or phone. According 
to federal authority, Mr. Guidi, it takes around half an hour to one hour for all inspectors 
concerned to start their industrial visits once the CMPCCAVM have notified them about the 
contingency. The effectiveness of PROFEPA inspections during the emergency alert, 
however, depends on the contingency duration. As federal authority Gonzalez Liquidamio 
at PROFEPA pointed out, “if the contingency lasts only 12 hours, it is very difficult for 
PROFEPA to visit the corresponding industries in all the MZMC; but if it lasts longer, then 
the required inspections are more likely to happen”.
Another example that shows the speed at which federal agencies get to know about an 
emergency situation is that given by Gustavo Olafz Fernandez, Director General of 
Environmental Health at Ssa (Direction General de Salud Ambiental). This federal
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authority explained that they usually receive the notification of a contingency situation from 
the DDF by phone. As soon as they get the information, they pass it through by fax or 
phone to other health organisations so they can act accordingly. The interview carried out 
with federal authority Olafz Fernandez took place late in the afternoon on 31st July 1995 
same day when there was an emergency situation. According to Olafz Fernandez, that day, 
the contingency started at one o’clock in the afternoon and by twenty past one, they already 
knew about it. By twenty to two in the afternoon they had already sent messages to all 
health authorities across the MZMC.
The importance of one single wide-authority for Mexico City which receives continuous 
information on levels of air pollution for the MZMC and which is in charge of 
disseminating the information to other public and private authorities when an emergency 
situation exists, is clear. If an adequate implementation of an emergency plan involves 
several activities across a huge metropolitan area like the MZMC (such as facilitating traffic 
speed, interruption of potholes activities and gardening and irrigation on traffic roads, and 
informing the population) the participation of lower tier authorities may be even more 
helpful in terms of speed and geographical coverage of local areas.
Despite the emergency plan for the MZMC seeming to be a well coordinated action, it has 
been criticised by academics and NGOs for the criteria being used to initiate the plan. 
Criticisms have focused on the fact that the threshold limits of the IMECA index value are 
too high compared to international values (see Chapter II). The outcome of the interviews 
showed a variety of answers on whether the plan has worked or not. While local authorities 
at DDF agree that the plan has worked because it has brought down high peaks of Ozone as 
well as informing the population about the emergency situation, federal authorities 
contradict themselves on its functionality. For instance, while federal authority D. Guidi at 
PROFEPA believes the plan adequately works in terms of bringing down the pollutants and 
for educational purposes, federal authorities Mr. Femandez-Bremauntz at SEMARNAP 
and Mr. Olafz Fernandez at Ssa have pointed out that the IMECA index value should be 
less tolerant. That is to say, the contingency plan for the case of Ozone should start when 
pollution levels reach 200 IMECA points (or even before) and not when they reach 250 
IMECA. Environmental groups and academics joined these two interviewees in criticising 
the inadequacy of the IMECA criterion values according to international standards and 
human health purposes. It must be noted, though, that the contingency plan has 
successfully operated in terms of reducing car use, lowering down industrial activities, and 
making people aware of the air quality situation. It has to be emphasized that, as 
environmental campaigner Calvillo at Greenpeace said, whatever the actions are, they must
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be preventive and not aiming at resolving the problem.
The case for the implementation of the contingency plan in Mexico City as presented here 
reveals the importance of ensuring a coordinated and equal governmental (and non­
governmental) response to the problem as envisaged by the orthodox model. The latter can 
be clearly seen when an emergency alert is officially launched through a ‘cascade’ system 
initiated by the CMPCCAVM. The successful implementation of all measures in such a 
plan needs the even and quick cooperation of all political units in a metropolitan complex in 
order to avoid the externalities that may be created by some units, who are not willing to 
take part as they do not suffer from the pollution that is originated either within their 
jurisdiction or in other areas of the metropolitan area.
7.4 Conclusion
The outcome of the semi-structured interviews carried out in Mexico City suggests that the 
existence of one single city-wide authority for the whole Federal District - the DDF - has 
facilitated the government response to air quality management across the MZMC. This area- 
wide body has allowed a coordinated and strategic approach for managing air quality 
issues, particularly regarding monitoring systems, transport and traffic management, and 
the implementation of the emergency plan. The advantages of this situation, though, have 
been underpinned by the fact that the DDF has not been democratically elected and thus has 
not represented neither Mexico City inhabitants nor non-governmental groups’ views. 
While devolution of power from the federal to the local government is required, improving 
air quality could be maintained and fostered in a more democratic system. Such increase in 
local authorities’ air pollution responsibilities, however, needs to be accompanied either by 
financial and statutory powers, or by the possibility of Mexico City’s authorities to 
celebrate coordination agreements with the federal government for financial, technical or 
personnel assistance. Additionally, a clearer legislation on distribution of functions in this 
regard would facilitate the implementation and enforcement of policies by the federal and 
local government.
Although heavy intervention by federal government agencies continues, the participation of 
local authorities regarding air quality management issues (e.g. DDF and EdoMex) have 
increased. Yet, central and local authorities have failed to create the institutional 
mechanisms to make community participation possible and accessible during the process of 
policy discussion for improving air quality. On the one hand, while the created 
metropolitan commission - CMPCCAVM - has not always achieved concerted action
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among all government participants, it has commonly ignored non-governmental and 
academic proposals on improving air quality. On the other hand, while the political reform 
process on reorganising the structures of local government in Mexico City have addressed 
the importance of citizen participation by means of creating democratically elected units of 
government, it has failed to include air quality management concerns in the debate. At the 
time of interviewing, there was no discussion either on enlarging the scale of the current 
GDF government unit, or on creating a metropolitan authority for the whole MZMC for 
managing diverse air quality issues. Furthermore, the findings did not show which 
functions within the current air quality management strategy can actually be allocated to the 
delegated units in Mexico City when they become elected authorities. The participation of 
lower tier authorities seemed adequate only for disseminating air quality information in their 
own local areas as well as for channelising citizen’s demands to upper levels of 
government.
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C H A P T E R  VIII
Conclusions and Further Avenues for Research
“There are two main responsibilities fo r  big city mayors. One is to be a political 
leader and to represent the city ideals and dreams fo r  a best future. The second is 
to be a good manager o f technical solutions to city problems...
Jaime Ravinet (current Mayor o f Santiago
de Chile).
8.1 Introduction
This research was written with the objective of contributing to the understanding of local 
government studies as well as of air quality policy research. By adopting a comparative 
approach which looked at two local case-studies (London and Mexico City), the thesis 
sought to address and analyse how local government operates in relation to air quality 
management and considering this in the light of diverse models of local government. The 
first four chapters (Chapters I-IV) provided a descriptive and analytical insight into air 
quality management issues and diverse approaches of local government - including a 
description of the current local structural arrangements in both case-studies. The three 
following chapters (Chapters V-VII) then sought to examine the viewpoints of central and 
local authorities and other key policy actors on the organisation of local government in 
London and Mexico City in relation to air pollution control.
The aim of this final chapter is not to repeat the conclusions presented at the end of each of 
the chapters but to draw them together. The first section draws together the main 
differences and similarities between the two case studies. The second section looks at the 
applications of the models of local government to air quality management (as discussed in 
Chapter III) and re-examines them in the light of the empirical material. The last section 
highlights the most relevant findings in the thesis and includes a brief section on further 
avenues for research.
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8.2 Main findings: a comparison
The findings of the two local case-studies examined in this thesis resulted in a series of 
similarities and differences. First, when exploring air quality regimes either under a single 
or comparative basis, attention needs to be paid to how society and government perceive 
and look at air pollution in a particular urban location. Determining whether or not poor air 
quality exists and thus what levels of pollution are permissible (commonly through 
domestic air quality bands and guidelines) is at least in part the result of social and political 
constructions. Indeed, levels of air pollution, types of air pollutants, and adverse effects on 
the health and welfare of human beings and the environment, can differ considerably from 
city to city according to scientific data and still be considered issues of much concern: just 
as it happens in the cases of London and Mexico City. So, for example, whereas in 
London concentrations of diverse air pollutants have breached the WHO health guidelines 
only a few times and vis-a-vis in Mexico City have regularly exceeded those threshold 
limits, air pollution is regarded as an urban environmental priority in both cities. The fact 
that two cities as distinct as London and Mexico City suffer from perceived poor air quality 
(albeit the scale of the problem is diverse in each case) shows that there may exist some 
interconnection between scientific evidence and social judgements in urban centres, 
irrespective of their wealth or geographical location, either from a developed or developing 
country.
Second, managing air quality in London and Mexico City has been largely the result of the 
way in which the UK and Mexican central governments have respectively addressed and 
responded to it. Similarities and differences in this regard, though, are linked to a distinct 
historical process in the evolution of air pollution in each country. The UK’s impressive 
record to recognise and respond to environmental degradation (e.g. by creating the first 
world’s environmental agency in 1863 and enacting the world’s first comprehensive air 
pollution control Act in 1956) can be seen as a logical outcome of a process of 
industrialisation that took place first in Britain and thus such a response. While during the 
1950s and 1960s levels of traditional air pollutants started to decline in London, they 
started to increase in Mexico City as soon as industrial development began to rapidly grow 
within and outside the city during these two decades (see Chapter II). However, the 1970s 
represents for both cities the beginning of rising levels of air pollution from a similar 
source: road transport emissions.
What is important to highlight during this last three decades of UK and Mexican 
government policy response, is that although high levels of pollution started to increase in
206
these two urban centres during the 1970s and 1980s, both national governments were slow 
to react and showed environmental lethargy, apathy or ignorance on their successive 
administrations. Whereas the UK government had a piecemeal, incoherent and incremental 
response to air pollution, the Mexican government had a heavily centralised, non- 
democratic and specific or sectorial response to it. In any case, both situations led the UK 
and Mexico into a confused jungle of institutions and laws regarding air quality 
management issues. It was not until the 1990s, that a more integrated response to 
environmental problems, and thus to air pollution, took place in both countries. This time, 
the Mexican government first officially recognised air pollution as an environmental priority 
in 1986 and launched a strict and integrated plan to control air pollution in 1990 through 
PICCA (which was enhanced and updated in 1996). By contrast, the British government 
took air pollution up to the highest priorities of its public policy agenda only in 1994 and, 
few years later, laid down the principles of a more coherent air quality management strategy 
in 1997 through the NAQS (see, for more details, Branes 1994: 83-85, 117-118; DoE 
1996 and 1997; Gonzalez Marquez & Cancino Aguilar 1994: 36-37; Liverman 1993: 228; 
McCormick 1991: 9-10; O’Riordan & Weale 1990: 12).
Third, the main source of air pollution in London and Mexico City is road transport 
emissions, particularly from private vehicles. Although industry is still a significant source 
of pollution in the case of Mexico City, the main pollution control policies in both cities 
need to be oriented to the improvement of public transport systems and stricter traffic 
management regulations. As car ownership and car use continue to grow in both urban 
centres, though, alternative traffic management measures and improved public transport 
may be offset by increasing levels of road transport emissions. Interestingly, while the 
number of cars continues to grow rapidly in London and Mexico City, the design of the air 
quality management strategies in both cities are largely influenced by the own UK and 
Mexican government’s long-standing commitments to road building and a relatively long 
period of under-investment in public transport. The widening of London’s orbital 
motorway (the M25) to 14 lanes along its busiest roads and the expansion of Mexico City’s 
metropolitan orbital motorway which surrounds the MZMC, exemplify the importance road 
building programmes have for these two countries. As the London’s M25, the new MZMC 
orbital motorway is intended to serve long distance traffic and reduce congestion problems 
in the metropolitan area. It is quite likely, though, that the latter will generate, like 
whenever new roads are built, more traffic and thus increased environmental pressure on to 
the Valley of Mexico City. The recent take-over by a Labour government in the UK, raises 
the question whether there will be a change in London post 1997 regarding road building 
schemes; similarly, the democratic process that Mexico City’s system of local government
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is undergoing (e.g. directly elected authorities) raises the question whether major road 
building projects will continue or not.
Fourth, the capacity of the existing air quality monitoring networks are different in each 
case. While both networks comprise manual and real time monitoring equipment, Mexico 
City’s automatic system is much more advanced and sophisticated than the one that exists 
in London. Despite this distinction, both monitoring networks have been subjected to some 
criticism due to the particular location of their air quality monitoring stations. Apart from 
this, the London system has also been criticised due to the limited number of real time 
monitoring sites and the lack of a complete, comprehensive and standardised air quality 
database. An adequate air quality monitoring network (like the one that operates in Mexico 
City) requires not only comprehensive and standardised databases, but a coordinated 
system which can provide continuous and accurate information on diverse pollutants. 
While there is not a single rule to determine the number and location of monitoring sites, 
these should, at least, cover and be evenly situated across the whole metropolitan area.
One final point that arises from this comparative study, is that while national air quality 
standards are stricter in London than in Mexico City for several pollutants, there are similar 
concerns on the way in which air pollution concentration is banded in both cities. In the 
case of London, two of the most relevant criticisms to the current DETR’s air quality 
criteria (banded as ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘poor’, ‘very poor’) are that it is too wide and 
vague and does not account for mixtures of pollutants. Likewise, in the case of Mexico 
City, criticisms to the MZMC air quality criteria (banded as IMECA: each pollutant equal to 
100 points) indicated that the bands are too wide and do not take into account all the 
synergetic effects of all mixtures of pollutants. While air quality bands have been criticised 
in both urban centres for being too tolerant, which in turn, make pollution episodes less 
likely to occur, an immediate response to high levels of air pollution through an emergency 
programme (i.e. contingency plan) has only been developed in Mexico City as such 
episodes have recurrently breached Mexican air quality guidelines.
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Table 8.1 Local governm ent organisation  in London and  Mexico City by the year 2000
London 
(as G reater London)
M exico C ity 
(as the F ederal D istrict)
Executive: Mayor + GDF
System
of NO legislative body Legislative: ALDF
local governm ent
NO supreme court Judiciary: TSJDF
U pper tier: U pper tie r:
Greater London Authority Federal District Government
GLA: GDF:
T iers Mayor + Assembly Mayor + Centralised,
of Deconcentrated, Paraestatal Units
local governm ent
Lower tier: Low er tie r:
33 local units 16 local units
(32 boroughs & City of (16 units with municipal
London) status)
D irect elections D irec t elections
(1 year in 4): (every 6 years):
D em ocratic  system Mayor Mayor
+ +
Assembly
i
All 16 local units
T
All 33 local units also: ALDF (every 3 years)
Source: Various
Before turning into the applications of the models of local government to air quality 
management, it is important to make some concluding comments regarding the structures of 
local government in London and Mexico City. As seen in Chapter IV, the two urban 
centres differ from each other in a number of organisational respects (see also Table 8.1). 
Both case studies, however, provide a substantial basis for making some useful 
generalisations about the formation and development of two distinct local government 
regimes during the 1990s. The common elements found in this research can be summarised 
in two main points. First, there exists in both cases continuous pressure for governmental 
changes. While such changes are being certainly influenced by the specific and embedded 
historical characteristics of each city, they seem to be equally oriented to strengthen local
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authorities by means of creating more democratic units of local government. Second, the 
idea of creating and/or democratising local units of government is leading to the adoption, 
by the turn of the millennium, of a variant of a metropolitan scheme as discussed in Chapter 
III. In London, the concept of a metropolitan authority is reproduced with the creation of 
the GLA which will jointly operate with the boroughs in a number of functions. Although 
this new area-wide unit will not be the kind of large-scale authority that existed in the past 
with lots of staff and powers (e.g. former LCC and GLC), it will be a metropolitan 
strategic authority. In Mexico City, the new local government reorganisation (i.e. the 
possibility to directly elect the Mayor and the local mayors of the 16 delegated units, both 
with a range of powers) resembles a variant of a ‘top-heavy’ metropolitan government. The 
process of structural reorganisation in London and Mexico City that has taken place over 
the last decade, has been accompanied with some devolution of power from the central to 
the local level (both at the upper and lower tiers) but it has not always included financial 
support mechanisms.
The next section examines the operation of local government in relation to air quality 
management. This is considered in terms of the models of local government as explained in 
Chapter III and re-examined in the light of the empirical material. It is important to 
acknowledge that the discussion on reforming local government in London has been 
invigorated by air quality concerns vis a vis lack of debate in the case of Mexico City.
8.3 Corollary: the need for a metro scheme for improving air quality?
In some respects, the picture that emerged from the two cases studies of how local 
government operates in relation to air quality management is fairly consistent with some 
organisational assumptions that are found in the literature on local government. The 
empirical work brings into light the advantages and disadvantages that the organisation of 
local government in each city has for dealing with air pollution as well as some of the 
lessons that can be learned for best governmental practice. It is clear that the empirical 
material showed the need for an area-wide coordinating authority for managing air quality 
with some joint participation of lower-tier authorities. Hence, the results in both case- 
studies suggests that contemporary local government practice fits better with the 
‘hierarchical’ than the ‘market’ or ‘network’ approaches. However, in the case of London 
(and to a much lesser extent in the case of Mexico City) there are some issues that can also 
be associated with the local governance approach. This section thus presents some of the 
most significant aspects of the empirical material in connection with the orthodox and local 
governance approaches and concludes by commenting on the relevance (advantages and
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disadvantages) to this and future research on air quality of the three models as outlined in 
Chapter IE.
In London, the current system of local government has implied institutional fragmentation, 
strong central government intervention, public-private partnerships and private networks 
when dealing with air pollution. The findings of the interviews suggest that such a system 
of political fragmentation at the local government level has created a number of metropolitan 
problems or concerns as identified by both the traditional orthodox and the local 
governance perspectives. First, conventional thinking argues that a fragmented system of 
local government can create problems of equity and financial equalisation among diverse 
local units. It seems that these two problems are manifested among the London boroughs in 
relation to diverse components of the air quality management system which have broad 
catchment areas. This is because some boroughs have had more financial resources, or 
simply, because air pollution has been regarded as a priority by the local authority. A clear 
example of this is the type of monitoring equipment that is managed by each borough. 
Being one of the leading boroughs in London for local air quality management initiatives, 
the City of Westminster, for example, has both the political interest and the resources to 
locally run its own expensive but fairly accurate monitoring system - OPSIS. At the time of 
interviewing, very few boroughs actually had their own automatic equipment. Although 
one of the main reasons why boroughs would not buy this equipment was the lack of 
statutory powers upon monitoring; now that they got such powers they still have not got 
enough resources for acquiring such equipment. As the central government has failed to 
provide financial support on this matter (leaving the local monitoring system as a non­
harmonised network), an area-wide body according to traditional assumptions would be 
able to shoulder local authorities’ expenses on air quality monitoring stations. The new 
metropolitan authority for London - the GLA - may solve some of the problems of 
promoting equity and financial equalisation across London (for monitoring and other broad 
catchment subfunctions) as long as it proves to be a politically impartial body. This is 
important simply because if the GLA benefits only those boroughs which are their political 
allies and/or bows to political pressure from the central government to do so, then equity 
and financial equalisation will not be obtainable.
Second, traditional orthodox views assume that the issues of community and lifestyles are 
involved in determining which issues have a metro or localised character. The outcome of 
the fieldwork in London seems to corroborate the fact that air pollution is basically an area- 
wide issue. Those aspects that within an air quality management system are ‘purely’ local 
in nature proved to be few. Thus, much of the subfunctions in the prime responsibilities of
211
an air quality management system (e.g. public transport system, traffic management issues, 
police, monitoring systems) were regarded as exclusively metropolitan or, in any case, 
concurrent. From a two-tier perspective, this means that an upper tier of government 
should in principle be the ideal body to take charge of most air pollution functions. In 
defining the responsibilities of the GLA, the recent government’s White Paper ‘A Mayor 
and Assembly for London’ resembles (under conventional assumptions) a ‘top-heavy’ 
metro scheme for air quality matters. It is only very few sub-functions, such as commuter 
railways or parking regulations, where the GLA will have little influence. Interestingly, the 
system that existed of concurrent powers shared by the former GLC and the boroughs 
regarding air quality monitoring and measurement functions (GLC 1983), will be re­
installed as soon as the GLA starts operating.
Third, the empirical work clearly showed that air pollution in London needs to be tackled 
within a comprehensive or integrated fashion. According to conventional assumptions, the 
concept of metropolitan-local division recognised by metro systems can make an integrated 
functional management response to diverse services possible. In principle, the 
concentration of a whole function (or most of it) in one unit simplifies coordination and 
reduces boundary frictions. Precisely, one of the main concerns that was found in London 
was not only the need of an integrated response, but the lack of coordination among 
boroughs, and among boroughs with other governmental and area-wide units. Not 
surprisingly, the main government reasons outlined for the creation of the GLA were about 
the need to provide a coordinated and ‘strategic leadership* unit where issues such as 
transport and air quality could be tackled at a London-wide level (see DETR 1997b).
Fourth, the gap that was found in terms of coordination and standardisation of many air 
quality management aspects, largely explains the emergence of diverse and alternative city- 
wide units across London. This, in turn, explains the existence of a complex set of 
institutions and actors (drawn from, but also beyond, government as envisaged by the local 
governance perspective) and the liaison jungle in which all of them operate. Although in the 
past local authorities in London provided local services with other agencies, the range of 
responsibilities that they held made them dominant within the overall system. This situation 
has changed with the lessening of the role of local authorities in London within the 
governance structure. As assumed by orthodox views, without a city-wide coordinating 
authority at the metropolitan level, the responsibility of some air quality London-wide 
functions has inevitably passed to central government and to other non-governmental area- 
wide bodies.
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Finally, the results of the empirical investigation in London showed that some of the 
dilemmas or critical issues that are embedded within the local governance perspective as 
outlined by Stoker (1996b), are present in the current system of local government in 
London when dealing with air pollution. The main dilemmas include not only a clear need 
for a more democratic, accountable and legitimate system for managing air quality, but one 
in which local authorities may provide strategic leadership to coordinate local networks (see 
also Stewart & Stoker 1995b: 195; Newman & Thomley 1997: 984). It is important to note 
that the reasons that the British government has given for creating the GLA, resemble in 
many ways (albeit some existing differences) those that two-tier advocates have partly used 
for justifying the existence of metro schemes. Such reasons include: the need to fill the 
democratic deficit created by the abolition of the GLC in 1985, to provide strong strategic 
leadership, and to restore accountability (see DETR 1997b and 1998). Interestingly, these 
three particular aspects are regarded within the local governance perspective as critical 
issues which need to be addressed and solved. Thus, while an effective air quality 
management strategy in London should imply a more democratic accountability system 
(where power-holders are to be seen legitimate), there is a fundamental need to re-consider 
traditional orthodox assumptions in order to reduce the existing gap or divorce between the 
system of governance and the normative codes used to explain and justify government. 
Eventually, this may lead to a redefinition of such concepts as democracy, accountability 
and legitimacy.
Moving on to Mexico City, the discussion on reforming the structures of local government 
in this urban centre has not included air quality concerns (see Chapter IV). Nevertheless, in 
the light of the models of local government, the analysis of the results of how an area-wide 
coordinating authority in Mexico City has managed air quality provide some interesting 
findings when they are compared with the case of London. There are three main aspects 
regarding Mexico City’s response to air pollution that need to be highlighted. First, Mexico 
City’s system of local government is not as politically fragmented as London and operates 
with a lower degree of public-private partnerships and private networks (i.e. the 
governance perspective is less applicable). This is because air pollution in Mexico City has 
been basically a policy issue subjected to considerable governmental intervention, either 
from the central government or the DDF (now the GDF). Although the role of 
democratically elected local authorities may be strengthened within the governance 
structure, strong central government intervention is likely to remain in both urban centres. 
Second, although the findings in the interviews showed that in London and Mexico City 
there is strong central government intervention on air pollution matters, the underlying 
reasons for this are different. Whereas central government intervention on air quality issues
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in London has grown largely due to political fragmentation at the local government level, in 
Mexico City such intervention has been due to the fact that air pollution was traditionally, 
until 1988, a federal function by constitutional mandate. Finally, while there is a 
fundamental need for a more democratic, accountable and legitimate system of local 
government in both urban centres, the underlying reasons for this are also different. While 
in London the latter mainly comes from an increased number of non-democratic area-wide 
agencies and public-private partnerships, in Mexico City it derives from the fact that the 
capital has been for long governed by a non-democratic, area-wide and mainly centrally 
created government unit.
The outcome of how Mexico City’s local government operates in relation to air quality 
management brings into light some interesting issues that relate to the traditional orthodox, 
public choice and local governance perspectives. First, orthodox views suggest that while 
the issues of equity and financial equalisation may be operated by both the central 
government and a metro authority, the latter has the advantage of also having greater local 
knowledge and accountability. In the case of Mexico City, the first part of this assumption 
proved to be right: the metropolitan problems of equity and financial equalisation were not 
issues of concern as most of the aspects which have broad catchment areas of the air quality 
management system were either under the responsibility of the central government or the 
GDF. However, the second part did not apply accordingly. The fact that the central 
government set up, for example, an effective, comprehensive and standardised air quality 
network system, suggests that the creation of a metro scheme cannot always be justified 
simply because local authorities have greater knowledge. Even more, in order to favour 
metro schemes over central government on accountability grounds, local authorities need to 
be democratically elected - something that did not happened in Mexico City until July 1997. 
Thus, such orthodox assumptions can only be relevant for creating a metro scheme in those 
urban centres where local authorities have been traditionally responsible for diverse air 
quality management subfimctions and can actually be accountable to the local electorate.
Second, while the findings corroborated the fact that air pollution is an area-wide issue, it 
did not show which aspects within an air quality management system should be 
functionally allocated to the delegated units in Mexico City. The only two issues where the 
participation of lower-tier authorities became evident were the issues of disseminating air 
quality information in their own local areas and of acting as organisations for channelising 
citizen’s demands to other levels of government. As suggested by public choice theorists, 
the monopolistic position that is likely to exist with a single governmental unit in a 
metropolitan area was present in the case of the former DDF. This was clearly manifested
214
with the 1990 air quality management strategy where only very few (non-democratic and 
centrally appointed) local government individuals participated with other central and 
EdoMex authorities. Other overtly monopolistic behaviour by the former DDF relates to the 
issues of access and distribution of certain type of information - particularly regarding 
morbidity and mortality rates within the MZMC. On the one hand, there clearly existed a 
lack of motivation and weak political will from the DDF authorities (including also the 
EdoMex) to be more responsive, to carry out or stimulate research on air pollution effects 
onto human beings. On the other hand, ample fragmentation of authority and overlapping 
jurisdictions where competition may be engendered to constrain the monopolistic behaviour 
of local authorities (as argued by public choice theorists), do not seem to ensure a solution 
to the problems of access and distribution of health information. Indeed, the empirical 
evidence showed that although still strictly confined to the world of academia, there are 
several universities and medical institutions that are carrying out that kind of research. 
Public access from and distribution by metro authorities may be significantly a matter of 
pure political convenience, which has more to do with political competition (i.e. electoral 
matters) or responsibility avoidance, than with competitive and rivalry practices as 
envisaged by public choice advocates.
Third, while the need to create proper lower-tier authorities in the DF was evident for 
democratic and government-people proximity purposes, the existence of an area-wide 
authority operating in the whole DF proved to be quite convenient in terms of coordination 
for implementing diverse air quality measures. An integrated and coordinated government 
response to air pollution across an urban centre which requires an even participation of all 
local units, could be delayed or opposed under a system of jurisdictional fragmentation 
where local authorities may act according to their own political priorities and interests. Such 
was the case with one of the many DF’s surrounding municipalities of the EdoMex which 
showed resistance in relation to the implementation of ‘A Day Without a Car’ plan for the 
entire MZMC.
Fourth, the set up of a non-governmental area-wide unit - the CMPCCAVM - for the whole 
of the MZMC resembles in many ways what the orthodox tradition envisages as one of the 
many approaches to confront political fragmentation through cooperation among local 
governments: the metropolitan council (see Chapter III). Although the CMPCCAVM did 
not arise only from local institutions, this area-wide mechanism has been constituted as a 
forum for deliberation and discussion as well as an advising and coordinating organisation 
for managing air quality and other environmental issues in the MZMC. The findings in the 
empirical work, though, showed that consensus and concerted action among all participants
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was sometimes difficult to achieve. This situation seems to suggest that under a politically 
fragmented system as envisaged by public choice theorists, bargained or cooperative 
agreements for tackling air pollution would be even more problematic. It also suggests that 
if an existing metropolitan authority such as the former DDF is not large enough to contain 
the metropolitan system (i.e. an area of one or more urban centres affected by bad air 
quality) an organisation like the CMPCCAVM facilitates a quick governmental response to 
an emerging urban environmental problem - especially if no major local government 
reorganisation in a given metropolitan area is desired. Despite the flaws that are likely to 
appear with the creation of these type of organisations, the CMPCCAVM has the enormous 
advantage of bringing together metropolitan as well as state and central government bodies 
into one forum of discussion. The analysis of the results, thus, suggest that the best way to 
manage and coordinate air quality in a large metropolitan area is to reduce the number of 
government representatives. Ideally, though, these representatives must be democratically 
elected, and should allow other organisations to participate on air quality issues, such as 
affected surrounding local units, NGOs, or the private sector, in order to make the 
decision-making process as inclusive as possible.
Finally, while Mexico City’s local authorities seemed to be operating in a complex and 
growing system of local governance, its system of local government (as already seen) is 
clearly a weak example of the dilemmas that are present within the local governance 
perspective when compared to the case of London. Indeed, the empirical work showed that 
the delivery and control of contracted out services in Mexico City, as well as the strategic 
decision-making, were still very much within the domain of governmental structures 
(central and/or local) and not of private or voluntary networks. This does not imply that 
there were not private actors delivering public services. Such services as taxis or mini­
buses are some of the areas of the system of public transport that have been subjected to 
some kind of contracting out. Likewise, all vehicles’ emissions tests are carried out by 
private operators that have been given permission (or rather a concession) to provide such 
service. While some public-private partnerships are likely to emerge in the near future 
(particularly after the 1997 local elections), the local government was still acting as the main 
responsible for city-management issues and public services provision. Even more, the 
former DDF certainly occupied a quite sovereign position and strategic leadership in 
relation to other key policy players despite existing tensions and difficulties with other 
central government units or institutions of civil society.
Summing up, although there is a need to move beyond the orthodox territory so as to 
widen the understanding on how local authorities operate in relation to air quality
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management, traditional assumptions (particularly the metro scheme approach) still provide 
a viable set of arguments about how to reorganise local government organisational 
structures to improve air quality (see Self 1997: 19; Stoker 1996a: 20). By contrast, the 
application of the public choice model to air quality management in terms of organisational 
structures is limited partly because this model takes as its starting point the diversity of 
individual preferences and the diverse nature of goods and services rather than the 
organisation structure (see Bish & Ostrom 1973: 17). However, as long as public choice 
assumptions discuss orthodox views, it provides a valuable approach for analysing how 
local government works regarding air quality management. While the existing range of 
policy responses to air pollution reinforces the ‘hierarchical’ approach, the current 
configuration of air quality as a public good emphasizes the externalities (negative and 
positive) and transactions costs that are associated with the public choice model which in 
turn leads one to consider the need for a metropolitan-type agency. Finally, the local 
governance approach provides an organising framework for understanding the complex 
and growing system of ‘networks’ in which local governments may be operating. The latter 
may assist in considering diverse alternatives for managing air quality through, for 
example, community groups or local networks (e.g. cycling groups) promoting 
behaviourial change. In suggesting a new code for challenging past hierarchical and 
conventional modes of thinking, the local governance perspective assists in distinguishing 
diverse issues that local authorities need to take into account in their dealings with air 
pollution control.
8.4 Further avenues for research
This section seeks to identify those important and related areas of analysis which were not 
covered in this research due to time and space limitations. It mentions the modest 
contribution that a comparative study like this brings into local government studies and air 
quality policy research as well as commenting on the most relevant aspects that were 
experienced during the fieldwork process in London and Mexico City.
The conclusions of this study confirmed four major existing gaps in the academic literature 
on local government studies and air quality research that were identified in Chapter I. First, 
although there are some comparative exercises on local government organisational 
structures (especially among Western societies), these are scarce within a North-South 
context. Second, there is very limited research in London and Mexico City (including 
comparative studies) on revising diverse proposals or models for local government reform 
in the light of the emerging urban environmental demands of the 1990s. Third, although
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diverse aspects of air quality management systems have been increasingly analysed, there 
have been very few comparative exercises in this regard. Finally, there is still limited 
research on how diverse systems of local government operate in order to improve air 
quality and bring about urban sustainability. This thesis makes a contribution towards 
closing these gaps but more research in each area still remains to be done.
The aftermath of doing a comparative study in London and Mexico City showed that while 
such an exercise enhances the understanding of the areas of analysis - e.g. local 
government systems and air quality management strategies - it also diminishes the 
possibility of making a more detailed examination of each case-study. This is partly 
explained due to the existing formal constraints of time and word extension when carrying 
out a PhD research, and partly because comparative exercises commonly demand paying 
less attention to specific technicalities but scanning for more general and comparative 
accounts. Clearly, London and Mexico City’s local organisational structures and air quality 
management systems would benefit from further analysis in order to review more fully 
how local government in these two cities operates in relation to air pollution particularly 
under the emerging systems of local governance.
Although the empirical data suggested the need for a variation of a metro scheme for 
dealing with air pollution (see Chapters V-VII), it does not prove definitively that with an 
area-wide authority (and lower-tier units) the problems of coordination, strategic leadership 
and representation, democracy and accountability, and public participation will be solved. 
Furthermore, some problems that the metro model will invariably have to face for 
managing air quality include functional allocation across different tiers of government 
(central, upper-tier and lower-tier), the metropolitan area to be covered, access to financial 
resources, and political strength of the metro authority vis a vis central government. It did 
show, however, that the best possible scenario across the whole local government 
organisational spectrum for better dealing with air pollution is the creation and adoption of 
some type of the metro scheme. This implies that in order to examine even further the 
implications of how diverse local organisational structures influence the capacity to address 
and ameliorate air pollution, there is a need to create a framework (not included in this 
research) for assessing governmental efficiency under diverse types of governmental 
arrangements. Thus, an area that also needs to be addressed in future studies includes 
setting up performance indicators to measure efficiency and effectiveness according to each 
local authorities own air quality management objectives.
From a theoretical point of view, although there are many issues in relation to air quality
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management that were raised in the thesis (particularly regarding public transportation 
systems and traffic management) they were not all addressed within the theories explained 
in Chapter m  due to space limitations. Further research on the analysis of such theories and 
air pollution need to take into account air quality management aspects raised in this study in 
order to interrogate the weaknesses of all approaches as well as to take the best from each 
of them for best governmental practice.
The analysis of the outcome of this research also showed that despite the similarities and 
differences that may exist between two or more distinct urban centres across the world, it is 
possible to carry out a pragmatic, empirically-based and comparative study. While this 
thesis acknowledges some methodological limitations and weaknesses on the part of the 
need for a more detailed description of each case-study and a wider explanation of diverse 
models of local government, it also provides an enhanced understanding of some of the 
steps that are required for doing comparative studies. Certainly, one of the most important 
aspects of the latter is the need to carry out empirical fieldwork in the urban areas that are 
subjected to analysis. In so doing, one must be prepared to experience a number of 
unexpected events and to adapt to diverse procedures both for collecting data from 
governmental and non-governmental bodies and carrying out structured and semi­
structured interviews. So, for example, in the case of London, all the semi-structured 
interviews were carried out as scheduled and on the arranged date and time. By contrast, in 
Mexico City, while carried out as scheduled, at least half of the semi-structured interviews 
with central and local authorities were either postponed for a following day or usually never 
on time (i.e. would take place one or even two hours later). It is also of utmost importance 
to take into account that both, updating interviews and data collection, may be fundamental 
during the whole PhD research process.
Finally, a question that was not addressed in this present study is the examination of social 
consciousness and/or public participation on air quality aspects precisely because much of 
the problems of air pollution is originated by motorists. This would inevitably involve 
analysis on diverse mechanisms for increasing environmental education; for example, 
through disseminating information containing the dangers that air pollution may cause to 
human beings, flora and fauna, and the built environment. London and Mexico City 
inhabitants require environmental awareness on air quality management issues so they can 
make a proper use of their motor vehicles and/or switch to other means of public transport. 
However, it is the ignorance and apathy of some government authorities (at central and 
local levels) which is in more urgent of being addressed.
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8.5 Conclusion
By the year 2000, London and Mexico City will continue to suffer from perceived poor air 
quality. While in the near future the levels of air pollution concentration may not increase 
from current levels, it is quite unlikely that any significant improvement will take place in 
any of these two urban centres. Although few pollution episodes may be experienced in 
London in the coming years (particularly during the wintertime) it is far from suffering the 
high and health-risk levels of pollution that exist in Mexico City. In spite of available 
(though still limited) information on present morbidity and mortality rates in these two 
cities, the UK and Mexican governments have not changed their policies toward road 
building expansion which has in turn favoured the use of private vehicles over public 
transportation systems. London and Mexico City car users* have not significantly shifted as 
yet to other means of transport so as to make a positive impact on bringing down air 
pollution levels. Seemingly, this situation is not expected to change in the short time.
The process of local government reorganisation that is currently taking place in London and 
Mexico City is leading local authorities in these two cities to further their participation on 
diverse air quality management issues. The adoption of metro schemes in both urban 
centres does not guarantee achieving and maintaining healthy urban air quality in the short 
term, but it is certainly a step in the right direction for making governmental response more 
adequate in terms of coordination, strategic leadership and representation, and public 
participation (i.e. democracy and accountability). The degree to which these metro bodies 
may succeed or not will depend a great deal on the figure of the mayor who will have to 
dominate political life in the capital as well as to administrate or manage air quality jointly 
with other local and central authorities, NGOs, the private sector, and the public. The 
changes in the organisational structures of local government in London and Mexico City are 
encouraging and optimistic for better dealing with air pollution; it is now up to politicians 
and citizens to make institutional and policy outcome work and thus improve air quality in 
both urban centres.
A P P E N D I X  I
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London
Semi-structured interviews
City of Westminster: Trevor Pugh, Client Director Built Environment.
Department of the Environment DoE - Air Quality Division (Industrial Pollution Branch): 
Mike Ekind, British Civil Servant.
Department of the Environment DoE - Strategy and Coordination Unit (Government Office 
for London GOL): Steven Putnam, British Civil Servant.
Greenpeace: Mathew Spencer, Atmospheric Campaigner.
London Boroughs Association LBA: Sandra Bell, Senior Policy Assistant (Environment). 
London Borough of Brent: Yogini Patel, Pollution Inspector.
London Borough of Camden: Quentin Given, Environmental Health Officer.
London Borough of Enfield: Robert Halford, Group Manager, Safety & Pollution Control. 
London Borough of Havering: Peter Hayden, Divisional Environmental Health Officer. 
London Borough of Hounslow: Rob Gibson, Senior Technician.
London Borough of Kingston Upon Thames: R.G. Smart, Environmental Health Officer. 
London First: Kate Hinton, Environmental Projects Assistant.
National Society for Clean Air NSCA: Dr. Tim Brown (over the phone).
South East Institute of Public Health SEIPH: John Rice, Director of Environmental Health.
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Access to interviews for an ESRC funded project “Metropolitan Governance & Community 
Study”:
Chartered Institute of Environmental Health Officers CIEHO - Director of Professional and 
Technical Services: Graham Jukes.
Department of the Environment DoE - Air Quality Management Division: Lynn Edwards, 
British Civil Servant
Second + updating interviews:
London Borough of Brent: Yogini Patel, Pollution Inspector
London Borough of Havering: Peter Hayden, Divisional Environmental Health Officer 
London First, Kate Hinton, Environmental Projects Assistant (over the phone)
Other informal discussions included:
City of Westminster: C. Cawley, Environmental Health Officer 
London Borough of Enfield: Anna Neroj, Technical Officer
University College London UCL: Dr. Neil Rose, Environmental Change, Research Centre, 
Department of Geography.
Visits to air quality monitoring stations:
City of Westminster: real time monitoring site (OPSIS system)
London Borough of Brent: manual & real time monitoring sites
London Borough of Camden: manual & real time (DoE’s EUN Phase 2 at UCL) 
monitoring sites
London Borough of Enfield: manual monitoring site 
London Borough of Havering: manual monitoring site 
London Borough of Hounslow: real time monitoring site
Structured questionnaires
City of London 
City of Westminster
London Borough of Barking & Dagenham
London Borough of Barnet
London Borough of Bexley
London Borough of Brent
London Borough of Bromley
London Borough of Camden
London Borough of Ealing
London Borough of Enfield
London Borough of Greenwich
London Borough of Hackney
London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham
London Borough of Haringey
London Borough of Harrow
London Borough of Havering
London Borough of Hillingdon
London Borough of Hounslow
London Borough of Islington
London Borough of Kensington & Chelsea
London Borough of Kingston upon Thames
London Borough of Lambeth 
London Borough of Lewisham 
London Borough of Newham 
London Borough of Richmond upon Thames 
London Borough of Southwark 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets 
London Borough of Waltham Forest 
London Borough of Wandsworth
N A M E
A U T H O R I T Y / A G E N C Y
POST
« CONFIDENTIAL »
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1.- How important for your authority is the air pollution problem in comparison with other 
kinds of pollution?
very important less don’t know RANK*
important important
Air pollution [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Water [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
pollution
Noise [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
pollution
Contaminated [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
land
Other (please specify)
* Please put in a rank of importance from 1 to 3 (with 1 being most important)
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2.- How seriously is your authority taking the air pollution reduction recommendations 
provided by the following?
The Rio
Declaration
on
Environment
and
Development 
Agenda 21 
EC
(Directives 
and non- 
obligatory 
recommenda­
tions)
OECD
UK (Air 
Quality 
Management 
System)
very seriously
[  ]
1 1
[ 1
[ 1 
[ 1
seriously less seriously
[ 1
1 1
[ 1
1 1 
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1 
[ 1
don’t know
[  ]
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1 
[ 1
RANK
Other (please specify)
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3.- Where do you go for advice and/or information regarding air pollution sources and the 
type and quantity of pollutants they emit?
UN
organisations
EC
Central
government
National
Environment
Technical
Centre
London 
Boroughs 
Association 
LB A,
Association 
of London 
Authorities 
ALA
Other local 
authorities 
(boroughs)
Private sector 
(e.g. London 
First)
Voluntary 
organisations 
(e.g. Friends 
of the Earth, 
Greenpeace)
frequently 
[ 1
[ 1 
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
occasionally 
[ 1
[ 1 
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
never 
1 1
[ 1 
1 1
[ 1
[ 1
1 1
[ 1
[ 1
don’t know 
[ 1
[ 1 
[ 1
1 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
RANK
4.- What current programmes is your authority carrying out regarding the air quality issue 
in London? (Please mention them)
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5.- Which agencies you are currently working with on the air pollution issue? (Please 
mention them)
6.- Which agency do you think is the most appropriate to coordinate efforts between 
London and surrounding counties when dealing with the air quality issue?
more appropriate less don't know RANK
appropriate appropriate
Each of the
33 local units [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]________________
in London
Central
government
through a [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ----
specialised
agency
A local tier of
government [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 1  ___
(such as 
former GLC)
Other
specialised
agency (e.g. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ----
South East 
Institute of 
Public 
Health)
Any additional comments
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1 -  Which of the following factors have limited your authority in your air quality aims?
very important less don't know RANK
important important
Central
government
intervention [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]________________
(i.e. lack of 
local powers)
Lack of a 
local tier of
government [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
for all
London-wide
services
Finance [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Management [ ] [ ] [ 1  [ ] ___
Lack of
technology [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ----
(equipment)
Lack of [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
political will
Inadequate 
policies (e.g.
economic, [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
legal
educational
Any additional comments
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8.- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: Which of the following air pollution consequences in 
London is your authority more concerned about?
very important less don't know RANK
important important
Human health
at the global [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
level
Human health 
at the local 
and national
levels (i.e. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
London and 
other urban 
and rural sites 
within the 
UK)
The
environment
(flora/fauna)
at the global [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
level (e.g. 
acid rain, 
greenhouse 
effect)
The
environment
(flora/fauna)
at the local [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
and national 
levels (i.e.
London &
UK)
Buildings/
(stone and [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
brickwork)
Other (please specify)
231
9 -  Is there any programme/research being carried out by your authority on air pollution 
and its effects on human health?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
9a.- If YES, could you please mention them?
9b.- Are you aware of any evidence to date of an association between exposure to any air 
pollutant and a respiratory disease or other illnesses as a consequence?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
9c.- If YES, please state which.
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10.- AIR POLLUTANTS. Which of the following sources of air pollution does your 
institution consider it necessary to deal with?
Domestic
building
heating
systems
Commercial
building
heating
systems
Plants/fac­
tories 
producing 
heat and/or 
electric power 
for use in 
industry
The 2 power
stations
which
generate
electricity for
London
Transport
Industry
(industrial
processes)
Incineration 
plants (waste)
Road
transport
very necessary
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ 1
[ ] 
[ 1 
[ 1
necessary less necessary
[ 1
[ ]
[ 1
[ 1
[ ] 
[ 1 
[ 1
[ ]
[ ]
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1 
[ ] 
[ ]
don’t know
[  }
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ 1
RANK
Other (please specify)
11.- Which of the following air pollutants is your authority covering as part of its control 
policy measures? (please tick as appropriate)
Ozone [ 1 
Sulphur dioxide [ ] 
Nitrogen Oxides [ ] 
Suspended particulate matter [ 1 
Carbon monoxide [ ] 
Carbon dioxide [ ]
Other (please specify)
Lead [ 
Hydrocarbons [ 
Volatile Organic Compounds [ 
Asbestos [ 
Ammonia [ 
Black smoke [
12.- Which of the above mentioned pollutants does your authority consider it is urgent to 
reduce? (Please mention them)
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13.- MONITORING: Is there any monitoring station within your authority’s jurisdiction?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
13a.- If YES, how many? 13a’.- If NOT, are you considering 
establishing one?
13b.- Which pollutants are being 
monitored?
13b’.- In the case that you start monitoring, 
which pollutant (s) will you cover?
13c.-Who coordinates the results of 
monitoring?
13d.- Which technology is used to 
monitor?
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14.- Which agency do you consider the most appropriate to standardise and coordinate the 
monitoring system?
more appropriate less don't know RANK
appropriate appropriate
Each of the
33 local units [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
in London
Central
government
through a [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
specialised
agency
A local tier of
government [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(such as 
former GLC)
Other
specialised
agency (e.g. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
South East
Institute of
Public
Health)
Other (please specify)
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15.- AIR QUALITY INFORMATION: Which air quality band should be followed for 
London?
more appropriate less don't know RANK
appropriate appropriate
UNECE [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Guidelines
WHO Health-
related [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
guideline
EC Directive [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
limit value
US
Environ­
mental [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Protection
Agency
Standards
DoEAir [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Quality Band
Other (please specify)
16.- Do you think that the current DoE’s air quality criteria in which air pollution 
concentration is banded is the appropriate one?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
16a.- Either YES or NO, could you please briefly explain why?
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17.- How do you consider the current availability of information regarding the air quality 
situation in London?
good regular bad don't know RANK
Media (e.g. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
TV, radio)
Newspapers [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Local
information
(e.g. local [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
magazines,
leaflets)
18.- Which do you think are the appropriate channels to provide information about 
London’s air quality situation?
Media (e.g. 
TV, radio)
Newspapers
Local
information 
(e.g. local 
magazines, 
leaflets)
Signposts on 
main roadside
Tube stations
more effective 
[ ]
[ ] 
[ ]
[ 1 
[ ]
effective less effective don’t know
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1
[ ]
[ 1
[ 1 
[ ]
[ 1
[ 1
[ ] 
[ 1
[ ]
[ ]
[ 1 
[ 1
RANK
TOTAL [ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Other (please specify)
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19.- TRANSPORT: Which of the following agencies do you consider appropriate to 
coordinate road traffic?
more appropriate less don’t know
appropriate appropriate
Each of the
33 local units [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
in London
Central
government
through a [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
specialised
agency
A local tier of
government [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(such as 
former GLC)
Other
specialised
agency (e.g. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
South East
Institute of
Public
Health)
RANK
Any additional comments
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20.- Which of the following modes of transport should be encouraged in order to 
contribute to a better air quality standard?
more important less don't know RANK
important important
More
environmentally-
friendly cars
(e.g. smaller [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
engines;
catalytic
converters)
Buses [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Underground [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Railways [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Cycling [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Walking [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Other (please specify)
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21.- Which of the following modes of transport should be improved to reduce air pollution 
in London?
more
necessary
necessary less necessary don’t know RAN*
Private cars [ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Taxis [ 1 1 1 [ 1 [ 1
Motorcycles [ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Buses [ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Heavy/
medium/light
goods
vehicles
[ 1 [ 1 1 1 [ 1
Underground 1 1 [ 1 [ 1 1 1
Railways 1 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Airplanes [ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Other (please specify)
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22.- Which policy measures do you consider more necessary to reduce air pollution from 
motor vehicles?
Voluntary 
reduction in 
use of 
vehicles
Obligatory 
reduction in 
use of
vehicles (1-2 
days weekly 
depending on 
air pollution 
levels)
Control
emissions
Instalment of
catalytic
converters
Use of
appropriate
petrol
Use of
electrical
vehicles
Faster traffic 
speed
Better
pedestriani-
sation
Better safety 
cycling routes
Road pricing
Other fiscal 
policies (e.g. 
tax on engine 
sizes; 
vehicles 
licensing fee)
very necessary
[ ]
[ 1
[ ]
[ 1
[ 1
[ ]
[ ]
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
necessary less necessary 
[ ] [ 1
[ 1
[ ]
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ ]
[ 1
[ ]
[ 1
[ 1 
[ ]
[ ] 
[ 1 
[ 1
[ 1
don’t know
[ 1
RANK
[ ]
[ 1
[ 1
[ ]
[ 1 
[ ]
[ ] 
[ 1 
[ 1
[ 1
Other (please specify)
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23.- Why do you think people are increasingly tending to make use of private cars?
very important less don't know RANK
important important
Lack of 
public
transport [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
(safe,
expensive,
accessible,
clean)
Less exposure
tobadair [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
quality
Safety [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]________________
reasons
Social status [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Consumism [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
and comfort
Widening
existing roads [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
and building 
new ones
Other (please specify)
24.- Why do you think people tend not to walk/cycle? (please tick as appropriate)
Air pollution exposure [ ]
Safety [ ]
Laziness [ ]
Weather conditions [ ]
Lack of cycling parking lots [ ]
Other (please specify)
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25.- EMERGENCY PLAN: Do you think it is necessary to set up an emergency plan in 
case air pollution levels exceed national (UK) and/or international (EU/WHO) standards?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
25a.- If YES, which of the following programmes do you consider more urgent?
more urgent urgent less urgent don't know RANK
Wintertime [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
alert plan
Summertime [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
alert plan
All-year alert [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
plan
25b.- Who do you think should coordinate the emergency air pollution plan?
more appropriate less don’t know RANK
appropriate appropriate
Each of the
33 local units [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
in London
Central
government
through a [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ----
specialised
agency
A local tier of
government [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
(such as 
former GLC)
Other
specialised
agency (e.g. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ----
South East 
Institute of 
Public 
Health)
Any additional comments
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26.- Which of the following aspects should be revised in order to achieve air quality 
standards in London?
very
important
important less
important
don’t know
Existing 
environ­
mental central 
and local 
policies
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Implementa­
tion and 
enforcement 
of current 
policies
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Economic 
model of 
development
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Legal and
taxation
mechanisms
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Social
attitudes (e.g. 
education, 
awareness, 
public
participation)
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Current 
governmental 
arrangements 
(no local tier 
of
government 
for London)
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
More
devolution of 
power to 
local
authorities
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Local
authorities
finance
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Political will 
from central 
and local 
authorities
[ ] [ 1 [ ] [ 1
RANK
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27.- Any additional comments.
A P P E N D I X  II
Mexico City
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Semi-structured interviews
Departamento del Distrito Federal DDF - Secretarfa del Medio Ambiente: Dr. Eduardo 
Palazuelos Rendon (Head of Secretariat)
Departamento del Distrito Federal DDF - Secretarfa del Medio Ambiente - Direccion 
General de Ecologia: Ing. Rodolfo Lacy Tamayo (Director General)
Departamento del Distrito Federal DDF - Secretarfa del Medio Ambiente - Direccion de 
Polfticas y Normas Ambientales: Lie. Gustavo Arrieta Lerdo de Tejada (Director General)
Departamento del Distrito Federal DDF - Secretarfa del Medio Ambiente - Direccion 
General de Ecologia: Lie. Teresa E. Saavedra Vazquez (Research Assistant)
Departamento del Distrito Federal DDF - Secretarfa del Medio Ambiente - Direccion de la 
Red Automdtica de Monitoreo Atmosferico - Subdireccidn de Desarrollo Tecnologico y 
Garantfa de Calidad: Ing. Francisco J. Rivera Nava (Under Director)
Greenpeace Mexico: Alejandro Calvillo (Atmospheric and Energy Campaigner)
Grupo de los 100: Homero Aridjis (President)
Instituto Mexicano del Petroleo IMP - Division de Protection Ambiental: Ing. Luis Morales 
Hernandez (Head of Division)
Instituto Nacional de Salud Publica INSP: Dr. Carlos Santos Burgoa (Researcher)
Secretarfa del Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca SEMARNAP - INE - 
Direccion General de Gestion e Information Ambiental: Dr. Adrian Femandez-Bremauntz 
(Director General)
Secretarfa del Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca SEMARNAP - PROFEPA: 
Lie. Antonio Azuela de la Cueva (Attorney General)
Secretarfa del Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca SEMARNAP - PROFEPA - 
Subprocuradurfa de Verificacidn Normativa: Ing. David Guidi (Head of Office)
Secretarfa del Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca SEMARNAP - PROFEPA - 
Delegation Estado de Mexico: Lie. Hugo Raul Gonzalez Liquidamio (Head of State of 
Mexico’s Delegation)
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Secretarfa de Salud Ssa - Subsecretarfa de Regulation y Fomento Sanitario - Direccion 
General de Salud Ambiental: Dr. Gustavo Olafz Fernandez (Director General)
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico UNAM - Centro de Ciencias de la Atmdsfera - 
Seccion de Contaminacion Ambiental: Dr. Humberto Bravo Alvarez (Head of Office)
Union de Grupos Ambientalistas: Regina Barba Pirez (President)
Second + updating interviews:
Departamento del Distrito Federal DDF - Secretarfa del Medio Ambiente - Direccion 
General de Proyectos Ambientales: Ing. Sergio Sanchez Martinez (Director General)
Union de Grupos Ambientalistas: Regina Barba Pirez (President)
Other informal talks included:
Corte Intemacional de Arbitraje Ambiental: Lie. Ramon Ojeda Mestre (Secretary General)
Instituto Mexicano del Petroleo IMP: Ing. Victor Zuniga (Research Assistant)
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico UNAM - Centro de Ciencias de la Atmosfera - 
Seccion de Contaminacion Ambiental: Pablo Sanchez (Research Assistant)
Visits to air quality monitoring stations: '
Departamento del Distrito Federal DDF - Delegacion Cuauhtemoc 
Departamento del Distrito Federal DDF - Delegacion Iztacalco
Departamento del Distrito Federal DDF - Delegacion Venustiano Carranza (OPSIS 
SYSTEM)
Instituto Mexicano del Petroleo IMP - Gustavo A. Madero
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico UNAM - Delegacion Coyoacan
Structured questionnaires
Delegacion Alvaro Obregon 
Delegacidn Azcapotzalco 
Delegacion Benito Juarez 
Delegacion Coyoacan 
Delegacion Cuajimalpa 
Delegacion Cuauhtemoc 
Delegacion Gustavo A. Madero 
Delegacion Iztacalco 
Delegacion Iztapalapa 
Delegacion Magdalena Contreras 
Delegacion Miguel Hidalgo 
Delegacion Milpa Alta 
Delegacion Tlahuac 
Delegacion Tlalpan 
Delegacion Venustiano Carranza 
Delegacion Xochimilco
N A M E
A U T H O R I T Y / A G E N C Y
POST
« CONFIDENTIAL »
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1.- How important for your authority is the air pollution problem in comparison with other 
kinds of pollution?
very important less don’t know RANK*
important important
Air pollution [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Water [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
pollution
Noise [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
pollution
Contaminated [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
land
Other (please specify)
*Please put in a rank of importance from 1 to 3 (with 1 being most important)
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2.- How seriously is your authority taking the air pollution reduction recommendations 
provided by the following?
The Rio
Declaration
on
Environment
and
Development 
Agenda 21 
OECD
very seriously
[ 1
[ 1 
[ 1
seriously less seriously
[ 1
[ 1 
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1 
[ 1
don’t know
[ 1
[ 1 
[ 1
RANK
NAFTA 
(North 
American 
Agreement on 
Environ­
mental
Cooperation - 
NAAEC)
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 1 1
Mexico
(Comprehe­
nsive
Programme 
Against Air 
Pollution 
PICCA)
[ 1 1 1 [ 1 [ 1
Other (please specify)
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3.- Where do you go for advice and/or information regarding air pollution sources and the 
type and quantity of pollutants they emit?
UN
organisations
NAFTA 
(Commission 
for Environ­
mental 
Cooperation 
CEC)
Federal
(central)
government
Local
government
(DDF)
Other local 
authorities 
(delegaciones, 
municipal­
ities)
Private sector
Voluntary 
organisations 
(e.g. Grupo 
de los 100, 
Greenpeace)
frequently occasionally 
[ 1 [ 1
1 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
never don ’t know
1 1 1 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1
RANK
4.- What current programmes is your authority carrying out regarding the air quality issue 
in Mexico City? (Please mention them)
5.- Which agencies you are currently working with on the air pollution issue? (Please 
mention them)
6.- Which agency do you think is the most appropriate to coordinate efforts between 
Mexico City and surrounding conurbated municipalities when dealing with the air quality 
issue?
more appropriate 
appropriate
less
appropriate
don’t know RANK
Each of the 
16 local units 
in Mexico 
City
1 1  1 1 [ 1 [ 1 ___
Federal
(central)
government
through a
specialised
agency
[ 1 1 1 [ 1 [ 1 ___
A local tier of 
government 
(such as 
DDF)
1 1  1 1 [ 1 [ 1 ___
Other
specialised
agency (e.g.
Metropolitan
Commission
cmpccavm)
[ 1  1 1 1 1 [ 1 ___
Any additional comments
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1 -  Which of the following factors have limited your authority in your air quality aims?
very important less don’t know RANK
important important
Federal
(central)
government [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]________________
intervention 
(i.e. lack of 
local powers)
DDF highly 
centralised
functions [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
(lack of 
responsi­
bilities at 
delegaciones 
level)
Finance [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Management [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Lack of
technology [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
(equipment)
Lack of [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
political will
Inadequate 
policies (e.g.
economic, [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
legal
educational
Any additional comments
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8.- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: Which of the following air pollution consequences in 
Mexico City is your authority more concerned about?
very
important
important less
important
don’t know RANK
Human health 
at the global 
level
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Human health 
at the local 
and national 
levels (i.e. 
Mexico City 
and other 
urban and 
rural sites 
within 
Mexico)
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
The
environment 
(flora/fauna) 
at the global 
level (e.g. 
acid rain, 
greenhouse 
effect)
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
The
environment 
(flora/fauna) 
at the local 
and national 
levels (i.e. 
Mexico City 
& Mexico)
[ 3 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Buildings 
(stone and 
brickwork)
[ 1 [ 3 [ 1 [ 1
Other (please specify)
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9.- Is there any programme/research being carried out by your authority on air pollution 
and its effects on human health?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
9a.- If YES, could you please mention them?
9b.- Are you aware of any evidence to date of an association between exposure to any air 
pollutant and a respiratory disease or other illnesses as a consequence?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
9c.- If YES, please state which.
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10.- AIR POLLUTANTS. Which of the following sources of air pollution does your 
institution consider it necessary to deal with?
very necessary necessary less necessary don’t know
Energy [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Production,
storage and [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
distribution
of fuels
Industry [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Services [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Domestic [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
activities
Road [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
transport
Environ- [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
mental
degradation
RANK
Other (please specify)
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13.- MONITORING*: Is there any monitoring station within your authority’s jurisdiction? 
YES [ ] NO [ ]
13a.- If YES, how many? 13a’.- If NOT, are you considering
establishing one?
14.- Which agency do you consider the most appropriate to standardise and coordinate the 
monitoring system?
more
appropriate
appropriate less
appropriate
don't know RANK
Each of the 
16 local units 
in Mexico 
City
[ ] [ ] [ 1 [ 1
Federal
(central
government
through a
specialised
agency
[ ] [ ] [ 1 [ ]
A local tier of 
government 
(such as 
DDF)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Other
specialised
agency (e.g.
Metropolitan
Commission
cmpccavm)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Other (please specify)
*NOTE: Questions 11,12 and part of 13 (13b, 13c, 13d) were not included in this 
questionnaire because delegaciones have no responsibilities regarding monitoring systems
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15.- AIR QUALITY INFORMATION: Which air quality band should be followed for 
Mexico City?
more appropriate less don't know RANK
appropriate appropriate
WHO Health-
related [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
guideline
EC Directive [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
limit value
US
Environ­
mental [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Protection
Agency
Standards
Ssa Mexican
Air quality [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
technical 
norms NOM
Other (please specify)
16.- Do you think that the current air quality criteria (IMECA) for Mexico City in which air 
pollution concentration is banded is the appropriate one?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
16a.- Either YES or NO, could you please briefly explain why?
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17.- How do you consider the current availability of information regarding the air quality 
situation in Mexico City?
good regular bad don't know RANK
Media (e.g. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
TV, radio)
Newspapers [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Local
information
(e.g. local [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
magazines,
leaflets)
18.- Which do you think are the appropriate channels to provide information about Mexico 
City's air quality situation?
Media (e.g. 
TV, radio)
Newspapers
Local
information 
(e.g. local 
magazines, 
leaflets)
Signposts on 
main roadside
Tube stations
more effective 
[ ]
[ ] 
[ 1
[ ] 
[ ]
effective less effective 
[ 1[ 1 
[ 1
[ 1
[ 1 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] 
[ ]
don't know 
[ ]
[ 1 
[ 1
[ 1 
[ 1
RANK
Other (please specify)
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19.- TRANSPORT: Which of the following agencies do you consider appropriate to 
coordinate road traffic?
more
appropriate
appropriate less
appropriate
don’t know RANK
Each of the 
16 local units 
in Mexico 
City
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Federal
(central)
government
through a
specialised
agency
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
A local tier of 
government 
(such DDF)
[ 1 [ ] [ ] [ ]
Other
specialised
agency (e.g.
Metropolitan
Commission
cmpccavm)
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Any additional comments
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20.- Which of the following modes of transport should be encouraged in order to 
contribute to a better air quality standard?
more
important
important less
important
don't know RANK
More
environmentally- 
friendly cars 
(e.g. gas 
and/or 
electricity 
use)
1 1 1 1 [ 1 [ 1
Buses [ 1 [ 1 [ 1 1 1
Electrical
buses
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Minibuses
(microbuses)
1 1 [ 1 [ 1 1 1
Light
railways (tren 
ligero)
1 1 1 1 [ 1 [ 1
Underground [ 1 1 1 [ 1 [ 1
Railways 1 1 [ 1 1 1 [ 1
Cycling [ 1 [ 1 1 1 [ 1
Walking [ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
Other (please specify)
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21.- Which of the following modes of transport should be improved to reduce air pollution 
in Mexico City?
more necessary less necessary don’t know RANK
necessary
Private cars [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]____________ ___
Buses [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]________________
Electrical [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
buses
Minibuses [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
(microbuses)
Light [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
railways (tren 
ligero)
Underground [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Railways [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ----
Taxis [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Motorcycles [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Heavy/
medium/light [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
goods
vehicles
Airplanes [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Other (please specify)
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22.- Which policy measures do you consider more necessary to reduce air pollution from 
motor vehicles?
very necessary necessary less necessary don’t know RANK
Voluntary
reduction in [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
use of 
vehicles
Obligatory 
reduction in 
use of
vehicles ('A [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Day Without
Car’
programme - 
HOY NO 
CIRCULA)
Control [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
emissions
Instalment of
catalytic [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
converters
Use of
appropriate [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
petrol
Use of
electrical [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
vehicles
Faster traffic [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
speed
Better
pedestriani- [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
sation
Better safety [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
cycling routes
Fiscal
policies [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(enviro­
nmental 
taxes)
Other (please specify)
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23.- Why do you think people are increasingly tending to make use of private cars?
very important less don't know RANK
important important
Lack of 
public
transport [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]________________
(safe,
expensive,
accessible,
clean)
Less exposure
to bad air [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
quality
Safety [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
reasons
Social status [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
Consumism [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
and comfort
Widening
existing roads [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
and building 
new ones
Other (please specify)
24.- Why do you think people tend not to walk/cycle? (please tick as appropriate)
Air pollution exposure [ ]
Safety [ ]
Laziness [ ]
Weather conditions [ ]
Lack of cycling parking lots [ ]
Other (please specify)
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25.- EMERGENCY PLAN: Do you think it is necessary to continue implementing the 
emergency plan (Plan de Contingencias Ambientales) in case air pollution levels exceed 
national (Mexico City's IMECA) and/or international (EU/WHO) standards?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
25a.- If YES, which of the following programmes do you consider more urgent?
more urgent urgent less urgent don’t know RANK
Wintertime [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
alert plan
Summertime [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
alert plan
All-year alert [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
plan
25b.- Who do you think should coordinate the emergency air pollution plan (Plan de 
Contingencias Ambientales)?
more appropriate less don’t know RANK
appropriate appropriate
Each of the
16 local units [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
in Mexico 
City
Federal
(central)
government [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
through a
specialised
agency
A local tier of
government [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ___
(such as 
DDF)
Other
specialised
agency (e.g. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ----
Metropolitan
Commission
cmpccavm)
Any additional comments
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26.- Which of the following aspects should be revised in order to achieve air quality 
standards in Mexico City?
very
important
important less
important
don’t know
Existing
ecological
policies
[ 1 1 1 1 1 [ 1
Implementa­
tion and 
enforcement 
of current 
policies
1 1 1 1 1 1 [ 1
Economic 
model of 
development
1 1 [ 1 1 1 1 1
Legal and
taxation
mechanisms
1 1 1 1 [ 1 1 1
Social
attitudes (e.g.
education,
awareness)
1 1 1 1 [ 1 [ 1
Current
government
arrangements
(DDF highly
centralised
functions)
[ 1 1 1 [ 1 [ 1
More
devolution of 
power to 
local
authorities 
(DDF & 
delegaciones)
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 1 1
Local 
authorities 
finance 
(DDF & 
delegaciones)
[ 1 [ 1 1 1 [ 1
Political will 
from federal 
and local 
authorities
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ 1
RANK
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27.- Any additional comments.
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